

اندیشه‌های سیاسی جین پینگ

نوشته

استیو تسانگ و الیویا چیوانگ

ترجمه

رحمت حاجی‌مینه

قاسم احمدی

محمد رضا حاتموند



انجمن ایرانی
مطالعات غرب آسیا

با همکاری



انتشارات
جهان سیاست

سرشناسه: تسانگ، استیو، ۱۹۵۹م؛ چیانگ، الیویا، ۱۹۷۹م.
عنوان و نام پدیدآور: اندیشه سیاسی شی جین پینگ / نویسندگان: استیو تسانگ و الیویا چیانگ /
ترجمه: رحمت حاجی‌مینه، قاسم احمدی و محمدرضا حاتموند
مشخصات نشر: کرج: جهان سیاست؛ تهران: انجمن ایرانی مطالعات غرب آسیا؛ ۱۴۰۴.
مشخصات ظاهری: ۳۵۴ ص.: جدول، نمودار؛ ۲۱/۵×۱۴/۵ س.م.
شابک: 978-622-4959-28-7

Title: The Political Thought of Xi Jinping/ Authors: Steve Yui-Sang Tsang & Olivia Cheung
موضوع: شی، جین‌پینگ، ۱۹۵۳-م. -- دیدگاه‌های سیاسی و اجتماعی -- سیاست و حکومت
موضوع: رشد اقتصادی -- چین -- تاریخ -- قرن ۲۱م. -- روابط خارجی -- سیاست اجتماعی
رده‌بندی کنگره: HC۴۲۷/۹۵
رده‌بندی دیویدی: ۳۳۸/۹۵۱۰۰۹۰۵
شماره کتابشناسی ملی: ۱۰۳۵۵۰۸۹
اطلاعات رکورد کتابشناسی: فیپا



انتشارات جهان سیاست (با همکاری انجمن ایرانی مطالعات غرب آسیا)



QR خرید پستی این کتاب

نام کتاب: اندیشه سیاسی شی جین پینگ
نویسندگان: استیو تسانگ و الیویا چیانگ
ترجمه: رحمت حاجی‌مینه، قاسم احمدی و محمدرضا حاتموند
ویراستار: مژده حسین‌خانی
صفحه‌آرایی و طراحی جلد: جهان سیاست
نوبت چاپ: اول، بهار ۱۴۰۵
ناشر: انتشارات جهان سیاست (با همکاری انجمن ایرانی مطالعات غرب آسیا)
شمارگان: ۵۰۰

چاپ و صحافی: چاپ و وظیفه

شابک: 978-622-4959-28-7

نشانی دفتر پخش: تهران، شاهین، خیابان گل لاله، بلوار سرلشکر مخبری (۳۵ متری گلستان)، پلاک ۱، ۱۹۸،
طبقه منفی ۱، واحد ۱۱، کد پستی: ۱۴۷۵۸۶۵۸۰۹، تلفن: ۰۲۱-۶۵۱۱۹۷۳۲
نشانی دفتر نشر: کرج، جهان‌شهر، بلوار مولانا، خیابان ابوعلی سینا، خیابان مهرگان شرقی، شماره ۱۷، ساختمان
میرعماد، طبقه ۴، واحد ۷، کدپستی: ۳۱۴۳۶۶۷۱۹۱، تلفن: ۰۲۶-۳۶۵۰۶۷۸۲

تارنمای انتشارات برای خرید پستی کتاب: www.pwpub.ir

کلیه حقوق برای انتشارات جهان سیاست محفوظ است.

فهرست مطالب

عنوان	صفحه
اختصارات	۱۰
تقدیر و تشکر	۱۱
سخن مترجمان	۱۳
مقدمه	۱۵
وضعیت پژوهش‌ها درباره رهبری شی	۲۰
ساختار کتاب	۲۷
فصل اول- اندیشه سیاسی شی جین پینگ	۳۱
اندیشه شی چیست؟	۳۳
معیاری در برابر اندیشه مائو تسه تونگ	۳۴
شکل‌گیری «مارکسیسم-لنینیسم- در اندیشه شی جین پینگ»	۳۶
ساخت سوسیالیسم چین محور	۳۶
منابع الهام‌بخش	۳۸
ظهور و تکامل اندیشه شی	۴۱
مرحله اول: از «رؤیای چین» تا حکومت چین، ۱۴-۲۰۱۲	۴۱
مرحله دوم: ظهور یک «نظام کامل نظری» ۱۷-۲۰۱۴	۴۵
مرحله سوم: اندیشه شی جین پینگ در مورد سوسیالیسم با ویژگی‌های چینی در عصر جدید، ۲۰۲۰-۲۰۱۷	۴۸
مرحله چهارم: «ده مقوله روشنی‌بخش»، سال ۲۰۲۱	۵۳
روش‌شناسی	۵۴
مبانی رفتاری: لنینیسم مشورتی با محوریت چین	۵۹
فصل دوم- احیای حزب کمونیست چین: اصلاحات درون‌حزبی و مبارزه با فساد	۶۷
مجازات عهدشکنان: ریشه‌کن کردن جناح‌های سیاسی	۷۰
تلقین ایدئولوژیک: همگام با اندیشه شی	۸۲

۸۴	«نهادسازی»: تقویت کمیسیون انضباطی حزب و مقررات درون‌حزبی
۸۵	تقویت کمیته مرکزی بازرسی انضباطی حزب
۸۸	تقویت مجدد قواعد و مقررات درون‌حزبی
۹۰	نتیجه‌گیری
۹۳	فصل سوم- رهبری تمام امور توسط حزب
۹۶	نهادینه‌سازی در برابر ضدنهادینه‌سازی در سیاست چین
۹۹	معکوس‌سازی سستی سازمانی در ساختار حزب
۱۰۳	گروه‌های راهبری مرکزی در سطح عالی
۱۰۵	ادغام بخش‌های حزبی با حوزه‌های مسئولیتی همپوشان
۱۰۷	ادغام نهادهای دولتی در ساختار حزبی
۱۱۰	تقویت ساختار حزبی در نهادهای غیرحزبی
۱۱۳	مقابله با «جریان‌های انحرافی ایدئولوژیک»
۱۱۹	بومی‌سازی مارکسیسم-لنینیسم با محوریت چین
۱۲۲	نتیجه‌گیری
	فصل چهارم- ایجاد یک جامعه با رفاه مناسب به‌صورت همه‌جانبه: «مبارزه با فقر و ارتقاء
۱۲۵	پیوندهای اجتماعی نانوشته»
۱۲۷	جامعه با رفاه متوسط چیست؟
۱۳۰	قرارداد اجتماعی جدید چین تحت اندیشه شی
۱۳۱	افزایش اثربخشی حزب در برآوردن مطالبات عمومی
۱۳۲	«دفاع قوی از امنیت حکومت»
۱۳۴	تقویت مجدد سیاست توده
۱۳۶	کمپین ضد فقر «شی»
۱۳۷	اهداف، محدوده و جدول زمانی
۱۳۹	اعزام گروه‌های بلندپایه به روستاها
۱۴۱	جابجایی و استخدام
۱۴۲	به‌روزرسانی سیستم پرونده‌های مائوئیستی

۱۴۵		بسیج گسترده مشارکت عمومی
۱۴۷		«ارتقاء سطح زندگی» او یغورها
۱۴۹		پیش به سوی جلو
۱۵۲		نتیجه گیری
۱۵۵		فصل پنجم - توسعه اقتصاد بازار سوسیالیستی: سه هدف اقتصادی شی جین پینگ
۱۵۸		هدف اصلی: قدرت اقتصادی
۱۵۹		رسیدن به غرب و از آن پیشی گرفتن
۱۶۰		تمرکز بر «دامنه های کلیدی» و «تکنولوژی های گلوگاهی»
۱۶۲		صندوق های حمایتی دولت
۱۶۴		زیرساخت های تحقیقاتی
۱۶۵		سیستم پاداش
۱۶۶		هدف دوم: نظم اقتصادی و امنیت
۱۶۶		تلاش برای کاهش بدهی
۱۶۷		شرکت های دولتی
۱۶۸		مؤسسات مالی و دولت های محلی
۱۷۰		توسعه دهندگان دارایی ها
۱۷۱		اعمال مقررات نظارتی بر کنسرسیوم های فناوری خصوصی داخلی
۱۷۳		استراتژی چرخش دوگانه
۱۷۶		هدف سوم: رفاه همگانی
۱۸۰		توزیع اول
۱۸۱		توزیع دوم
۱۸۲		توزیع سوم
۱۸۳		محدودیت های هدایت دولت و سوسیالیسم در پیگیری شی جین پینگ
۱۸۳		برای رفاه مشترک
۱۸۶		نتیجه گیری
۱۸۹		فصل ششم - ایجاد یک ملت چینی وطن پرست: ناسیونالیسم حزب محور

به سوی رؤیای چین: «عشق به میهن» و پاسخ به ندای ملی	۱۹۲
معلمان مدارس، اعضای هیئت علمی دانشگاه‌ها و مشاوران تحصیلی	۱۹۳
ساختن «ملتی از قهرمانان»	۱۹۵
تنها میهن پرستان می توانند بر هنگ کنگ حکومت کنند	۱۹۸
«آموزش میهن پرستی باید از کودکی آغاز شود»	۲۰۰
«تاریخ را بشناس و حزب را دوست بدار»	۲۰۳
«نشان دادن عشق به سوسیالیسم» از طریق عمل به «ارزش‌های بنیادین سوسیالیستی»	۲۰۸
به اندیشه شی باور داشته باش	۲۱۰
تجسم «ارزش‌های اصلی سوسیالیستی»	۲۱۱
نتیجه‌گیری	۲۱۴
فصل هفتم - ساختن «سرنوشت مشترک برای بشریت»	۲۱۷
روایت «ایجاد یک سرنوشت مشترک برای بشریت»	۲۱۹
«سرنوشت مشترک برای بشریت» روایتی چین محور	۲۲۲
نظام تیان‌شیا در شرق آسیا پیشامدرن: تصور شی در برابر واقعیت	۲۲۳
چشم‌انداز تیان‌شیایی شی جین‌پینگ برای یک نظم جهانی چین محور	۲۲۶
امنیت رژیم و رهبری را در اولویت قرار دهید	۲۲۶
تشدید ملی‌گرایی حزب محور	۲۲۹
«پیگیری چین محوری تنگ‌نظرانه»	۲۳۳
ادعای نقش رهبری جهانی	۲۳۷
توجیه رویکرد چین	۲۴۲
نتیجه‌گیری	۲۴۳
نتیجه‌گیری	۲۴۷
یک پروژه در دست اجرا	۲۴۷
اندیشه شی چه هست و چه نیست	۲۴۸
ارتقاء نظام سیاسی به لنینیسم مشورتی با محوریت چین	۲۵۰
چشم‌انداز اندیشه شی	۲۵۳

۲۵۵	 بازگرداندن دوباره عظمت به چین
۲۵۵	 پیامدهای اندیشه شی برای چین و جهان
۲۵۶	 پیامدها برای چین
۲۶۱	 پیامدها برای جهان
۲۶۴	 پایداری اندیشه شی
۲۶۷	 منابع و یادداشتهای
۳۴۱	 نمایه



اختصارات

اختصار	نام فارسی	لاتین
ASEAN	آسیا شرق جنوب کشورهای انجمن	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRICS	یک سازمان بین دولتی با عضویت برزیل، روسیه، هند، چین، آفریقای جنوبی، مصر، اتیوپی، امارات متحده عربی، ایران، اندونزی، بولیوی، عربستان سعودی و نیجریه	BRICS
CCP	چین کمونیست حزب	Chinese Communist Party
EU	اروپا اتحادیه	European Union
GDP	داخلی ناخالص تولید	Gross Domestic Product
MIC 2025	2025 چین ساخت	Made in China 2025
PLA	خلق بخش آزادی ارتش	People's Liberation Army
PRC	چین خلق جمهوری	People's Republic of China
SOE	دولتی شرکت	State-Owned Enterprise
UN	متحد ملل سازمان	United Nations



تقدیر و تشکر

اگرچه تحقیقات فشرده برای این پروژه در دو سال گذشته انجام شده، اما بیشتر مفهوم سازی های اساسی برای آن و شناخت اهمیت آن در بازه زمانی طولانی تری محقق شده است. از سال ۲۰۱۷ که شی جین پینگ اولین اندیشه خود را عملی ساخت، دانشجویان، همکاران دانشگاهی و مخاطبین در دولت ها، مجموعه شرکت ها، رسانه ها، اتاق های فکر و جامعه مدنی سؤالات و پژوهش هایی را در مورد چین مطرح کرده اند. این علاقه آن ها زیربنای ارزش درک اندیشه شی جین پینگ است.

بسیاری از آن ها بیش از خود را بر اساس مطالعه یا تجربه کار در چین یا گفتگو با همکاران چینی با ما به اشتراک گذاشتند. بحث با آن ها به شکل گیری اندیشه بنیانی این پروژه کمک کرد. همان طور که ما درگیر تحقیق و نگارش فشرده بودیم، این امتیاز را داشتیم که برخی از یافته های اولیه خود را با بسیاری از آن ها مورد مبادله، بحث و بررسی قرار دهیم. انتقادات و بازخوردهای آن ها این پروژه را بسیار غنی کرده است. ما به همه کسانی که با ما مشارکت کردند، مدیون هستیم. ما از مؤسسه اس او ای اس چین به جهت محیط مهیجی که در اختیار ما قرار دادند و از فارغ التحصیلان این مؤسسه و نیز برای حمایت های مالی از این پروژه تحقیقاتی، تشکر می کنیم. بدون مساعدت فارغ التحصیلانی که از کمک هزینه تحصیلی اولیه یا چونگ حمایت کردند، این تحقیق نمی توانست در بازه زمانی فشرده ای که ما تعیین کرده ایم تکمیل شود. حمایت اداری کارآمدی که لیزا ویتینگتون و آکی البرزی در مؤسسه انجام داده اند نیز ما را قادر ساخت تا بر روی این پروژه تمرکز کنیم. در انجام تحقیقات فشرده برای این پروژه، ما کمک های تحقیقاتی بسیار خوبی دریافت کرده ایم. در این مورد از آرتی لام، جاستین لیو، نیکولا هاروی وود و ژیفان ژو بسیار سپاسگزاریم. همچنین بی نهایت از متیو چیت وود برای به اشتراک گذاشتن تجارب د سته اول خود درباره کمپین ضد فقر در چین و از جورج مگنوس برای اندیشه ها و نظراتش در مورد یکی از فصل ها سپاسگزاریم.



سخن مترجمان

کتابی که پیش رو دارید، تلاشی کم‌نظیر برای تحلیل منظومه فکری و سیاسی یکی از تأثیرگذارترین رهبران معاصر چین، شی جین‌پینگ، است. نویسندگان با تکیه بر سال‌ها پژوهش میدانی، بررسی منابع چینی و رصد تحولات سیاسی داخلی و خارجی چین، تصویری ژرف از ساختار ذهنی و ایدئولوژیک رهبر کنونی حزب کمونیست چین ارائه می‌دهند؛ تصویری که فهم آن برای پژوهشگران سیاست بین‌الملل، مطالعات چین و حتی علاقه‌مندان به تحولات ژئوپلیتیکی قرن بیست‌ویک ضرورتی انکارناپذیر یافته است.

ترجمه‌ی این اثر، افزون بر جنبه‌ی زبانی، نیازمند فهم عمیق از زمینه‌های سیاسی، تاریخی و مفهومی چین معاصر بود. مفاهیمی همچون «لنینیسم مشورتی»، «اندیشه شی جین‌پینگ» و اصطلاحات خاص در روایت حزب کمونیست چین، تنها در متن نمی‌گنجند؛ بلکه در دل ساختار قدرت، تاریخ انقلاب و سنت فکری چینی معنا می‌یابند. به همین دلیل، در فرایند ترجمه تلاش کردیم در کنار امانت‌داری زبانی، به انتقال بافت مفهومی نیز پایبند باشیم.

نکته مهم و تأمل‌برانگیز در این کتاب، رویکرد نویسندگان به جایگاه شی جین‌پینگ در تاریخ فکری حزب کمونیست چین است؛ آنان با دقتی کم‌نظیر، نشان می‌دهند که چگونه «اندیشه شی» نه صرفاً یک روایت رسمی، بلکه تلاشی ساختاریافته برای بازسازی ایدئولوژی نظام و تقویت اقتدار شخصی اوست.

درعین حال، جا دارد اشاره‌ای شود به اهمیت این نکته که نویسندگان این کتاب، با وجود آنکه در غرب آموزش دیده‌اند و در نهادهای دانشگاهی انگلستان فعالیت دارند، هر دو چینی تبار هستند. این امر، بی‌تردید بر عمق فهم آنان از بسترهای فکری، فرهنگی و زبانی چین افزوده است. در فضایی که بسیاری از تحلیل‌ها از بیرون و گاه با رویکردی ساده‌انگارانه

به تحولات چین می‌نگرند، حضور نویسندگانی با پیوند مستقیم فرهنگی و زبانی با سرزمین موضوع پژوهش بر دقت و غنای تحلیلی اثر افزوده است. شناخت زیسته‌ی آنان از زبان و فرهنگ چینی و توانایی‌شان در خوانش لایه‌های پنهان‌تر گفتمان حاکم، این کتاب را از بسیاری دیگر متمایز کرده است.

در پایان، امیدواریم این ترجمه بتواند دریچه‌ای تازه برای شناخت سیاست امروز چین و به‌ویژه سازوکارهای فکری رهبر قدرتمند آن بگشاید و بستری برای گفت‌وگو، تحقیق و تحلیل بیشتر در فضای فارسی‌زبان فراهم آورد. در نهایت، جای دارد از زحمات مسئولان انتشارات جهان سیاست که امور مربوط به چاپ این کتاب را کشیدند، کمال مراتب قدردانی خود را اعلام داریم.

با احترام

رحمت حاجی مینه، قاسم احمدی و محمدرضا حاتموند

بهار ۱۴۰۵



منابع و یادداشت‌ها

از صفحه ۲۶۷ تا صفحه ۳۴۰ این، کتاب اختصاص به منابع و یادداشت‌های آن دارد. به جهت حفظ محیط زیست و کاهش هزینه کتاب برای خوانندگان گرامی، این بخش به صورت فایل روی سایت انتشارات جهان سیاست قرار داده شده است. برای دسترسی به این بخش وارد سایت این انتشارات شده و کتاب اندیشه سیاسی شی جین پینگ را جستجو کنید و فایل صفحات نمونه کتاب را مشاهده فرمایید و یا QR زیر را اسکن فرمایید.



<https://pwpub.ir/1042>

1. The fullest footage, recorded by CNA of Singapore, is available at <https://www.Youtube.com/watch?v=yHAHOmgG9Y> (accessed April 27, 2023).
2. General Secretary Hu Yaobang was sacked and General Secretary Zhao Ziyang was removed from office and put under house arrest in the reform era, but Deng Xiaoping was the real leader at the time. Neither Hu nor Zhao was the top leader despite formally holding the top office.
3. They are: upholding the Communist path; upholding the people's democratic dictatorship; upholding the leadership of the CCP; and upholding Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought.
4. Willy Lam, *Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, Reform, or Retrogression?* (Oxford: Routledge, 2015), xiv.
5. *Ibid.*, xi-xvi, 263-65.
6. See also, for example, Minxin Pei, *"The Twilight of Communist Party Rule in China;" American*

- Interest*, November 12, 2015, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/the-twilight-of-communist-party-rule-in-china/> (accessed January 26, 2021).
7. David Shambaugh, *China's Future* (Cambridge: Polity, 2016), 133.
8. *Ibid.*, 136.
9. Steve Tsang and Honghua Men (eds.), *China in the Xi Jinping Era* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 328-41.
10. Robert S. Ross and Jo Inge Bekkevold (eds.), *China in the Era of Xi Jinping: Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 277.
11. *Ibid.*, 278.
12. Cheng Li, *Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 356-57.
13. Carl Minzner, *End of an Era: How China's Authoritarian Revival Is Undermining Its Rise* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 32.
14. *Ibid.*, 34.
15. For the third historical resolution, see "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu dang de bainian fendou zhongda chengjiu he lishi jingyan de jueyi" (Resolution of the CCP Central on the major achievements and historical experience of the Party over the past century), *Renmin ribao*, November 17, 2021, 1.
16. Joseph Fewsmith, *Rethinking Chinese Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 157.
17. Kerry Brown, *Xi: A Study in Power* (London: Icon, 2022), 5, 7, 13.
18. Alfred Chan, *Xi Jinping: Political Career, Governance, and Leadership, 1953-2018* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), 275.
19. Elizabeth Economy, *The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 16.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Holy Chik, "Coronavirus: China's Top Expert Writes of Eventual Return to Normal, but Article Deleted at Home: • South China Morning Post, April 19, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3174751/coronavirus-chinas-top-expert-writes-eventual-return-normal?tpcc=enlz-china&UUID=3dfa5816889b9f1e4f80962d8d567c6b&next_article_id=3174696&article_id_list=3174736,3174691,3174408,3174768,3174781,3174757&tc=5&CMCampaignID=bb265e69d46e44413eb697c078a1633f (accessed May 16, 2022).

22. Richard McGregor, Xi Jinping: *The Backlash* (Melbourne: Penguin Books, 2019); Willy Lam, *The Fight for China's Future: Civil Society vs. the Chinese Communist Party* (Oxford: Routledge, 2020), 199.
23. Frans; ois Bougon, *Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping* (London: Hurst, 2018), 10.
24. For the former, see, for example, Kerry Brown, *China's Dream: The Culture of Chinese Communism and the Secret Sources of its Power* (Cambridge: Polity, 2018); David Kerr, *China's Many Dreams: Comparative Perspectives on China's Search for National Rejuvenation* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); for the latter, see, for example, Avery Goldstein, "China's Grand Strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance: • *International Security* 45, no. 1 (2020): 164-201.

فصل اول

1. For example, "'Xi Thought' Is Creeping into Everything from Chinese Sci-fi to Company Filings: • *Bloomberg News*, October 19, 2020, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-19/rise-of-xi-thought-shows-long-future-for-one-man-rulein-china> (accessed January 21, 2021).
2. Jinping Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan* [Xi Jinping: *The Governance of China*, vol. 3] (Beijing: Waiwen chubanshe, 2020), 429.
3. Stuart Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Praeger, 1963), 3.
4. See, for example, Willy Lam, "Xi Jinping's Ideology and Statecraft;" *Chinese Law and Government* 48, no. 6 (2016): 409-17; Chris Buckley, "Xi Jinping Thought Explained: A New Ideology for a New Era: • *New York Times*, February 26, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-thought-explained-anew-ideology-for-a-new-era.html> (accessed May 20, 2020).
5. See Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction* (London: Verso, 1991); Heike Holbig, "Ideology after the End of Ideology: China and the Quest for Autocratic Legitimation: *Democratization* 20, no. 1 (2013): 61-81.
6. See Michael A. Peters, "The Chinese Dream: Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era: • *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 49, no. 14:1299-304; Yongnian Zheng (i~i<i: f"), "Xi Jinping de zhengzhi luxian tu" [Xi Jinping's political road map], *Ifeng.com*, October 16, 2014, http://news.ifeng.com/a/20141016/422187_42_0.shtml?_share=sina&tp=1413475200000 (accessed May 22, 2020).
7. "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu dang de bainian fendou zhongda chengjiu he lishi jingyan de jueyi: • November 17, 2021.

8. We will detail how Xi Thought does so in the subsequent chapters. In the case of Mao Thought, see Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*; Stuart Schram, *The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
9. CCP Central Party School Editorial Office, *Xi Jinping de qi nian zhiqing suiyue [Xi Jinping's Seven Years as an Educated Youth]* (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2017), 116-18, 384-402, 399.
10. See Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, 57-61, 188-92; Schram, *The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung*, 33-42.
11. See Chun Lin, *The Transformation of Chinese Socialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).
12. Xi, *Xifinpingtan zhiguo lizhengdi sanjuan*, 4, 13, 17, 18, 21, 32-33. Emphasis added.
13. Jinping Xi, "Jianchi lishi weiwu zhuyi, buduan kaipi dangdai Zhongguo makesi zhuyi fazhan xin jingjie" [*Persist in historical materialism; continuously open new frontiers for the development of contemporary Chinese Marxism*], *Qiushi*, January 15, 2020, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-01/15/c_1125459115.htm (accessed January 13, 2021).
14. Jinping Xi, "Zai jinian Liu Shaoqi tongzhi danchen 120 zhounian zuotan hui shang de jianghua" [*Speech at the symposium commemorating the 120th birthday of comrade Liu Shaoqi*], *Renmin ribao*, November 24, 2018, 2.
15. Jinping Xi, "Zai jinian Mao Zedong tongzhi danchen 120 zhounian zuotan hui shang de jianghua" [*Speech at the symposium commemorating the 120th birthday of comrade Mao Zedong*], *Renmin ribao*, December 27, 2013, 2.
16. The mass line has been discussed earlier in this chapter under the section on consultative Leninism.
17. Confucianism is partly based on the ideas of Confucius and partly on other schools of thoughts including Legalism. If reduced to its bare minimum, the teachings of Confucius were about doing the right thing in the judgment of history. Emperors and their agents since the second (or the Han) empire put forth a body of ideas which they called "Confucianism" to serve as a universal code of conduct for officials and common people, as they realized that the first (Qin) empire's reliance on the use of force and Legalism alone could not sustained the empire. Confucianism was introduced as a kind of state ideology to make the authority of "the son of Heaven" unchallengeable. Since the Han empire, what is called "Confucianism" generally includes a large dose of Legalism without this being formally acknowledged.
18. For Xi's biography and rise to power, see Chan, *Xi Jinping*.

19. This is, in Chinese, "Xi Jinping zong shuji yi xilie zhongyao jianghua:" See "Liu Yunshan, Zhang Gaoli zai xin jin zhongyang weiyuanhui de weiyuan, houbu weiyuan xuexi guanche dang de shiba da jingshen yantao ban zuo fudao baogad" [Liu Yunshan and Zhang Gaoli delivered reports at the seminar for studying and implementing the spirit of the 18th Party Congress for new and alternate members of the Central Committee], *Renmin ribao*, January 7, 2013, 1.
20. For Zhao, see "Zhonggong zhongyang, quanguo renda changwei hui, guowuyuan lingdao tongzhi fenbie canjia shi'er jie quanguo renda yici huiyi daibiao tuan fenzu shenyi he taolun" [Leading cadres of the CCP Central, National People's Congress, and State Council participated, respectively, at the breakout groups for the first session of the 12th National People's Congress], *Xinhua*, March 6, 2013, http://www.xinhuanet.com//2013lh/2013-03/06/c_124420017_4.htm (accessed May 6, 2022). For Li, see "Li Yuanchao, Li Zhanshu fenbie canjia jiangsu, guizhou daibiao tuan shenyi" [Li Yuanchao and Li Zhanshu participated respectively at the panel discussion with the Jiangsu and Guizhou delegations], *Renmin ribao*, March 8, 2013, 4.
21. See "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zai quan dang shenru kaizhan dang de qunzhong luxian jiaoyu shijian huodong de yijian" [The CCP Central's advice for deeply implementing the education and practice of the party's mass line campaign in the whole party], *Xinhua*, May 9, 2013, <http://qzlx.people.com.cn/n/2013/0930/c365007-23090188.html> (accessed January 22, 2021).
22. "General Secretary Xi Jinping's series of important remarks" is, in Chinese, "Xi Jinping zong shuji xilie zhongyao jianghua:" See "Sheng bu ji ganbu xuexi Guanche Xi Jinping zong shuji xilie jianghua jingshen yantao ban zaijing juban" [Seminars for provincial cadres to study and implement the spirit of general secretary Xi Jinping's series of important remarks held in Beijing], *Gov.cn*, November 4, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-11/04/content_2521397.htm (accessed May 6, 2022).
23. "Shenru xuexi guanche Xi Jinping zong shuji xilie zhongyao jianghua jingshen" [Study and implement the spirit of general secretary Xi Jinping's series of important remarks deeply], *Renmin ribao*, July 17, 2014, 12.
24. "Three keeping-in-lines" is, in Chinese, "sange kanqi:" See "Shenru xuexi guanche Xi Jinping zong shuji xilie zhongyao jianghua jingshen" [Study and implement the spirit of general secretary Xi Jinping's series of important remarks deeply], *Renmin ribao*, December 9, 2013, 15.
25. "Becoming exemplary models in three respects" is, in Chinese, "sange biao shuai:"
26. "'Xi Jinping zong shuji xilie zhongyao jianghua duben' chubao faxing" [Publication of A Reader of General Secretary Xi's Series of Important Remarks], *Xinhua*, June 23, 2014,

- www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-06/23/c_1120674437.htm (accessed January 21, 2021).
27. "Gongtong fanyi chuban Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan" [Jointly translate and publish the third volume of Xi Jinping: The Governance of China], Renmin wang, March 3, 2021, <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1693158948196368365&wfr=spider&for=pc> (accessed May 12, 2022).
- By comparison, Quotations from Chairman Mao, aka the "Little Red Book;" was distributed nationwide by 1966. Over 800,000 copies of the book, in Chinese or in one of the 14 non-Chinese translations, were sent to 117 countries in eight months from October 1966 to May 1967. See Lanjun Xu, "Translation and Internationalism;" in *Maos Little Red Book: A Global History*, ed. Alexander C. Cook (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 76-95, 85. The all-out promotion of Xi Thought is unmistakably modelled after that of Mao Thought.
28. See "chuban shuoming" [publisher's note] in Jinping Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng [Xi Jinping: the governance of China]. (Beijing: Waiwen chubanshe, 2014).
29. "Zhongguo gongchandang di shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di si ci quanti huiyi gongbao" [Communique of the fourth plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee], Xinhua, October 23, 2014, https://www.ccps.gov.cn/xytt/201812/t20181212_123251.shtml (accessed May 10, 2020).
30. The "three-comprehensives" is "sange quanmian" in Chinese. Xi's remarks in Fujian in November 2014, available at: <http://jhsjk.people.cn/article/26724805> (accessed January 14, 2021).
31. Xi's remarks in Jiangsu in December 2014, available at: <http://jhsjk.people.cn/article/26724805> (accessed January 14, 2021).
32. Jinping Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan [Xi Jinping: the governance of China, vol. 2] (Beijing: Waiwen chubanshe, 2017), 27.
33. The "four-comprehensives" are "sige quanmian" in Chinese.
34. "Zhongguo gongchandang di shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di wu ci quanti huiyi gongbao" [Communique of the fifth plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee], Xinhua, October 29, 2015, https://www.ccps.gov.cn/zt/xxddsbbjwzqh/zyjs/201812/t20181211_118164.shtml (accessed May 10, 2020).
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid. The "five major new development concepts" are, in Chinese, "wuda fazhan linian."
37. "Xi Jinping dui tuijin 'liang xue yi zuo' xuexi jiaoyu changtai hua zhidu hua zuochu chong yao zhishi" [Xi Jinping issued important instructions on promoting the normalization and

institutionalization of the "two actions and one behavior" educational program], *Xinhua*, April 16, 2017, <http://news.12371.cn/2017/04/16/ARTI1492341510140877.shtml> (accessed May 22, 2020).

38. Shaoqi Liu, "Lun gongchandang yuan de xiuyang" [On how to be a good communist], *Renmin ribao*, August 1, 1962, 1. For English translation, see *Chinese Law and Government* 1, no. 1 (1968): 61-67.

39. The "four consciousnesses" is, in Chinese, "sige yishi." See "Zhongguo gongchandang di shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di liu ci quanti huiyi gongbao" [Communique of the sixth plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee], *Xinhua*, October 27, 2016, <http://news.12371.cn/2016/10/27/ARTI1477566918346559.shtml> (accessed July 20, 2020).

40. See, for example, "Duanzao juegui zhongcheng de zhengzhi ping" [Cultivate the political character of absolute loyalty], *Jiefangjun bao*, July 23, 2014, <http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0723/c40531-25329447.html> (accessed June 15, 2020).

41. Zhanshu Li, "Xi Jinping xilie jianghua yijing chubu xingchengle wanzheng de lilun tixi" [Xi Jinping's series of remarks have already preliminarily become a complete theoretical system], *Thepaper.cn*, April 30, 2017, https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1674663 (accessed May 20, 2020).

42. For the year-long program, the intakes are normally of vice-minister rank. There is also a different class for ministerial rank intakes. See David Shambaugh, "Becoming a ganbu: China's Cadre Training School System," *Journal of Contemporary China* (2022), FirstView.

43. Yunshan Liu, "Shenru xuexi zhangwo Xi Jinping zong shuji xilie zhongyao jianghua guanchuan de makesi zhuyi lichang guandian fangfa" [Learn and grasp deeply the Marxist standpoint, perspective, and method in general secretary Xi Jinping's series of important remarks], *Xuexi shibao*, May 31, 2017, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/nl/2017/0531/c64094-29308033.html> (accessed May 22, 2020).

44. Mingfu Liu (xrJ ~JHI) and Zhongyuan Wang (.: £,~), *Xi Jinping sixiang* [Xi Jinping Thought] (London: New Classic Press, 2017). For the press report, see "Xi Jinping sixiang zhong yingwen ban zai yingguo chubao faxing" [The Chinese and English versions of Xi Jinping Thought is published in the UK], *Sina.com.hk*, March 28, 2017, <https://sina.com.hk/news/article/20170328/0/1/2/%E7%BF%92%E8%BF%91%E5%B9%B3%E6%80%9D%E6%83%B3%E4%B8%AD%E8%8B%BI%E6%96%87%E7%89%88%E5%9C%A8%E8%8B%BI%E5%9C%8B%E5%87%BA>

%E7%89%88%E7%99%BC%E8%A1%8C-7149055.html (accessed May 22, 2020).

45. "Zai dang de chuangxin lilun weida qizhi xia kuobu qianjin" [Stride forward under the great banner of the party's theoretical innovations], *Dangjian yanjiu* editorial office 7 (2017): 19-23.

46. Yi Wang, "Zai Xi Jinping zong shuji waijiao sixiang zhiyin xia kaita qianjin" [Open new grounds and march forward under the guidance of general secretary Xi Jinping's diplomatic thought], *Renmin wang*, September 1, 2017, <http://theory.people.com.cn/nl/2017/0901/c40531-29508376.html> (accessed May 22, 2020).

47. The "eight making-dears" are, in Chinese, "bage mingque."

48. The "four-comprehensives" are "complete the process of building a moderately well-off society comprehensively;" "deepen reform comprehensively;" "advance the governing of the country according to the law comprehensively;" and "comprehensively governing the Party strictly." The "five-in-one" development strategy refers to allround development of economy, politics, culture, society, and ecology.

49. Xi's vision of "rule of law" means "rule by law" in practice, see Chapter 2.

50. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 15-16.

51. *Ibid.*, 22-23.

52. *Ibid.*, 23.

53. See "10 jia Xi Jinping xin shidai Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi sixiang yanjiu zhongxin (yuan) chengli" [10 research centers or institutes on Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era were established], *Xinhua*, December 14, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-12/14/c_1122112908.htm (accessed September 25, 2020).

54. "Zhongyang pizhun di 10 jia Xi Jin ping xin shidai Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi sixiang yanjiu zhongxin (yuan) xiangji chengli" [The 10 center-approved 10 research centers or institutes on Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era were established successively], *Xinhua*, April 18, 2018, <http://theory.people.com.cn/nl/2018/0418/c40531-29932832.html> (accessed September 25, 2020).

55. For degree programs, see "Yunnan min da chengli Xi Jinping xin shidai Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi sixiang yanjiu zhongxin" [Yunnan University established a research center on Xi Jin ping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era], *Renmin wang*, November 5, 2017, <http://yn.people.com.cn/n2/2017/1105/c378439-30888697.html> (accessed September 25, 2020). For online modules, see TsinghuaX, "Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era:" Edx, [date unspecified], <https://www.edx.org/course/xi-jinpings->

thought-on-socialismwith-chinese-char (accessed September 25, 2020).

56. The "two upholds" is, in Chinese, "liangge weihu:" "Zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhi ju zhaokai huiyi" [Politburo convenes meeting], *Renmin ribao*, September 22, 2018, 1.

57. For Wang's political beliefs and career, see Haig Patapan and Yi Wang, "The Hidden Ruler: Wang Huning and the Making of Contemporary China;" *Journal of Contemporary China* 27, no. 109 (2018): 47-60.

58. "Zhongyao tongzhi: Xuexi qiangguo jifen guize biangeng la!" [Important notice: the scoring rules of xuexi qiangguo have changed], *Thepaper.cn*, March 29, 2019, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_3233524 (accessed May 20, 2020).

59. The official English title for this unit is "Publicity Department;" but the Chinese title remains unchanged from previously and is the "Propaganda Department."

60. "Xuexi qiangguo: Learn More to Make Your Country Stronger;" *China Daily*, April 11, 2019, <http://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201904/11/WS5d0373fb498e12256565db21/xue-xi-qiang-guo-xuexi-qiangguo-learn-more-to-make-your-country-stronger.html> (accessed September 25, 2020).

61. Stella Chen, "Speaking Loud for Xi Jinping;" *China Media Project*, May 18, 2022, <https://chinamediaproject.org/2022/05/18/speaking-loud-for-xi-jinping%EF%BF%BC/> (accessed May 27, 2022).

62. Yi Wang, "Shenru xuexi guanche Xi Jinping waijiao sixiang, buduan kaichuang Zhongguo tese daguo waijiao xin jumian" [Study and implement Xi Jinping Thought on diplomacy conscientiously and break new ground in great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics], *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, July 20, 2020, <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/tl798986.shtml?from=timeline> (accessed July 20, 2020); "Xi Jinping waijiao sixiang yanjiu zhongxin chengli yishi chenggong juxing" [Inaugural ceremony of Xi Jinping Thought on diplomacy research center successfully launched], *China Institute of International Studies*, July 21, 2020, http://www.ciiis.org.cn/2020-07/21/content_41227967.html (accessed September 14, 2020).

63. "Di er pi 7 jia Xi Jinping xin shidai Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi sixiang yanjiu zhongxin chengli" [Second batch of research centers on Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era established], *Xinhua*, June 26, 2021, <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1703601711367132953&wfr=spider&for=pc> (accessed May 12, 2022).

64. The "ten making-dears" are, in Chinese, "shige mingque:"

65. "Zhongguo gongchandang di shijiu jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di liu ci quanti huiyi gongbad'

[Communique of the sixth plenum of the 19th CCP Central Committee], Xinhua, November 11, 2021, <http://politics.people.com.cn/nl/2021/1111/cl001-32280048.html> (accessed May 16, 2020).

66. See Gang Qian, "China Discourse Report 2018;" China Media Project, December 30, 2018, <https://chinamediaproject.org/2018/12/30/china-discourse-report-2018/> (accessed September 23, 2020); Gang Qian, "Diplomatic Moves toward 'Xi Thought,'" China Media Project, July 27, 2020, <https://chinamediaproject.org/2020/07/27/diplomatic-moves-toward-xi-jinping-thought/> (accessed September 23, 2020).

67. For example, in the official English language translation of Xi Jinping's report to the 19th Party Congress, the Chinese phrase *guojia anquan* has been mistranslated as "national security." The accurate translation should be "state (implying regime) security." See Steve Tsang, "Party-State Realism: A Framework for Understanding China's Approach to Foreign Policy," *Journal of Contemporary China* 29, no. 122 (2020): 304-18, 307. The office of "Chairman of the State" has also been deliberately mistranslated by official Chinese sources as "President" which is widely used.

68. Steve Tsang, "Consultative Leninism: China's New Political Framework," *Journal of Contemporary China* 18, no. 62 (2009): 865-80, 866.

69. For how long such rules and norms must be observed for them to be considered institutionalized is moot. See Fewsmith, *Rethinking Chinese Politics*.

70. For a discussion of Leninism, see Fewsmith, *Rethinking Chinese Politics*, 5-7; Tsang, "Consultative Leninism," 866-67, 868.

71. Tsang, "Party-State Realism."

فصل دوم

1. Roderic Broadhurst and Peng Wang, "After the Bo Xilai Trial: Does Corruption Threaten China's Future?" *Survival* 56, no. 3 (2014): 157-78.

2. In the 2009 blockbuster *Jianguo Daye*, the actor playing Chiang Kai-shek used this expression upon learning of the severity of corruption in the Kuomintang. It has since been widely used in Chinese society to refer to the corruption of the CCP. See Xinsheng Qiao (T!ff!~), "Guchui 'fanfu wang dang wanggud jiqi weixian' [Promoting "crackdown on corruption will finish the party and the country" is ultradangerous], *Huanqiu shibao*, April 25, 2014, www.chinamil.com.cn/jwgd/2014-04/25/content_5881136.htm (accessed November 18, 2020).

3. Sutang Zhang (it!,~@¥.), Jie Qin(~~), Xiaoguang Huo (!!t+ft), and Yajie Li(\$.ill!~), "Kaichuang Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi shiye xin jumian de jianqiang lingdao jiti" [The resilient

- leadership collective for building a new enterprise of socialism with Chinese characteristics*], *Renmin ribao*, November 16, 2012, 7; Yijun Song<*.~'.>), "Xi Jinping wei zong shuji de zhongyang lingdao jiti xingcheng shimd" [The full story of the formation of the central leadership collective with Xi Jinping as general party secretary], *Renmin wang*, June 8, 2013, <http://ldangshi.people.com.cn/n/2013/0608/c85037-21793787.html> (accessed October 27, 2020).
4. See Lam, *Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping*, 38-39, 44-45.
5. *Ibid.*, 34-74.
6. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 222.
7. *Ibid.*
8. See, for example, Shaoqi Liu, "Zai kuoda de zhongyang gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua" [Speech at the enlarged central work conference], *Marxists.org*, January 30, 1962, <https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/1968/5-016.htm> (accessed October 29, 2020).
9. Frank Diki: itter, *The Cultural Revolution: A People's History, 1962-1976* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016).
10. Lowell Dittmer, *Liu Shaoqi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 141-70.
11. Olivia Cheung, *Factional-Ideological Conflicts in Chinese Politics: To the Left or to the Right?* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2023).
12. Neil Thomas, "Ties That Bind: Xi's People on the Politburo:' Macro Polo, June 17, 2020, <https://macropolo.org/analysis/the-ties-that-bind-xi-people-politburo/> (accessed May 31, 2022). See also Wu Guoguang, "The King's Men and Others: Emerging Political Ties under Xi Jinping:' *China Leadership Monitor*, June 1, 2019, <https://www.prcleader.org/wusummer> (accessed May 31, 2022).
13. Cheung, *Factional-Ideological Conflicts in Chinese Politics*.
14. Lam, *Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping*, 6-7.
15. *Ibid.*, 7-8.
16. Jinping Xi, "Zai zhonggong shiba jie si zhong quanhui di er ci quanti huiyi shang de jianghua" [Speech at the second meeting of the fourth plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee], *Xinhua*, October 23, 2014, <http://www.12371.cn/special/xjpzyls/ddjlgj/2/> (accessed November 2, 2020).
17. "Hengyang pohuai xuanju an" [Henyang's electoral sabotage case], *Zhongguo qingnian bao*, August 19, 2014, zqb.cyol.com/htrnl/2014-08/19/nw.Dll0000zgqnb_20140819_6-0l.htm (accessed November 18, 2020).
18. "Chinese Province Says Ends Corruption 'Cancer:' Reuters, August 10, 2017,

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-corruption-shanxi-idUSKBNIAQ02N> (accessed November 18, 2020).

19. "Neimenggu dao cha 20 nian she mei fubai wenti" [Inner Mongolia investigates coal-related corruption going back 20 years], *Xinhua*, April 21, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/2020-04/21/c_1125883849.htm (accessed November 18, 2020).

20. Authors' database.

21. Edward White and Sun Yu, "China Executes Former Asset Management Chief for Corruption," *Financial Times*, January 29, 2021, <https://www.ft.com/content/820cf0ec-09a7-4d2e-a86d-897de725d712> (accessed May 17, 2022).

22. Catherine Philp, "FBI Chief Christopher Wray: China Using Anti-Corruption Programme Operation Fox Hunt against Dissidents," *Times*, July 8, 2020, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/fbi-director-christopher-wray-china-using-anti-corruption-programme-operation-fox-hunt-to-crack-down-on-dissidents-wxmzp07g0> (accessed July 27, 2020).

23. "Xiang shijie zhanshi Zhongguo fanfu juexin" [Show the world China's determination to crackdown on corruption], CCP Central Commission of Discipline Inspection, November 10, 2020, http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/toutiao/202011/t20201110_229695.html (accessed November 11, 2020). The conversion from CNY to USD is made on the basis of the 2020 exchange rate of the US Government's Internal Revenue Service (IRS), available at: <https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/yearlyaverage-currency-exchange-rates> (accessed June 25, 2022).

24. Figures were retrieved from the 2021 and 2022 annual reports of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, available at: <http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/> (accessed May 16, 2022). The conversion from CNY to USD for ¥16.74 billion and ¥2.95 billion is made, respectively, on the basis of the 2021 and 2020 exchange rates of the IRS.

25. "Xi Jinping zai di shiba jie zhongyang jilu jiancha weiyuanhui di liu ci quanti huiyi shang de jianghua" [Xi Jinping's speech at the sixth plenum of the 18th CCP Central Commission of Discipline Inspection], *Xinhua*, January 12, 2016, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/nl/2017/0823/c64094-29489862.html> (accessed July 22, 2020).

26. Nectar Gan, "China's 'House of Cards' Hits the TV Screen as Xi Jinping Whips His Cadres: • South China Morning Post, April 5, 2017, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2084717/chinas-house-cards-hits-tv-screen-xi-jinping-whips-his> (accessed July 27, 2020).

27. Eva Pils, "From Independent Lawyer Groups to Civic Opposition: The Case of China's New Citizen Movement: • *Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal* 19, no. 1 (2017): 110-52.
28. Gao Feng, "Chinese Star Peng Announces Retirement from Tennis, Dismisses Safety Concerns: • *Radio Free Asia*, February 7, 2022, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/olympics-pengshuai-02072022091413.html> (accessed May 17, 2022).
29. Jinping Xi, "Zai jinian xinhai geming 110 zhounian dahui shang de jianghua" [Speech at the commemoration of the 110th anniversary of the Revolution of 1911], *Renmin ribao*, October 10, 2021, 2.
30. "Zhou Yongkang bei xian fan qian: Zhong jiwei dale 'wu chang waiwei zhan'" [Before Zhou Yongkang was overturned, the CCP Central Commission of Discipline Inspection had fought "five peripheral battles"], *Zhongguo ribao*, November 28, 2014, http://cnews.chinadaily.com.cn/2014-11/28/content_18992383_2.htm (accessed October 28, 2020).
31. Benjamin Kang Lim and Ben Blanchard, "Exclusive: China Seizes \$14.5 Billion Assets from Family, Associates of Ex-Security Chief: Sources;" *Reuters*, March 30, 2014, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-china-corruption-zhou/exclusive-china-seizes-14-5-billion-assets-from-family-associates-of-ex-security-chief-sources-idUSBREA2T02S20140330> (accessed October 28, 2020). The conversion from CNY to USD is made on the basis of the 2014 exchange rate of the US Federal Reserve Bank, available at: <https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/current/> (accessed June 25, 2022).
32. The conversion from CNY to USD is made on the basis of the 2015 exchange rate of the US Federal Reserve Bank.
33. "Zhou Yongkang yishen bei panchu wuqi tuxing" [Zhou Yongkang sentenced life imprisonment at first instance], *Xinhua*, June 11, 2015, <http://fanfu.people.com.cn/n/2015/0611/c64371-27141308.html> (accessed October 28, 2020).
34. Janet Liu and Larry Ong, "The Rise and Fall of China's Domestic Security and Legal Affairs Apparatus;" *Sinoinsider*, July 4, 2018, <https://sinoinsider.com/2018/07/therise-and-fall-of-chinas-domestic-security-and-legal-affairs-apparatus/> (accessed January 12, 2021).
35. There was a seven-month gap between the announcement of initial investigation (December 6, 2013) and formal investigation (July 29, 2014) against Zhou. This was significantly longer than the gap between these two announcements for Ling Jihua and Sun Zhengcai (two weeks), Bo Xilai (less than one month), Guo Boxiong (less than two months), and Xu Caihou (less than three months).
36. See Guoxing Cao, "Zhou Yongkang an mimi kaiting dai lai zhengyi" [Controversies ensuring

- from the closed-door trial of Zhou Yongkang], *Radio France International*, June 12, 2015, <https://www.rfi.fr/cn/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/20150612-%E5%91%A8%E6%B0%B8%E5%BA%B7%E6%A1%88%E7%A7%98%E5%AF%86%E5%BC%80%E5%BA%AD%E5%B8%A6%E6%9D%A5%E4%BA%89%E8%AE%AE> (accessed November 2, 2020).
37. For details, see Lam, *Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping*, 106-107.
38. For a discussion of Xi's relationship with the four military generals he installed, see Nan Li, "Party Congress Reshuffle Strengthens Xi's Hold on Central Military Commission," *China Brief*, February 26, 2018, <https://jamestown.org/program/partycongress-reshuffle-strengthens-xis-hold-central-military-commission/> (accessed October 1, 2020).
39. "Profile: Xi Jin ping and His Era," *Xinhua*, November 17, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/17/c_136758372.htm (accessed November 4, 2020).
40. See Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan*, 401-11, and Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan, 383-86; Nan Li, *Civil-Military Relations in Post-Deng China* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021).
41. "Communist Youth League's Budget Down 50% from 2015 Expenditures" *Global Times*, May 3, 2016, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/981043.shtml> (accessed on July 27, 2020).
42. They were Liu Tienan and Song Lin, both were Ling Jihua's proteges.
43. The nine were: Jiang Jiemin, Su Rong, Yao Mugen, Chen Anzhong, Zhao Zhiyong, Wang Yongchun, Ran Xinquan, Zhou Yongkang, and Xu Caihou.
44. The other was Hu Chunhua, a protege of Hu Jintao, who failed to enter the 19th Politburo Standing Committee.
45. "Gang mei: Hu Chunhua ceng zipu shijiu da bu ru chang yuanyin" [Hong Kong press: Hu Chunhua once self-disclosed the failure to enter the Politburo Standing Committee of the 19th Party Congress], *Vision Times*, October 27, 2017, <https://www.secrechina.com/news/gb/2017/10/27/839447.html> (accessed December 14, 2020); "Zhonggong shijiu da changwei mingdan jiemi (1): Ge dai zhiding jieban ren Hu Chunhua yiwai chuju" [Unveiling the secrets of the name list of the Politburo Standing Committee of the 19th Party Congress, part 1: The unexpected exclusion of Hu Chunhua, the successor appointed before the current generation of leadership], Bowen Press, October 16, 2017, https://bowenpress.com/news/bowen_185380.html?_cf_chl_jschl_tk_=c029b6fde783c38e60la07bbf68bead21273b6b4-1607955505-0-AfOlgaMmzaagXiaikT-0dYPnzR6dL3EaXyyRhA6F-GPOwxzdM0XstfSPgcb (accessed December 14, 2020).

46. The introduction chapter has further details relating to Hu Chunhua.
47. "Xi Jinping zai Huashengdun zhou lianhe huanying yanhui shang de yanjiang" [Xi Jinping's speech at the welcome banquet at Washington state], Xinhua, September 23, 2015, <http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2015/09-23/7539991.shtml> (accessed October 29, 2020).
48. "Xi Jinping zai shiba jie zhongyang jiwei er ci quanhui shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua" [Xi Jinping made an important speech at the second plenum of the 18th Central Commission of Discipline Inspection], Xinhua, January 22, 2013, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0122/c64094-20289660-3.html> (accessed July 20, 2020).
49. Xi, *Xifinpingtan zhiguo lizhengdi er juan*, 151-56, 161-68.
50. Xi differentiated the "personal intentions" of party members from the party's "organizational intentions" in his speech on January 14, 2014, available at: <http://www.12371.cn/special/xjpzyls/ddjlgj/3/> (accessed October 4, 2020).
51. For the meaning and context of these three terms, see Chapter 1.
52. Suisheng Zhao, "Top-Level Design and Enlarged Diplomacy: Foreign and Security Policy Making in Xi Jinping's China," *Journal of Contemporary China* 32, no. 139 (2022): 73-86, at 77.
53. Juliette Garside and David Pegg, "Panama Papers Reveal Offshore Secrets of China's Red Nobility," *Guardian*, September 6, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/06/panama-papers-reveal-offshore-secrets-china-red-nobility-big-business> (accessed on July 27, 2020).
54. This clampdown took place as part of the "Education and Practice of the Party's Mass Line" campaign, which will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.
55. "Zhongguo gongchandang di shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di liu ci quanti huiyi gongbao:"
56. William Zheng, "Chinese Communist Party Critic Ren Zhiqiang Gets 18 Years for Corruption," *South China Morning Post*, September 22, 2020, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3102481/chinas-big-cannon-ren-zhiqiang-gets-18-years-corruption> (accessed October 30, 2020).
57. "Da hu pai ying san nian duo, Xi Jinping dapo guanyu fanfu de wu zhong lundia" [Over three years of fighting tigers and swatting flies; Xi Jinping broke five theories about anticorruption], *Zhongguo ribao*, October 24, 2016, https://china.chinadaily.com.cn/2016-10/24/content_27157753.htm (accessed May 17, 2022).
58. Xu Gang did not work with or under Xi during the latter's 17 years in Fujian. Si received a major political promotion-to be Secretary of the Zhejiang Party Organization Department-in June 2001, more than 1.5 years before Xi took up Zhejiang's vice governorship in December

2002. Ai was CEO of the state-owned steel conglomerate Shanghai Baowu, where he had worked for 13 years straight before becoming Shanghai's vice mayor in December 2007. He did not work with Xi when he was Shanghai's Party Secretary for eight months in 2007.

59. Yu Gao (ilaJlfitr), "Nan'er Xi Jinping" [Xi Jinping the man], DW, January 25, 2013, <https://www.dw.com/zh/%E7%94%B7%E5%84%BF%E4%B9%AO%E8%BF%91%E5%B9%B3/a-16549520> (accessed September 2, 2020).

60. Jinping Xi, "Guanyu jianchi he fazhan zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi de ji ge wenti" [Several questions concerning the persistence in and development of socialism with Chinese characteristics], Qiushi, April 1, 2019, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2019-04/01/c_1124307480.htm (accessed October 1, 2020).

61. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng, 414.

62. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan, 142.

63. Cheung, *Factional-Ideological Conflicts in Chinese Politics*.

64. Liu, "Lun gongchandang yuan de xiuyang:"

65. "Jiaoyu shijian huodong di yi pi zongjie ji di er pi bushu huiyi zaijing zhaokai" [Meeting convened in Beijing to sum up the first batch of the education and practice activities and to prepare for the second batch], Gov.en, January 20, 2014, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2014-01/20/content_2571323.htm (accessed July 10, 2020).

66. See "Zhonggong zhongyang yinfa 'xian yishang dang he guojia jiguan dangyuan lingdao ganbu minzhu shenghuo hui ruogan guiding'" [CCP Central printed and distributed "several regulations concerning the democracy life meetings for party members and leading cadres at party and state organs above the county level"], Renmin ribao, January 13, 2017, 1. See also "Shanxi sheng wei changwei banzi zhaokai 2016 niandu minzhu shenghuo hui" [The Shanxi provincial standing party committee convened the 2016 democracy life meeting], Shanxi ribao, January 26, 2017, <http://news.12371.cn/2017/01/26/ARTII485402324608867.shtml> (accessed October 20, 2020).

67. "Xi Jinping guanyu quanmian yifa zhiguo lunshu zhaibian" [Excerpts of Xi Jinping's speeches on advance the governing of the country according to the law comprehensively], Renmin wang, May 18, 2015, <http://jhsjk.people.cn/article/27017189> (accessed May 30, 2020).

68. "Xi Jinping guanyu dang feng lianzheng jianshe he fan fubai douzheng lunshu zhaibian" [Excerpts of Xi Jinping's speeches on the party's workstyle and integrity construction and the anticorruption struggle], Renmin wang, January 27, 2015, <http://jhsjk.people.cn/article/26456155> (accessed May 31, 2020).

69. "Zhongban yinfa 'Zhongguo gongchandang jilu jiancha jiguan jiandu zhi ji gongzuo guize'" [*General office of CCP Central issued "provisions for the supervision and discipline enforcement work of the discipline inspection and supervision authorities of the CCP"*], *Renmin ribao*, January 7, 2019, 1.
70. See Yookyung Yeo, "Complementing the Local Discipline Inspection Commissions of the CCP: Empowerment of the Central Inspection Groups," *Journal of Contemporary China* 25, no. 97 (2016): 59-74.
71. Ibid.; "Jianchi changgui xunshi yu zhuanxiang xunshi xiang jiehe" [*Persist in combining regular and earmarked inspections*], *CCP Central Commission of Discipline Inspection*, January 2015, http://zgjjjc.ccdi.gov.cn/bqml/bqxx/201506/t20150621_58252.html (accessed June 2, 2020).
72. Qishan Wang, "Zai shiba jie zhongyang jiwei qi ci quanhui shang de gongzuo baogao" [*Work report at the seventh plenum of the 18th CCP Central Commission of Discipline Inspection*], *Xinhua*, January 6, 2017, <http://news.12371.cn/2017/01/19/ART11484813994692933.shtml> (accessed July 1, 2020).
73. Leji Zhao, "Zai shijiu jie zhongyang jiwei liu ci quanhui shang de gongzuo baogao" [*Work report at the sixth plenum of the 19th CCP Central Commission of Discipline Inspection*], January 18, 2022, https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/ldhcn/wbld/202202/t20220228_174676.html (accessed May 17, 2022).
74. See "Li Keqiang zhuchi zhaokai guowuyuan changwu huiyi" [*Li Keqiang chaired the state council standing committee meeting*], *Renmin ribao*, October 24, 2019, 1.
75. These are: The General Office of the CCP Central Committee, Central Organization Department, Central Publicity Department, Central United Front Department, the National People's Congress, General Office of the State Council, and the central-level Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
76. Wang Qishan's work report at the seventh plenum of the 18th Central Commission of Discipline Inspection, January 6, 2017.
77. Jie Jiang (~\$), "Kaiqi dang he guojia fan fubai gongzuo xin pianzhang" [*Opening a new chapter for the anticorruption work of the party and state*], *Renmin ribao*, March 1, 2019, 6.
78. Flora Sapio, "The National Supervision Commission: A 'Subaltern History,'" *Modern China* 48, no. 4 (2022): 754-84, at 759.
79. "Guojia jiancha tizhi gaige shidian qude shixiao" [*Solid outcomes achieved from the pilot experiment of the national supervisory system reform*], *Xinhua*, November 5, 2017, <http://>

- [/www.xinhuanet.com/2017-11/05/c_1121908387.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/2017-11/05/c_1121908387.htm) (accessed on July 20, 2020).
80. Jinping Xi, "Zai xin de qidian shang shenhua guojia jiancha tizhi gai" [Deepen the national supervision institutional reform at a new starting point], *Qiushi*, February 28, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-02/28/c_1124176601.htm (accessed October 31, 2020).
81. Ziyang Zhao, "Zai zhongguo gongchandang di shisan ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao" [Report at the 13th CCP congress], *Renmin ribao*, November 4, 1987, 1.
82. "Renda changwei hui shenya sheli guojia jiancha bu yi'an" [The National People's Congress Standing Committee deliberated the motion to establish the state ministry of supervision], *Renmin ribao*, November 29, 1986, 4.
83. Jinping Xi, "Jiakuai jianshe shehui zhuyi fazhi guojia" [Accelerate the construction of a socialist rule of law country], *Qiushi*, January 2015, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/2020-06/04/c_1126073255.htm (accessed November 2, 2020).
84. Xi's address to the Politburo Standing Committee on October 8, 2015, available at: <http://www.12371.cn/special/xjpzyls/ddjlgj/4/> (accessed October 7, 2020).
85. Xi's speech at the 24th collective study session of the 18th Politburo Standing Committee on June 26, 2015, available at: <http://www.12371.cn/special/xjpzyls/ddjlgj/4/> (accessed October 7, 2020).
86. Ibid.
87. Shaoqi Liu, "Dang gui dang fa de baogao" [Report of intraparty rules and regulations], *Renmin wang*, November 6, 1938, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/69112/73583/73601/74108/5039662.html> (accessed October 30, 2020).
88. The last refers to formal investigation, which always leads to criminal prosecution. "Zhongguo gongchandang jilu chufen tiaoli" [CCP discipline and punishment ordinance], *Xinhua*, October 1, 2018, <http://www.12371.cn/2018/08/27/ART11535321642505383.shtml> (accessed October 8, 2020).
89. Wang Qishan repeatedly said that the numbers and types of sanctions given by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection followed this quota system. See, for example, Wang, "Zai shiba jie zhongyang jiwei qi ci quanhu shang de gongzuo baogao."
90. See Articles 46(2), 46(3), and 53 of "Zhongguo gongchandang jilu chufen tiaoli," October 1, 2018.
91. "Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui gongzuo tiaoli" [Work regulations of the CCP Central Committee], *Xinhua*, October 12, 2020, <http://www.81.cn/big5/ss/2020->

10/12/content_9918121.htrn (accessed November 2, 2020).

92. *Xi does not have the status, authority, and capacity Mao commanded in his heyday. At the Lushan Conference of 1959, when Mao thought his authority was being challenged as Marshall Peng Dehuai questioned whether the Great Leap Forward policy was right, Mao dared the party top echelons to side with Peng, in which case he would, as he threatened to, raise a new Red Army backed up by a new party to overthrow them. Mao's threat was sufficiently credible that it delivered the deterrence effect.*

There is as yet no indication that a comparable threat by Xi would be seen in a comparable light.

93. *For example, see Xi's critique of the antipoverty campaign, presented in Chapter 4.*

94. Yuen Yuen Ang, *China's Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

95. "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu dang de bainian fendou zhongda chengjiu he lishi jingyan de jueyi:"

96. See, for example, Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 48.

فصل سوم

1. See Hochul Lee, "Political Institutionalization as Political Development in China:" *Journal of Contemporary China* 24, no. 65 (2010): 559-71.

2. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 110.

3. "Zhonggong zhongyang yinfa 'shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an'" [CCP Central issued "plan for deepening reform of party and state organizations"], *Renmin ribao*, March 22, 2018, 1.

4. 2,958 votes in favor, 2 against, and 3 abstentions.

5. Ling Li, "The Muddled Case against Xi Jinping's Third Term;" *LSE China Dialogues* blog, March 31, 2022, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2022/03/31/the-muddled-case-against-xi-jinpings-third-term/> (accessed May 19, 2022).

6. Fewsmith, *Rethinking Chinese Politics*, 16-18.

7. Xiaoping Deng, *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan di er juan* [Selected works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1994), 320-43.

8. *Institutionalization is a process, and not something that can be completed overnight by an order from the top. The costs for violating norms get higher as time passes, and institutionalization becomes consolidated once the costs of overturning the norms is significantly higher than of upholding them.*

9. Joseph Fewsmith, *The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2013), 68-107; Cheng Li, "Intra-Party Democracy in China: Should We Take It Seriously?" *China Leadership Monitor* 3, November 23, 2009, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/intra-party-democracyin-china-should-we-take-it-seriously/> (accessed September 20, 2019).

10. Fewsmith, *Rethinking Chinese Politics*, 158-59.

11. Cheng Li, "The End of the CC P's Resilient Authoritarianism? A Tripartite Assessment of Shifting Power in China;" *China Quarterly* 211 (2012): 595-623; Alice Miller, "Institutionalization and the Changing Dynamics of Chinese Leadership Politics;" in *China's Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy*, ed. Cheng Li (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 61-79.

12. See, for example, Xi's speech on June 28, 2013, available at: <http://www.12371.cn/special/xjpzyls/ddjlgj/3/> (accessed October 15, 2020).

13. See, for example, Jinping Xi, "Guanyu 'zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jianchi he wanshan Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi zhidu tuijin guojia zhili tixi he zhili nengli xiandaihua ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding' de shuoming" [Explanation concerning "the decision of the CCP Central on certain major questions concerning the persistence and perfection of the institutions of Chinese solution and the facilitation of the modernization of the state governance system and capacity"], *Renmin ribao*, November 6, 2019, 4.

14. The notable dissenters are Ren Zhiqiang and Cai Xia. For the former, see discussion in Chapter 2. For the latter, see Xia Cai, "The Party That Failed: An Insider Breaks with Beijing;" *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2021, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-12-04/chinese-communist-party-failed> (accessed December 22, 2020).

15. Xi said it provides "the fundamental assurance for a decisive victory in completing the process of building a moderately well-off society comprehensively, and for achieving a great victory for socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era;" See Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 89.

16. Jinping Xi, "Zhongguo gongchandang lingdao shi Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi zui benzhi de tezheng" [The leadership of the Chinese communist party is the most basic feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics], *Qiushi*, July 15, 2020, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-07/15/c_1126234524.htm (accessed December, 11, 2020).

17. Ibid.

18. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 89.

19. Danwei are party-directed work units that assign jobs and provide welfare to citizens.

20. Xi's speech on January 14, 2014, available at: <http://www.1237 Len/special/xjpyls/ddjlgj/3/> (accessed November 27, 2020).
21. Ibid.
22. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 112.
23. Jinping Xi, "Guanyu 'zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding' de shuoming" [Explanation of the "decision of the CCP Central on deepening reform of party and state organizations"], *Renmin ribao*, November 16, 2013, 1.
24. Ibid.
25. Xi's speech on February 2, 2015, available at: http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-07/15/c_1126234524.htm (accessed November 10, 2020). The notion of "all stars twinkle around the moon" was from Confucius, see Xuezhong Guo, *The Politics of the Core Leader in China: Culture, Institution, Legitimacy, and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 133-42.
26. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng*, 126; *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan*, 273; and *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 166-67.
27. "Xi Jinping zai quanguo zuzhi gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua quanwen:'
28. Erik van Ree, "Stalin's Organic Theory of the Party," *Russian Review* 52, no. 1 (1993): 43-57, 55.
29. "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding" [Decision of the CCP Central concerning certain major questions of deepening reform comprehensively], *Renmin ribao*, November 16, 2013, 1.
30. It is important not to confuse central leading small groups, which are party organs, with State Council leading small groups, which are state organs. We counted 24 permanent central leading small groups of the Party by December 2020. For a list of 57 central leading small groups by October 2017, see Christopher Johnson, Scott Kennedy, and Mingda Qiu, "Xi's Signature Governance Innovation: The Rise of Leading Small Groups," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, October 17, 2017, [csis.org/analysis/xis-signature-governance-innovation-rise-leading-smallgroups](https://www.csis.org/analysis/xis-signature-governance-innovation-rise-leading-smallgroups) (accessed December 22, 2020).
31. There are no published guidelines on how long a central leading small group should operate. We consider a group to be permanent if its term of office and reference are not exclusively linked to a one-off event.
32. Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, ed., *Chinese Authoritarianism as Fragmented Authoritarianism: Earthquakes, Energy and Environment* (Oxford: Routledge, 2017).
33. Jinping Xi, "Guanyu shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige jueding gao he fang'an gao de

shuoming" [Explanation concerning the final and preliminary drafts of the decision on deepening reform of party and state organizations], *Xinhua*, April 11, 2018, <http://news.12371.cn/2018/04/11/ARTI1523454152698258.shtml> (accessed December 11, 2020).

34. "Zhong zhongyang yinfa 'shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang'an:"

35. Jiabao Wen, "Zai gaige kaifang de xin xingshi xia jiaqiang he gaijin jiguan dang de jianshe" [Strengthen and improve party-building of agency party committees under the new situation of reform and opening up], *Renmin ribao*, March 3, 1988, 4.

36. The ranking, from top down, is Premier, Vice Premier, and State Councilor.

37. See Liu and Ong, "The Rise and Fall of China's Domestic Security and Legal Affairs Apparatus:'

38. See David Lampton, "Xi Jinping and the National Security Commission: Policy Coordination and Political Power:' *Journal of Contemporary China* 24, no. 95(2015): 759-77.

39. This is a central Leninist tenet discussed in Chapter 2.

40. David Shambaugh, "Becoming a ganbu"; Ignatius Wibowo and Lye Liang Fook, "China's Central Party School: A Unique Institution Adapting to Changes:' in *The Chinese Communist Party in Reform*, ed. Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Yongnian Zheng (London: Routledge, 2006), 139-56.

41. Xi, "Guanyu shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige jueding gao he fang'an gao de shuoming:'

42. Rongchen Zhang (*5R\$), "Zhunque bawo 'dang zheng fengong' gainian" [Accurately grasp the concept of the division of labor between the Party and state], *Renmin wang*, April 10, 2017, <http://theory.people.com.cn/nl/2017/0410/c40531-29198863.html> (accessed May 19, 2022).

43. Baogang Guo, "A Partocracy with Chinese Characteristics: Governance System Reform under Xi Jinping;' *Journal of Contemporary China* 29, no. 126 (2020): 809-23.

44. David Shambaugh, *China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008).

45. Richard McGregor, "How the State Runs Business in China:' *Guardian*, July 25, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/25/china-business-xi-jinpingcommunist-party-state-private-enterprise-huawei> (accessed November 27, 2020).

46. This could be a party cell (for firms with 3-49 party members), a party branch (for firms with 50-100 party members) or a party committee (for firms with over 100 party members). See Article 4 of "Zhongguo gongchandang zhibu gongzuo tiaoli (shixing)" [CCP work ordinance for party branch work (trial)], *Renmin ribao*, November 26, 2018, 1; Articles 6 and 7 of "Zhongguo

- gongchandang dangzu gongzuo tiaoli (shixing)* [CCP committee work ordinance (trial)], *Renmin ribao*, June 17, 2015, 2; and Article 4 of "*Zhongguo gongchandang guoyou qiye jiceng zuzhi gongzuo tiaoli (shixing)*" [CCP regulations for the work of grassroot organizations of SOEs (trial)], *Renmin ribao*, January 6, 2020, 1.
47. Article 9 of "*Zhongguo gongchandang zhibu gongzuo tiaoli (shixing)*:"
48. Shaoqi Liu, "Guanyu dangwei lingdao he dang zheng fengong wenti" [The question of the leadership of party committees and the division of labor between the party and state], *Renmin wang*, April 1955, <http://www.people.com.cn/item/newsq/zz/lj/lj042.html> (accessed December 11, 2020).
49. Xiaojun Yan and Jie Huang, "Navigating Unknown Waters: The Chinese Communist Party's New Presence in the Private Sector," *China Review* 17, no. 2 (2017): 37-63.
50. *Ibid.*; Bruce Dickson, *Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Daniel Koss, "Party Building as Institutional Bricolage: Asserting Authority at the Business Frontier," *China Quarterly* 248 (2001): 222-43, 234.
51. For party-building in major state-owned telecom firms, see Colin Hawes and Grace Li, "Transparency and Opaqueness in the Chinese ICT Sector: A Critique of Chinese and International Corporate Governance Norms," *Asian Journal of Comparative Law* 12, no. 1 (2017): 41-80.
52. "Xi Jinping zai quanguo zuzhi gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua quanwen" [Full text of Xi Jinping's speech at the national organization work conference], *Renmin ribao haiwang wang*, September 17, 2018, <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1611898738998911734&wfr=spider&for=pc> (accessed November 10, 2020).
53. *Ibid.*
54. See Section 24 of "*Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan guanyu shenhua guoyou qiye gaige de zhidao yijian*" [The CCP Central and State Council's guiding opinions on deepening reform of state-owned enterprises], *Renmin ribao*, September 14, 2015, 6.
55. "Shangshi gongsi zhili zhunze" [Governance regulations of listed companies], *China Securities Regulatory Commission*, September 30, 2018, http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjpublic/zjh/201809/t20180930_344906.htm (accessed December 11, 2020).
56. "*Zhonggong zhongyang yinfa Zhongguo gongchandang guoyou qiye jiceng zuzhi gongzuo tiaoli (shixing)*" [The CCP Central distributes the work ordinance for grassroots party

- organizations (trial)], Renmin wang, January 6, 2020, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/nl/2020/0106/c419242-31535249.html> (accessed December 1, 2020).
57. For the meaning of these terms, see Chapter 1. For a discussion of their applications, see also Chapter 2.
58. "Jiaqiang xin shidai minying jingji tongzhan gongzuo de yijian" [Strengthen united front work of the private economy for the new era], Renmin ribao, September 16, 2020, 1.
59. "Zhong zu bu: Quanguo 187.7 wan ge fei gongyouzhi qiye yi jiandang zuzhi" [Central organization department: 1.877 million of non-state-owned enterprises have established party organizations], Zhongguo wang, June 18, 2019, http://news.china.com.cn/txt/2018-06/30/content_54173620.htm (accessed December 11, 2020).
60. Ruowei Sheng (~; s'it), "Fazhan dangyuan tiaokong xiaoguo mingxian" [The development of aspiring party members has achieved obvious results], Renmin ribao, July 1, 2014, 17.
61. For the full text of Document no. 9, see "Zhonggong zhongyang bangong ting yinfa 'guanyu dangqian yishi xingtai lingyu qingkuang de tongbad de tongzhi'" [A notice concerning the issue of the "communique on the current state of the ideological sphere" by the General Office of the CCP Central], Mingjing Magazine 43 (2013): 26-
29. See also its Chinafile translation available at: <https://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation> (accessed January 5, 2021).
62. The documentary can be viewed at youku.com, https://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XNzAwNjE5MDYw.html (accessed November 27, 2020).
63. The documentary is accessible at youku.com, https://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XNTg0NDEwNTk2OA==.html (accessed June 6, 2022).
64. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan, 327.
65. Ibid., 328.
66. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan, 124.
67. Ibid., 122.
68. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan, 346.
69. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan, 124-25.
70. Ibid., 18.
71. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan, 335.
72. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan, 339. Xi first mentioned "standing on the vast land ... should be confident of this" at the 120th anniversary of Mads birthday on December 26, 2013, see Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng, 171.

73. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng*, 12.
74. Jinping Xi, "Jianshe Zhongguo tese Zhongguo fengge Zhongguo qipai de kaogu xue" [*Construct archaeology with Chinese characteristics and style*], *Qiushi*, November 30, 2020, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-11/30/c_1126799145.htm (accessed December 11, 2020).
75. Jinping Xi, "Zai yazhou wenming duihua dahui kaimu shi shang de zhuzhi yanjiang" [*Keynote speech on the opening ceremony of the conference on dialogue of Asian civilizations*], *Xinhua*, May 15, 2019, <http://jhsjk.people.cn/article/31086588> (accessed November 27, 2020).
76. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan*, 202.
77. Xi's speech on February 17, 2014, available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/xxjxs/2020-07/16/c_1126247846.htm (accessed November 10, 2020).
78. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 120.
79. Xi, *Xifinpingtanzhiguolizheng*, 181.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., 91. Xi defined "scientific socialism" as the opposite of "utopian socialism:" In this speech, he said scientific socialism takes socialism as "a process of practice that perfects and develops over time"; utopian socialism views socialism as an "unchanging dogma."
82. Xi's speech on December 11, 2015, available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/xxjxs/2020-07/16/c_1126247846.htm (accessed December 3, 2020).

فصل چهارم

1. Xiaoping Deng, *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan di san juan* [*Selected works of Deng Xiaoping*, vol. 3] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), 143, 204, 224, 324-25.
2. See, for example, Shaojie Zhou and Angang Hu, *China: Surpassing the "Middle Income Trap"* (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 36-69.
3. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan*, 84.
4. See Chapter 1 for a discussion of consultative Leninism.
5. See Chapter 1 for the timeline of national rejuvenation Xi presented at the 19th Party Congress in 2017.
6. Deng, *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan di san juan*, 143, 324-25.
7. Ibid., 215-16, 226.

8. Ibid., 379.
9. Zemin Jiang, "Zai Zhongguo gongchandang di shiliu ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao:" *Renmin ribao*, November 18, 2022, 1.
10. The figures are retrieved from the World Bank, available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD?locations=CN> and <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN> (accessed June 25, 2022).
11. Ibid.
12. The conversion from CNY to USD is made on the basis of the 2020 exchange rate of the IRS.
13. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan*, 84.
14. Ibid., 362.
15. Ibid., 84.
16. Teresa Wright, *Popular Protest in China* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018).
17. Jeremy Page, "Internal Security Tops Military in China Spending;" *Wall Street Journal*, March 5, 2011, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CJB-13441> (accessed December 10, 2021).
18. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng*, 68.
19. Ibid., 95.
20. Ibid., 97.
21. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan*, 3 7 4.
22. Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung, "Has Xi Jinping Made China's Political System More Resilient and Enduring?" *Third World Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (2022): 225-43, 226.
23. Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung, "Uninterrupted Rise: China's Global Strategy according to Xi Jinping Thought;" *Asian Forum* 9, no. 2, <http://www.theasianforum.org/uninterrupted-rise-chinas-global-strategy-according-to-xi-jinping-thought/#20> (accessed March 3, 2021).
24. This is often, in our views, mistranslated as the national security commission. The original is *guojia anquan weiyuanhui*, which can mean either national security commission or state security commission. Since this is more about internal security than external security, state security is the appropriate translation.
25. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng*, 201.
26. These are: political, homeland, military, economic, cultural, social, science and technology, information, ecological, resource, nuclear, overseas interests, biological, space, polar, and deep sea security.
27. After "state (implying regime) security" comes: "sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, people's well-being, sustainable economic and social development, other major national

interests, and a continued state of security:'

28. "Hong Kong National Security Police Hotline Received over 200,000 Tips in First Year:" *Hong Kong Free Press*, November 5, 2021, <https://hongkongfp.com/2021/11/05/hong-kong-national-security-police-hotline-received-over-200000-tips-in-first-year/> (accessed December 10, 2021).

29. "Dismantling Free Society: Hong Kong One Year after the National Security Law:" *Human Rights Watch*, June 25, 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/feature/2021/06/25/dismantling-free-society/hong-kong-one-year-after-national-security-law> (accessed December 14, 2021); "Xingshi anjian de tongji shuzi" [Statistics on criminal cases], *Gov.hk*, April 27, 2022, <https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202204/27/P2022042700445p.htm> (accessed June 7, 2022).

30. Xi's remarks at the second Politburo collective study session on the national big data strategy on December 8, 2017, available at: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-12/09/content_5245520.htm (accessed June 4, 2021).

31. Biao Teng, "From 1989 to '1984': Tiananmen Massacre and China's High-Tech Totalitarianism:" *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal* 5, no. 2 (2019): 691-711, 698.

32. Jing Yang, "WeChat Becomes a Powerful Surveillance Tool Everywhere in China: *Wall Street Journal*, December 22, 2020, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/wechat-becomes-a-powerful-surveillance-tool-everywhere-in-china-11608633003> (accessed June 3, 2021).

33. Chuncheng Liu, "Multiple Social Credit Systems in China:" *Economic Sociology* 21, no. 1 (2019): 22-32.

34. Human Rights Watch, "China's Algorithms of Repression: Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App;" May 1, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-policemass> (accessed May 28, 2021).

35. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan*, 335.

36. Juan Wang and Yu Mou, "The Paradigm Shift in the Disciplining of Village Cadres in China: from Mao to Xi;" *China Quarterly* 248 (2021): 181-99; David Bandurski, "Xi Jinping, playing with Fire:" *China Media Project*, October 17, 2013, <https://chinamediaproject.org/2013/10/17/xi-jinping-playing-with-fire/> (accessed February 14, 2022).

37. Central Commission for Deepening Reform Comprehensively, "Guanyu xin shidai wenming zhongxin shijian gongzuo de zhidao yijian" [Guiding recommendations on the pilot work of establishing new-era civilization practice centers], *Xinhua*, July 6, 2018, <https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%85%B3%E4%BA%E5%BB%BA>

- %ES%AE%BE%E6%96%B0%E6%97%B6%E4%BB%A3%E6%96%87%E6%98%8E%E5%AE%9E%E8%B7%B5%E4%B8%AD%E5%BF%83%E8%AF%95%E7%82%B9%E5%B7%A5%E4%BD%9C%E7%9A%84%E6%8C%87%E5%AF%BC%E6%84%8F%E8%A7%81/2272121?fr=aladdin#reference-[1]-23300173-wrap (accessed February 14, 2022).
38. State Council, "Zou xiang wenming shijian xin yuezhang, gedi xin shidai wenming shijian zhongxin shidian gongzuo qude zhashi chengxiad" [Sound a new tune of putting civilization into practice: The pilot work of new-era civilization practice centers in various localities made achievements], *Xinhua*, November 23, 2021, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-11/23/content_5652632.htm (accessed May 14, 2022).
39. See the official website of the new-era civilization practice centers, available at: <http://www.wenning.cn/wrnsjzx/> (accessed February 14, 2022). See also Jessica Batke, "A Vast Network of New Era Civilization Practice Centers' Is Beijing's Latest Bid to Reclaim Hearts and Minds;" *ChinaFile*, January 31, 2022, <https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/features/vast-network-of-new-era-civilization-practice-centersbeijings-latest-bid> (accessed February 14, 2022).
40. "Jianchi he fazhan 'feng qiao jingya: Xi Jinping zong shuji zheyang shuo" [What Xi Jinping says about upholding and developing the "Fengqiao experience"], *Qiushi*, March 2, 2021, http://www.qstheory.cn/laigao/ycjx/2021-03/02/c_1127157904.htm (accessed February 14, 2022).
41. Deng, Deng Xiaoping wenxuan di san juan, 145.
42. Qingjie Zeng, "Managed Campaign and Bureaucratic Institutions in China: Evidence from the Targeted Poverty Alleviation Program:" *Journal of Contemporary China* 29, no. 123(2020):400-15,407-408.
43. Tsang and Cheung, "Has Xi Jinping Made China's Political System More Resilient and Enduring?" 230-31.
44. For policy delays on Xi's common prosperity program, see Chapter 5. For truncation of Xi Thought, see Chapter 1.
45. The conversion from CNY to USD is made on the basis of the 2015 exchange rate of the US Federal Reserve Bank.
46. In official terminology, they were the "jiandang lika" population, a concept we will return to later.
47. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan*, 87.
48. Interview with Matthew Chitwood in May 2021.
49. These 12 western provinces, with their number of poor counties indicated in brackets, were:

Yunnan (88), Tibet (74), Sichuan (66), Guizhou (66), Gansu (58), Shanxi (56), Qinghai (42), Guangxi (33), Xinjiang (32), Inner Mongolia (31), Chongqing (14), and Ningxia (8). The figures were published by the PRC Rural Revitalization Bureau on December 23, 2014, available at: http://www.cpad.gov.cn/art/2014/12/23/art_343_981.html (accessed May 10, 2021).

50. These six central provinces, with their number of poor counties indicated in brackets, were: Hunan (40), Henan (38), Shanxi (36), Hubei (28), Jiangxi (24), and Anhui (20). See *ibid.*

51. These included Hebei and Hainan, which had 45 and 5 poor counties respectively. See *ibid.*

52. These included Heilongjiang and Jilin, which had 20 and 8 poor counties respectively. See *ibid.*

53. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan*, 84.

54. *Ibid.*, 73.

55. "China Removed All Remaining Counties from Poverty List:" *Xinhua*, November 24, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-11/24/c_139538338.htm (accessed June 4, 2021).

56. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 258.

57. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan*, 91.

58. Jinping Xi, "Zai juezhan juesheng tuopin gongjian zuotan hui shang de jianghua" [*Speech at the national poverty alleviation symposium*], *Renmin ribao*, March 7, 2020, 2.

59. Xingmiu Liao, Wen-Hsuan Tsai, and Zheng-Wei Lin, "Penetrating the Grassroots: First-Secretaries-in-Residence and Rural Politics in Contemporary China: • Problems of PostCommunism 67, no. 2 (2020): 169-79.

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*

62. Kevin J. O'Brien and Rongbin Han, "Path to Democracy? Assessing Village Elections in China;" *Journal of Contemporary China* 18, no. 60 (2009): 359-78; Han Zhang, Huirong Chen, and Jishu Wang, "Meritocracy in Village Elections: The 'Separation of Election and Employment' Scheme in Rural China;" *Journal of Contemporary China* 28, no. 119 (2019): 779-94.

63. "Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan guanyu da ying tuopin gongjianzhan san nian xingdong de zhidao yijian" [*Guiding opinions of the CCP Central and State Council on the three-year action to win the war against poverty*], *Renmin ribao*, August 20, 2018, 1.

64. "Xiang zhongdian xiangcun chixu xuanpai zhu cun di yi shuji he gongzuo dui" [*Continue to select and dispatch first-party-secretaries-in-residence and work teams*

to villages requiring extra support], *Renmin ribao*, May 12, 2021, 1.

65. "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisan ge wu nian guihua gangyad" [Outline of the PRC 13th five-year plan on national economic and social development], *Renmin ribao*, March 18, 2016, 1.

66. "Jin qian wan ren yi di fupin banqian renwu quanmian wancheng" [Full completion of the mission of relocating nearly 10 million people for poverty alleviation], *Jingji ribao*, January 29, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/local/2021-01/29/c_1127039090.htm (accessed June 2, 2021).

67. Sarah Rogers, Jie Li, Kevin Lo, Hua Guo, and Cong Li, "China's Rapidly Evolving Practice of Poverty Resettlement: Moving Millions to Eliminate Poverty: • Development Policy Review 38 (2020): 541-54.

68. Kevin Lo and Mark Wang, "How Voluntary Is Poverty Alleviation Resettlement in China?" *Habitat International* 73 (2018): 34-42, at 37-38.

69. Bingwen Zheng (*~*) (), "Hou 2020 shiqi jianli wending tuopin chang xiao jizhi de sikad" [Thoughts on establishing a stable and effective mechanism for poverty alleviation in the long term in the post-2020 period], *Hongguan jingjiguanli* 9 (2019): 17-25, 21.

70. Jennifer Golan, Terry Sicular, and Nithin Umapathi, "Unconditional Cash Transfers in China: Who Benefits from the Rural Minimum Living Standard Guarantee (dibao) Program?" *WorldDevelopment* 93 (2017): 316-36.

71. Bingwen Zheng, "Hou 2020 shiqi jianli wending tuopin chang xiao jizhi de sikao;" 21.

72. State Council Poverty Alleviation Office, "Fupin kaifa jian dang li ka gongzuo fang'an" [Work plan for jiangang lika for the purpose of poverty alleviation and development], *Gov.cn*, April 2, 2014, http://www.cpad.gov.cn/art/2014/4/ll/art_50_23761.html (accessed June 2, 2021).

73. Zeng, "Managed Campaign and Bureaucratic Institutions in China;" 407-408; Yueli Wang (: Effi~), "Shuzi xia xiang: nongcun jingzhun fupin zhong de jishu zhili" [Data going down to the countryside: Technical governance for targeted poverty alleviation in villages], *Shehuixue yanjiu* 6 (2016): 119-42, 126-27, 134.

74. Jie Yang, "The Politics of the dang'an: Specialization, Spatialization, and Neoliberal Governmentality in China;" *Anthropological Quarterly* 84, no. 2 (2011): 507-33.

75. Zheng, "Hou 2020 shiqi jianli wending tuopin chang xiao jizhi de sikao;" • 20.

76. Interview with Matthew Chitwood in May 2021.

77. Wang, "Shuzi xia xiang: nongcun jingzhun fupin zhong de jishu zhili;" 130-36.
78. *The other three winds are: bureaucratism, hedonism, and extravagance.*
79. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan, 150. *There are no published selection criteria for the eastern and western counties in the scheme.*
80. "Zhong ban guo ban yinfa 'guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang dongxi bu fupin xiezuo gongzuo de zhidao yijian'" [The general office of the CCP Central and State Council issued the "guiding opinions on further strengthening cooperation on east-to-west poverty alleviation"], Renmin ribao, December 8, 2016, 1.
81. *The conversion from CNY to USD is made on the basis of the 2020 exchange rate of the IRS.*
82. Victor Couture, Benjamin Faber, Yizhen Gu, and Lizhi Liu, "Connecting the Countryside via E-Commerce: Evidence from China;" *American Economic Review: Insights* 3, no. 1 (2021): 35-50.
83. Lijie Fang and Chien-Chung Huang, "Targeted Poverty Alleviation in China: Evidence from Jingdong E-Commerce Poverty Alleviation: • *Poverty and Public Policy* 12, no. 4 (2020): 386-96.
84. "2020 nian Zhongguo zhongyang caizheng zhuanxiang fupin zijin da 1461 yi yuan" [China's central earmarked fund for poverty alleviation reached 146.1 billion yuan in 2020], Zhongguo xinwen wang, December 2, 2020, <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1684974058326254598&wfr=spider&for=pc> (accessed June 4, 2021). *The conversion from CNY to USD is made on the basis of the 2020 exchange rate of the IRS.*
85. CCP Central and State Council, "Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang dongxi bu fupin xiezuo gongzuo de zhidao yijian: •
86. Jinping Xi, "Zai quanguo tuopin gongjian zongjie biao Zhang dahui shang de jianghua" [Speech at the national meeting to conclude the poverty alleviation campaign and to honor model poverty fighters], Xinhua, February 25, 2021, <http://jhsjk.people.cn/article/32037041> (accessed June 4, 2021).
87. Ibid.
88. CCP cell of National Rural Revitalization Bureau, "Renlei jian pin shishang de weida qiji" [A great miracle in the poverty reduction history of humankind], Qiushi, February 15, 2021, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2021-02/15/c_1127089936.htm (accessed June 4, 2021).
89. Jinping Xi, "Jianchi yifa zhi jiang" [Persist in governing Xinjiang according to law],

- Xinhua, September 26, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-09/26/c_1126544371.htm (accessed December 14, 2021). The conversion from CNY to USD is made on the basis of the 2019 exchange rate of the IRS.
90. Geoffrey Nice, Nick Vetch, Tim Clark, Raminder Kaur, Parveen Kumar, David Linch, Ambreena Manji, Audrey Osler, and Catherine Roe, "Uyghur Tribunal Judgement: Summary Form;" Uyghur Tribunal, December 9, 2021, <https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Uyghur-Tribunal-Summary-Judgment-9th-Dec-21.pdf> (accessed December 14, 2021).
91. Adrian Zenz, "'Thoroughly Reforming Them towards a Healthy Heart Attitude': China's Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang;" *Central Asian Survey* 38, no. 1 (2019): 102-28.
92. "Fact Check: Lies on Xinjiang-Related Issues versus the Truth;" Xinhua, February 5, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-02/05/c_139723816.htm (accessed June 4, 2021).
93. Chris Buckley and Steven Lee Myers, "China Said It Closed Muslim Detention Camps: There's Reason to Doubt That;" *New York Times*, August 9, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/09/world/asia/china-xinjiang-muslim-detention.html> (accessed June 4, 2021).
94. Adrian Zenz, "Coercive Labor and Forced Displacement in Xinjiang's CrossRegional Labor Transfers: A Process-Oriented Evaluation;" Jamestown Foundation, March 2021, <https://jamestown.org/product/coercive-labor-and-forced-displacement-in-xinjiangs-cross-regional-labor-transfer-program/> (accessed May 30, 2021).
95. Nice et al., "Uyghur Tribunal Judgement"; Matthew Hill, David Campanale, and Joel Gunter, "'Their Goal Is to Destroy Everyone': Uighur Camp Detainees Allege Systematic Rape;" *BBC*, February 2, 2021, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asiachina-55794071> (accessed June 3, 2021).
96. "Fact Check:"
97. "China Uighurs: Xinjiang Ban on Long Beards and Veils;" *BBC*, April 1, 2017, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-39460538> (accessed June 2, 2021).
98. Nathan Ruser, James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, and Tilla Hoja, "Cultural Erasure;" *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, September 24, 2020, <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cultural-erasure> (accessed June 2, 2021).
99. Ministry of Education, "Quanguo tongchou xianyu nei chengxiang yiwu jiaoyu

- yiti hua gaige fazhan xianchang tuijin hui: dianxing anli" [Successful examples promoted at the national on-the-spot promotion meeting for the coordination of the reform and development of compulsory education in urban and rural areas at the county level in an integrated manner], Gov.en, January 9, 2018, http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/xw_zt/moe_357/jyzt_2017nztzl/ztzl_xyncs/ztzl_xy_dxjy/201801/t20180109_324074.html, 232 (accessed June 2, 2021).
100. Xi, "Jianchi yifa zhi jiang:'
101. Xi's remarks to Xinjiang delegates to the National People's Congress on March 10, 2017, available at: <https://mzt.sc.gov.cn/scmzt/xyd/2017/5/3/l/72d216c6cf824ad5b26740384ef68bc9.shtml> (accessed June 2, 2021).
102. "Subsidies for Han Settlers 'Engineering Demographics' in Uyghur-Majority Southern Xinjiang;" Radio Free Asia, April 13, 2020, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/settlers-04132020172143.html> (accessed June 4, 2021); "Zhuanyi jiuye renshu chixu zengzhang" [Labor transfer employments continue to increase], Xinjiang ribao, October 10, 2020, <https://news.sina.cn/gn/2020-10-10/detail-iihvvpwzl230022.d.html> (accessed May 24, 2021).
103. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan, 300-301.
104. Xi, "Zai quanguo tuopin gongjian zongjie biao Zhang dahui shang de jianghua:'
105. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan, 157.
106. Jinping Xi, "Zai jie jue 'liang bu chou san baozhang' tuchu wen ti zuotan hui shang de jianghua" [Speech at the symposium on solving the outstanding issues of the "two worries-not and three guarantees"], Qiushi, August 15, 2019, <http://jhsjk.people.cn/article/31298180> (accessed June 3, 2021).
107. Xi, "Zai quanguo tuopin gongjian zongjie biao Zhang dahui shang de jianghua:'
108. Matthew Chitwood, "For China, Ending Poverty Is Just the Beginning;" Foreign Affairs, November 19, 2020, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-11-19/china-ending-poverty-just-beginning> (accessed May 30, 2021).
109. Hanjie Wang, Qiran Zhao, Yunli Bai, Linxiu Zhang, and Xiaohua Yu, "Poverty and Subjective Poverty in Rural China;" Social Indicators Research 150 (2020): 219-42. The conversion from CNY to USD is made on the basis of the 2016 exchange rate of the IRS.
110. "Guowuyuan zongli Li Keqiang huida zhongwai jizhe ti wen" [Premier Li Keqiang answered questions from Chinese and foreign journalists], Xinhua, May 28, 2020,

<https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1667934922251536007&wfr=spider&for=pc> (accessed June 4, 2021). The conversion from CNY to USD is made on the basis of the 2020 exchange rate of the IRS.

111. Ibid.

112. "Lishi xing de kuayue xin fendou de qidian: Xi Jinping zong shuji guanyu da ying tuopin gongjianzhan zhongyao lunshu zongshu" [A historic breakthrough and a new starting point for striving forward: A summary of general secretary Xi Jinping's important remarks on winning the war against party], *Renmin ribao*, February 24, 2021, 1.

فصل پنجم

1. "China to Leapfrog US as World's Biggest Economy by 2028: Think Tank," Reuters, December 26, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-chinaeconomy-idUSKBN29000C> (accessed May 2, 2022).

2. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan*, 213, 203.

3. Ibid., 213.

4. Jinping Xi, "Nuli chengwei shijie zhuyao kexue zhongxin he chuangxin gaodi" [Strive to become the global scientific hub and innovation high ground], *Qiushi*, March 15, 2021, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2021-03/15/c_1127209130.htm (accessed February 8, 2022).

5. Jinping Xi, "Jianding bu yi zou Zhongguo tese zizhu chuangxin daolu" [Walk the path of independent innovation with Chinese characteristics unswervingly], *Renmin wang*, March 3, 2016, theory.people.com.cn/nl/2016/0303/c402884-28169080.html (accessed January 25, 2022).

6. Jinping Xi, "Jianding bu yi zou Zhongguo tese zizhu chuangxin daolu (2)" [Walk the path of independent innovation with Chinese characteristics unswervingly (2)], *Renmin wang*, March 3, 2016, theory.people.com.cn/nl/2016/0303/c402884-28169080.html (accessed January 25, 2022).

7. Ibid.; Xi, "Jianding bu yi zou Zhongguo tese zizhu chuangxin daolu:'

8. Jinping Xi, "Zai Zhongguo kexueyuan di ershi ci yuanshi dahui, Zhongguo gongchengyuan di shiwu ci yuanshi dahui, Zhongguo ke xie di shi ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de jianghua" [Speech at the joint meeting of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Chinese Academy of Engineering, and the China Association for Science

- and Technology*], *Renmin ribao*, May 29, 2021, 2.
9. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng*, 213.
10. "Jianshe shijie keji qiangguo, kan Xi Jinping shi da guanjian ci" [On the building of a global power that is scientifically and technologically strong, see Xi Jinping's ten key words], *Xinhua*, May 30, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/xxjxs/2018-05/30/c_1122908666.htm (accessed May 3, 2022).
11. "Guowuyuan yinfa 'Zhongguo zhizao 2025'" [The State Council issued "Made in China 2025"], *Renmin ribao*, May 20, 2015, 1.
12. For the 2020 document, see National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, and Ministry of Finance, "Guanyu kuoda zhanlue xing xinxing chanye touzi peiyu zhuangda xin zengzhang dian zengzhang ji de zhidao yijian" [Guiding opinions on the expansion of investment in strategic emerging industries and on the cultivation and consolidation of new growth points and poles], *Gov.en*, September 8, 2020, https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/tz/202009/t20200925_1239582.html?code=&state=123 (accessed May 3, 2022).
13. Xi, "Zai Zhongguo kexueyuan di ershi ci yuanshi dahui, Zhongguo gongchengyuan di shiwu ci yuanshi dahui, Zhongguo ke xie di shi ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de jianghua:"
14. Xi, "Jianding bu yi zou Zhongguo tese zizhu chuangxin daolu (2):"
15. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan*, 412-14; Elsa B. Kania and Lorand Laskai, "Myths and Realities of China's Military-Civil Fusion Strategy;" *Center for a New American Security*, January 28, 2021, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/myths-and-realities-of-chinas-military-civil-fusion-strategy> (accessed July 7, 2021).
16. Xi, "Jianding bu yi zou Zhongguo tese zizhu chuangxin daolu:"
17. Ibid.
18. Fenghua Pan, Fangzhu Zhang, and Fulong Wu, "State-Led Financialization in China: The Case of the Government-Guided Investment Fund;" *China Quarterly* 247 (2021), 749-72.
19. Liang Jiang (江梁), "Zhengfu yindao jijin: 12 wan yi de kunjing yu maodun" [Government guidance funds: The ¥12 trillion dilemma and contradictions], *Sina*, December 13, 2018, <https://cj.sina.com.cn/artides/view/1720289731/668989c301900fx38> (accessed July 20, 2021).

20. Zero2IPO Group, "Qingke shuju: 2020 nian yindao jin sheli fanghuan, you jijin yi nian touchu shi ji zhi zi jijin" [Zero2IPO's data: The establishment of guidance funds slowed in 2020, some funds invest more than a dozen sub-funds in a year], Sina, February 10, 2021, https://stock.finance.sina.com.cn/stock/go.php/vReport_Show/kind/search/rptid/666260335318/index.phtml (accessed July 30, 2021).
21. Ngor Luong, Zachary Arnold, and Ben Murphy, "Understanding Chinese Government Guidance Funds: An Analysis of Chinese-Language Sources;" Center for Security and Emerging Technology Issue Brief, March 2021, <https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/understanding-chinese-government-guidance-funds/>, 22 (accessed July 25, 2021).
22. Zero2IPO Group, "Zero2IPO's data:' The conversion from CNY to USD is made on the basis of the 2020 exchange rate of the IRS.
23. The lack of data that provides a breakdown itself raises questions on why such data is not collected or published, particularly if government guidance funds do attract private capital.
24. Ngor Luong, Zachary Arnold, and Ben Murphy, "Understanding Chinese Government Guidance Funds:'
25. Ziyi Tang and Xiaoli Xue, "Four Things to Know about China's \$670 Billion Government Guidance Funds;" Caixin, February 5, 2020, <https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-02-25/four-things-to-know-about-chinas-670-billion-government-guidance-funds-IO1520348.html> (accessed January 29, 2022).
26. Ibid.
27. Josh Ye, "China's Semiconductor Output in May Hits All-Time High amid Chip Shortage and Tech War with us;" South China Morning Post, June 16, 2021, <https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-war/article/3137537/chinas-semiconductor-output-may-hits-all-time-high-amid-chip-shortage> (accessed July 18, 2021).
28. Tanwen Dawn-Hiscox, "China Grants Unigroup \$22bn to Boost Semiconductor Sector;" Data Center Dynamics, March 30, 2017, <https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/china-grants-ungroup-22bn-to-boost-semiconductor-sector/> (accessed May 3, 2022).
29. "China Gives Up on \$20bn Wuhan Chipmaking Fiasco;" Asia Financial, March 3, 2021, <https://www.asiafinancial.com/china-gives-up-on-20bn-wuhan-chipmaking-fiasco> (accessed May 3, 2022).

30. "Guowuyuan yinfa 'Zhongguo zhizao 2025:'. "
31. Kakuya Nishikawa, Xujun Song (5ltfll, '. \$), and Nan Ye (~t:fm), "Zhongguo bandaoti chanye ruhe jiasu guochan hua" [How to accelerate local production for China's semiconductor industry?], *Caijing*, January 4, 2021, https://news.caijingmobile.com/arti/de/detail/428352? source_id=43 (accessed February 1, 2021).
32. Jinping Xi, "Guojia zhong chang qi jingji shehui fazhan zhanlue ruogan zhongda wenti" [Several major issues concerning the national medium- to long-term economic and social development strategy], *Qiushi*, October 31, 2020, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-10/31/c_1126680390.htm (accessed June 10, 2021).
33. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng, 125.
34. Xi, "Jianding bu yi zou Zhongguo tese zizhu chuangxin daolu (2)"; Xin Ling, "China Reveals Plan to Build New National Labs;" *Bulletin of the Chinese Academy of Sciences*, January 2016, https://english.cas.cn/bcas/2016_1/201604/P020160408589102642600.pdf (accessed May 3, 2022).
35. This is, in Chinese, "jiefang guashuai:."
36. "Keji bu guanyu fabu guojia zhongdian yanfa jihua 'shuxue he yingyong yanjiu' deng zhongdian zhuanxiang 2021 niandu dingxiang xiangmu shenbao zhinan de tongzhi" [The Ministry of Science and Technology's notice on the release of the 2021 application guidelines for nationally targeted projects of "mathematics and applied research"]. *Gov.cn*, October 22, 2021, <https://service.most.gov.cn/u/cms/static/202105/%E9%99%84%E4%BB%B6-%E2%80%9C%E6%95%B0%E5%AD%A6%E5%92%8C%E5%BA%94%E7%94%A8%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6%E2%80%9D%E9%87%8D%E7%82%B9%E4%B8%93%E9%A1%B92021%E5%B9%B4%E5%BA%A6%E9%A1%B9%E7%9B%AE%E7%94%B3%E6%8A%A5%E6%8C%87%E5%8D%97%E5%92%8C%E2%80%9C%E6%8F%AD%E6%A6%9C%E6%8C%82%E5%B8%85%E2%80%9D%E6%A6%9C%E5%8D%9520210510175301.pdf> (accessed February 8, 2022). The conversion from CNY to USD is made on the basis of the IRS's 2021 exchange rate.
37. Ibid.
38. "Xi Jinping chuxi guoqi dangjian gongzuo huiyi: jianchi dang dui guoqi de lingdao bu dongyad" [Xi Jinping attends work conference for party-building in SO Es: Persist in the Party's leadership over SOEs unswervingly], *Xinhua*, October 11, 2016, <http://jhsjk.people.cn/article/28770122> (accessed May 4, 2022).

39. Xi, "Guojia zhong chang qi jingji shehui fazhan zhanlue ruogan zhongda wenti:"
40. "Xi Jinping zhuchi zhaokai zhongyang quanmian shenhua gaige weiyuanhui di shiliu ci huiyi" [Xi Jin ping chairs and convenes the 16th meeting of the Central Commission for Deepening Reform Comprehensively], *Renmin ribao*, November 3, 2020, 1.
41. Xi, *Xifinpingtanzhigulizheng*, 76.
42. "People's Republic of China:" *International Monetary Fund Country Report no. 19/266*, August 9, 2019, <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/08/08/Peoples-Republic-of-China-2019-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Rep-Ort-Staff-48576> (accessed June 16, 2021).
43. Tianlei Huang, "Rising SOE Defaults Alarm Investors but Could Benefit the Chinese Economy;" *China Economic Watch Blog*, Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 29, 2021, <https://www.piie.com/blogs/china-economic-watch/rising-soe-defaults-alarm-investors-could-benefit-chinese-economy> (accessed June 17, 2021).
44. Gunter Schubert and Thomas Heberer, "State-Business Relations under Xi Jinping: Steering the Private Sector and Private Entrepreneurs:" in *Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping: The Future Political Trajectory*, ed. Arthur S. Ding and Jagannath P. Panda (Oxford: Routledge, 2021), 105-30, 112.
45. Lingling Wei, "China's Xi Ramps Up Control of Private Sector: 'We Have No Choice but to Follow the Party,'" *Wall Street Journal*, December 10, 2020, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-xi-clampdown-private-sector-communist-party-11607612531> (accessed July 8, 2021).
46. Dan Jiang {江丹}, "Guoqi gaige san nian xingdong fang'an laile" [The three-year action plan for reform of SOEs has arrived], *Shenzhen Securities Times*, October 12, 2020, https://news.stcn.com/sd/202010/20201012_2419792.html (accessed February 1, 2021).
47. Dan Strumpf, "Tencent, Alibaba in Group Buying \$11.7 Billion Stake in State-Owned Telecom;" *Wall Street Journal*, August 16, 2017, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-16/unicom-to-raise-11-7-billion-via-stock-sale-to-alibaba-others> (accessed May 4, 2022).
48. Adam Y. Liu, Jean C. Oi, and Yi Zhang, "China's Local Government Debt: The Grand Bargain;" *China Journal* 87 (2022): 40-71.
49. Jinping Xi, "Shenhua jinrong gaige, cujin jingji he jinrong liangxing xunhuan jiankang

fazhan" [Deepen financial reform; promote the healthy development of the virtuous circle of the economy and finance], *Renmin ribao*, July 16, 2017, 1.

50. "China Financial Services Regulation: Increased Supervision of Large-Sum and Suspicious Transactions;" Norton Rose Fulbright, January 2017, <https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/278d4460/china-financial-services-regulation-increased-supervision-of-large-sum-and-suspicious-transactions> (accessed May 4, 2022).

51. "China's New Shadow Banking Rules Signal Fresh Push to Clamp Down Systemic Risk;" S&P Global, June 16, 2021, <https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/china-s-new-shadow-banking-rules-signal-fresh-push-to-clamp-down-systemic-risk-65022047> (accessed May 4, 2022).

52. "China Tightens Grips on Local Government Hidden Debt;" Reuters, July 26, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-debt-lgfv-idUSKBN2EW05F> (accessed May 4, 2022).

53. Nicholas R. Lardy, "China's Private Firms Continue to Struggle;" *China Economic Watch Blog*, Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 4, 2019, <https://www.piie.com/blogs/china-economic-watch/chinas-private-firms-continue-struggle> (accessed July 8, 2021).

54. Nicholas R. Lardy, "China's Private Firms Continue to Struggle: Part n;" *China Economic Watch Blog*, Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 24, 2019, <https://www.piie.com/blogs/china-economic-watch/chinas-private-firms-continue-struggle-part-ii> (accessed July 8, 2021).

55. Wanxia Lin, "Homes Are for Living in, Not Speculating On-China's Leaders;" *Asia Times*, December 16, 2016, <https://asiatimes.com/2016/12/homes-living-not-speculating-chinas-leaders/> (accessed May 4, 2022).

56. Andy Lin, Thomas Hale, and Hudson Lockett, "Half of China's Top Developers Crossed Beijing's 'Red Lines,'" *Financial Times*, October 8, 2021, <https://www.ft.com/content/d5803d64-5cc5-46f0-bed0-lbc207440f9c> (accessed April 2, 2022).

57. "Evergrande Defaults on \$1.2B in Foreign Bonds, Fitch Says, as China Intervenes in Debt-Ridden Real Estate Sector;" *CNS News*, December 9, 2021, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/evergrande-stock-china-default-bonds-fitch-chinese-market-intervention/#:~:text=Watch%20CBS%20News-,Evergrande%20defaults%20on%20%241.2B%20in%20foreign%20bonds%2C%20Fitch%20says,debt%2Dridden%20r>

- eal%20estate%20sector&text=On%20Thursday%2C%20Fitch%20confirmed%20the, to%20a%20restricted%20default%20rating (accessed March 3, 2022).
58. Weizhen Tan, "Defaults Loom over More Property Developers as China Reassures Investors on Evergrande;" *CNBC*, October 18, 2021, <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/18/china-property-defaults-risks-for-other-developers-pboc-on-evergrande.html> (accessed February 5, 2022).
59. "China to Curb New 'Hidden Debts' in 2022 to Fend Off Systemic Financial Risks;" *Global Times*, December 16, 2021, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202112/1241673.shtml> (accessed January 11, 2022).
60. Wei, "China's Xi ramps up control of private sector:"
61. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 263-64.
62. "China Fines Alibaba, Tencent in Anti-Monopoly Crackdown;" *DW*, November 20, 2021, <https://www.dw.com/en/china-fines-alibaba-tencent-in-anti-monopolycrackdown/a-59890545> (accessed February 9, 2022).
63. "Hangzhou: kaizhan yingxiang qinqing zhengshang guanxi tuchu wenti zhuanxiang zhili" [Hangzhou: The launching of a targeted rectification to address issues that affect clean government-business relations], *Gov.cn*, August 23, 2021, https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yaowen/202108/t20210813_248217.html (accessed August 24, 2021).
64. "Zhongguo gongchandang di shijiu jie zhongyang jilu jiancha weiyuanhui di liu ci quanti huiyi gongbao:"
65. Arjun Kharpal, "Huawei Says It Would Never Hand Data to China's Government: Experts Say It Wouldn't Have a Choice;" *CNBC*, March 4, 2019, <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/05/huawei-would-have-to-give-data-to-china-governm-ent-if-asked-experts.html> (accessed July 30, 2021).
66. Ernesto Londono and Leticia Casado, "Brazil Needs Vaccines: China Is Benefiting;" *New York Times*, March 15, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/15/world/americas/brazil-vaccine-china.html> (accessed July 7, 2021).
67. For state support received by Huawei, see Chuin-Wei Yap, "State Support Helped Fuel Huawei's Global Rise;" *Wall Street Journal*, December 25, 2019, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-support-helped-fuel-huaweis-global-rise-11577280736> (accessed January 3, 2022).
68. Jinping Xi, "Zai jingji shehui lingyu zhuanjia zuotan hui" [Speech at symposium with experts in economic and social fields], *Renmin ribao*, August 25, 2020, 2.

69. Jinping Xi, "Zhengque renshi he bawo zhong chang qi jingji shehui fazhan zhongda wenti" [Correctly understand and grasp the major issues of medium and long-term economic and social development], *Qiushi*, January 15, 2021, jhsjk.people.cn/article/32001270 (accessed January 31, 2021).
70. Ibid.
71. Xi, "Guojia zhong chang qi jingji shehui fazhan zhanlue ruogan zhongda wenti."
72. Yiwei Wang (: EJZ; tfe;), "'Shuang xunhuan' kaichuang 'zhuchang quanqiu hua'" ["Dual circulation" opens up "home-based globalization"], *Qiushi*, December 7, 2020, http://www.qstheory.cn/qshy/jx/2020-12/07/c_1126830421.htm (accessed June 10, 2021).
73. Jining Xi, "Zhengque renshi he bawo zhong chang qi jingji shehui fazhan zhongda wenti."
74. Xi's speech in Hebei between 29-30 December 2012, available at: "Xi Jinping tan gaishan minsheng: yao yinuo qianjin, shuo dao jiu yao zuo dao" [Xi Jinping talks about improving livelihood: It is a solemn promise, what has been said must be done], *Renmin wang*, January 9, 2019, <http://jhsjk.people.cn/article/30512335> (accessed December 31, 2021).
75. See Chapter 1.
76. "Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan guanyu zhichi zhejiang gao zhiliang fazhan jianshe gongtong fuyu shifan qu de yijian" [The CCP Central and State Council's recommendations on supporting the high-quality development of Zhejiang and its building of a common prosperity demonstration zone], *Renmin ribao*, June 11, 2021, 1.
77. Jinping Xi, "Zhashi tuidong gongtong fuyu" [Promote common prosperity solidly], *Qiushi*, October 15, 2021, www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2021-10/15/c_1127959365.htm (accessed February 3, 2022).
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. "Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan guanyu zhichi zhejiang gao zhiliang fazhan jianshe gongtong fuyu shifan qu de yijian."
82. Xi, "Zhashi tuidong gongtong fuyu."
83. Jinping Xi, "Bawo xin fazhan jieduan, guanche xin fazhan linian, goujian xin fazhan

- geju" [Grasp the new development stage, thoroughly implement new development concepts, build a new development pattern], Qiushi, April 30, 2021, www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2021-04/30/c_1127390013.htm (accessed June 10, 2021).
84. For the meaning of these terms, see the discussion of the second distribution to come in this chapter.
85. Xi, "Zhashi tuidong gongtong fuyu: 'Muqian woguo linghuo jiuye guimo da 2 yi ren" [200 million people are flexibly employed at present], Gov.en, May 20, 2021, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-05/20/content_5609599.htm (accessed February 3, 2022).
87. Jinping Xi, "Zhengque renshi he bawo woguo fazhan zhongda lilun he shijian wenti" [Correctly understand and grasp the major theoretical and practical problems of China's development], Qiushi, May 15, 2022, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/2020-06/04/c_1126073255.htm (accessed May 17, 2022).
88. "Gongtong fuyu! Jili zhengshi fa bu gongtong fuyu jihua xingdong gangling" [Common prosperity! Geely formally announces their common prosperity action plan], Baidu, July 6, 2021, <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1704514255562076701&wfr=spider&for=pc> (accessed February 5, 2022).
89. "Zai zeng 500 yi yuan zijin, tengx: un qidong 'gongtong fuyu zhuanxiang jihua'" [Another ¥50 billions of funds: Tencent launched "targeted plan for common prosperity"], Renmin wang, August 19, 2021, <http://gongyi.people.com.cn/nl/2021/0819/cl51132-32199448.html> (accessed February 6, 2022). The conversion from CNY to USD is made on the basis of the IRS's 2021 exchange rate.
90. "Alibaba jituan touru 1,000 yi yuan renminbi zhuli gongtong fuyu" [Alibaba group injects ¥100 billion to promote common prosperity], Alibaba Group, September 3, 2021, <https://www.alibabagroup.com/cn/news/article?news=p210903> (accessed February 4, 2022).
91. "China's JD.com CEO Joins Billionaire Charity Rush with \$2.3 Bln Share Pledge," Reuters, February 2, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/article/jdcom-ceo-charity/chinas-jd-com-ceo-joins-billionaire-charity-rush-with-62-mln-share-pledge-id USL4N2UDISO> (accessed February 5, 2022).
92. Xi, "Zhashi tuidong gongtong fuyu: 'Zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhi ju zhaokai huiyi, Xi Jinping zhuchi" [Politburo meeting convenes; Xi Jinping chairs], Xinhua, December 4, 2021, <http://jhsjk.people>.

cn/article/19791288 (accessed May 4, 2022).

فصل ششم

1. Jinping Xi, *Lun Zhongguo gongchandang lishi* [On the history of the Chinese Communist Party] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2021), 244.
2. "Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China;" available at: <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eelceus/Eng/ywzn/lsw/vpna/faq/t710012.htm> (accessed January 18, 2022).
3. Ibid.
4. Suisheng Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).
5. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng, 40.
6. Xi, *Lun Zhongguo gongchandang lishi*, 2.
7. Jinping Xi, "Zai kexuejia zuotan hui shang de jianghua" [Speech at symposium with scientists], *Renmin ribao*, September 12, 2020, 2.
8. Jinping Xi, "Zai qiyejia zuotan hui shang de jianghua" [Speech at symposium with entrepreneurs], *Renmin ribao*, July 22, 2020, 2.
9. Ibid.
10. Xi, "Zai kexuejia zuotan hui shang de jianghua:"
11. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng, 59.
12. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng, 64.
13. See Clive Hamilton and Mareike Ohlberg, *Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party Is Reshaping the World* (London: Oneworld Publications, 2021).
14. Jin ping Xi, "Zai qingzhu Zhongguo gongchandang chengli 100 zhounian dahui shang de jianghua" [Speech at the celebration ceremony of the centenary of the establishment of the CCP], *Renmin ribao*, July 2, 2021, 2.
15. "Jiaoyu bu guanyu yinfa 'xin shidai gaoxiao jiaoshi zhiye xingwei shi xiang zhunze: 'xin shidai zhong xiao xue jiaoshi zhiye xingwei shi xiang zhunze: 'xin shidai you'eryuan jiaoshi zhiye xingwei shi xiang zhunze' de tongzhi" [Ministry of Education's notice concerning the release of 'ten guidelines for the professional conduct of new-era university teachers;' 'ten guidelines for the professional conduct of new-era secondary school and primary school teachers;' and 'ten guidelines for the professional conduct of kindergarten teachers'], *Gov.cn*, November 16, 2018, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-11/16/content_5341065.htm (accessed January 12, 2022).

16. Ibid.
17. Jinping Xi, "Zai zhexue shehui kexue gongzuo zuotan hui shang de jianghua" [Speech at symposium on the work of philosophy and social sciences], *Renmin ribao*, May 19, 2016, 2.
18. Patapan and Wang, "The Hidden Ruler:."
19. Weiwei Zhang (iti. ~tlj, J), "Wanquan you keneng ba Zhongguo zhengzhi gushi jiang de geng touche, geng jingcai" [It is entirely possible to tell a clearer and more exciting story of Chinese politics], *Guancha*, June 23, 2021, https://www.guancha.cn/ZhangWeiWei/2021_06_23_595469_s.shtml (accessed June 24, 2021).
20. For Yuan's essays, see his personal webpage, available at: <http://www.aisixiang.com/thinktank/YuanPeng.html>.
21. "Putong gaodeng xuexiao fudao yuan duiwu jianshe guiding" [Regulations on the construction of a corps of guidance counselors at colleges and universities], Ministry of Education, May 31, 2018, <http://www.gxgsxy.com/public/xgzx/gzgd/2018/05/31/15264530715.html> (accessed December 11, 2021); "Putting the Party at the Center of Education;" China Media Project, June 23, 2021, <https://chinamediaproject.org/2021/06/23/putting-the-party-at-the-center-of-education/> (accessed June 30, 2021).
22. Xi's speech on September 30, 2018, available at: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1629780737991209052&wfr=spider&for=pc> (accessed September 20, 2021).
23. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng, 36.
24. Jinping Xi, "Zai 'qiyi xunzhang' ban shou yishi shang de jianghua" [Speech at the ceremony for awarding the "July 1st medal"], *Renmin ribao*, June 30, 2021, 2.
25. Peng Yuan, "Meiguo xuyao yi chang shenke de zhengzhi biange" [The United States requires a profound political reform], *Huanqiu shibao*, January 12, 2017, <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrNJZGD6> (accessed May 4, 2022).
26. It seems that most of them lost their lives to a traffic accident, a rainstorm, or an illness, see "Zhi ji fupin yingxiong; chao 1800 ren xisheng zai tuopin gongjian yixian" [Tribute to poverty alleviation heroes; over 1800 people sacrificed on the front line of poverty alleviation], *CCTV*, April 3, 2021, <https://news.cctv.com/2021/04/03/ARTIsjmls2siTlCUK8FQUlcs210403.shtml> (accessed May 4, 2021).
27. "Zhongyang jingji gongzuo huiyi zai Beijing juxing" [Central economic work conference held in Beijing], *Renmin ribao*, December 17, 2016, 1.
28. Chuin-Wei Yap, "China Takes the Brakes off Coal Production to Tackle Power

Shortage;' *Wall Street Journal*, October 20, 2021, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-takes-the-brakes-off-coal-production-to-tackle-power-shortage-11634727>

835 (accessed November 11, 2021).

29. Andrew Marquardt, "Shanghai Residents Scream Out from High-Rise Apartments as Lockdown Stretches into Second Week," *Fortune*, April 11, 2022, <https://fortune.com/2022/04/11/shanghai-lockdown-residents-screaming-apartments-covid/> (accessed April 27, 2022).

30. Longjiang Hu and Xiuzhi Zhao, "China Focus: Late Science 'Lunatic' Huang Danian: Never Go Gentle into That Good Night;" *Xinhua*, May 19, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/19/c_136298913.htm (accessed June 8, 2021).

31. See Cheung, *Factional-Ideological Conflicts in Chinese Politics*, 33-35; Olivia Cheung, "Factional Model-Making in China: Party Elites' Open Political Contention in the Policy Process;" *China Quarterly* 251 (2022): 705-25.

32. Xi, *Lun Zhongguo gongchandang lishi*, 244.

33. "Xin shidai aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shishi gangyad" [Implementation outline for patriotism education for a new era], *Renmin ribao*, November 13, 2019, 6. See Chapter 1 for the meaning and context of "four consciousnesses" and "two upholds":

34. Xi, *Lun Zhongguo gongchandang lishi*, 107-11.

35. "Qing dang fangxin; qiang guoyou wd" [Party, please be assured that you can count on me to make the country strong], *Renmin ribao*, July 11, 2021, 5.

36. Xi, "Zai qingzhu Zhongguo gongchandang chengli 100 zhounian dahui shang de jianghua:"

37. Matthew Taylor King, "The Gospel According to Xi;" *Wall Street Journal*, June 4, 2020, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-gospel-according-to-xi-11591310956> (accessed May 5, 2022).

38. "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu jibenfa" [Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China], available at: <https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/tc/basiclaw/index.html> (accessed May 16, 2022).

39. Jiatun Xu, {i-f-Ut!}, *Xu Jiatun Xianggang huiyilu (shang)* [Xu Jiatun's Hong Kong memoir, part I] (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshe, 1993), 152-53.

40. "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu weihu guojia anquan fa" [The Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in

- the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region*], *Renmin ribao*, July 1, 2020, 5.
41. Steve Tsang, *Governing Hong Kong: Administrative Officers from the Nineteenth Century to the Handover to China, 1862-1997* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), 172-76.
42. Jinping Xi, "Zai Aomen Tebie Xingzhengqu zhengfu huanying wanyan shang de zhici" [Speech at the welcome dinner of the government of the Macau Special Administrative Region], *Renmin ribao*, December 19, 2019, 2.
43. Xi, *Lun Zhongguo gongchandang lishi*, 108.
44. Jinping Xi, "Jianchi Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi jiaoyu fazhan daolu; peiyang de zhi ti mei lao quanmian fazhan de shehui zhuyi jianshe zhe he jieban ren" [Persist in the education development path of socialism with Chinese characteristics; cultivate socialist builders and successors who are well-developed in all aspects], *Renmin ribao*, September 11, 2018, 1.
45. Jinping Xi, "Sizhengke shi luoshi lide shuren genben renwu de guanjian kecheng" [Ideology and thought work is the key module for moral and personal development], *Qiushi*, August 31, 2020, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-08/31/c_1126430247.htm (accessed May 4, 2022).
46. Edward Vickers, "Smothering Diversity: Patriotism in China's School Curriculum under Xi Jinping," *Journal of Genocide Research* 24, no. 2 (2021): 158-70, 161.
47. "Jiaoyu bu guanyu yinfa 'zhong xiao xue jiaocai guanli banfa; zhiye yuan xiao jiaocai guanli banfa' he 'putong gaodeng xuexiao jiaocai guanli banfa' de tongzhi" [Ministry of Education's notice concerning the release of the "management of teaching materials for secondary and primary schools; • "management of teaching materials for vocational training schools; • and "management of teaching materials for colleges and universities"], *Gov.en*, December 19, 2019, http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A26/moe_714/202001/t20200107_414578.html (accessed February 4, 2021); Tsukasa Hadano, "China Purges School Libraries of Western Veneration," *Nikkei Asia*, April 18, 2021, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-purges-school-libraries-of-Western-veneration2> (accessed February 1, 2021).
48. "Jiaoyu bu bangong ting guanyu yanjin youhai APP jinru zhong xiao xue xiaoyuan de tongzhi" [Ministry of Education's notice concerning banning harmful apps from entering the campus of secondary and primary schools], *Gov.en*, December 28, 2018, http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A06/s3321/201901/t20190102_365728.html (accessed September 14, 2021); "Jiaoyu bu deng ba bumen guanyu yindao

guifan jiaoyu yidong hulianwang yingyong youxu jiankang fazhan de yijian"

[Recommendations of eight departments including the Ministry of Education on guiding and regulating the orderly and healthy development of education-related mobile internet applications], Gov.en, August 15, 2019, http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/Al6/moe_784/201908/t20190829_396505.html (accessed September 14, 2021).

49. "Jiaoyu bu deng ba bumen guanyu yinfa 'zonghe fang kong ertong qingshaonian jinshi shishi fangan' de tongzhi" [Notice of eight departments including the Ministry of Education on the release of the "implementation plan for the comprehensive prevention and control of myopia for children and adolescents], Gov.en, August 30, 2018, http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/Al7/moe_943/s3285/201808/t20180830_346672.html (accessed January 1, 2021).

50. "Jinyibu jianqing yiwu jiaoyu jieduan xuesheng zuoye fudan he xiaowai peixun fudan" [Further reduction of the homework burden and off-campus training burden for students at the stage of compulsory education], Renmin ribao, July 25, 2021, 1.

51. National Health Commission, Ministry of Education, State Administration for Market Regulation, and General Administration of Sport of China, "Yingyang yu jiankang xuexiao jianshe zhinan" [Guidelines on building a nutritious and healthy school], Zhongguo jiaoyu zaixian, June 24, 2021, https://www.eol.cn/zhengce/guizhang/202106/t20210624_2127255.shtml (accessed May 5, 2022).

52. "Jiaoyu bu deng ba bumen guanyu yinfa 'zonghe fang kong ertong qingshaonian jinshi shishi fang'an' de tongzhi:."

53. Ibid.

54. Xi, "Jianchi Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi jiaoyu fazhan daolu; peiyang de zhi ti mei lao quanmian fazhan de shehui zhuyi jianshe zhe he jieban ren: •

55. The homework restrictions first appeared in the directive "Jiaoyu bu deng ba bumen guanyu yinfa 'zonghe fang kong ertong qingshaonian jinshi shishi fang'an' de tongzhi:." They are subsequently reiterated in "Jinyibu jianqing yiwu jiaoyu jieduan xuesheng zuoye fudan he xiaowai peixun fudan:."

56. "Guowuyuan bangong ting guanyu guifan xiaowai peixun jigou fazhan de yijian" [The General Office of the State Council's recommendations concerning the regulation of off-campus training organizations], Gov.en, August 22, 2018, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2018-08/22/content_5315668.htm#:~:text=%E6%A0%A1%E5%A4%96%E5%9F%B9%E8%AE%AD%E6%9C%BA%E6%9E%84%E5%BA%94

%E5%AE%9E%E4%BA %8B%E6%B 1 %82%E6%98%AF, %E6%8F%90%E5%8D%87
%E5%9F%B9%E8%AE%AD%E5%AF%B9%E8%B 1 %A1 %E6%BB%A1 %E6%84
%8F%E5%BA %A6%E3%80%82 (accessed May 4, 2022).

57. "Jinyibu jianqing yiwu jiaoyu jieduan xuesheng zuoye fudan he xiaowai peixun fudan:'

58. Alexander Chipman Koty, "More Regulatory Clarity after China Bans For-Profit Tutoring in Core Education:' China Briefing, September 27, 2021, <https://www.chinabriefing.com/news/china-bans-for-profit-tutoring-in-core-education-releases-guidelines-online-businesses/> (accessed October 25, 2021).

59. "China's Offline Tutoring Firms Decrease by 40%: Ministry of Education;' Global Times, November 1, 2021, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202111/1237799.shtml> (accessed November 4, 2021).

60. "Gongbu xiuding hou de 'minban jiaoyu cujin fa shishi tiaoli'" [Announcement of the revised "implementation regulations for the private education promotion law"], Renmin ribao, May 15, 2021, 2.

61. "2020 nian quanguo jiaoyu shiye fazhan tongji gongbao" [National education development statistics for 2020], Gov.en, August 27, 2021, www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_sjzl/sjzl_fztjgb/202108/t20210827_555004.html (accessed September 14, 2021).

62. Xi, Lun Zhongguo gongchandang lishi, 13; Jinping Xi, "Xueshi mingli, xueshi zengxin, xueshi chongde, xueshi lixing" [Learn history to develop understanding, build confidence, admire righteousness, and put what is learned into practice], Qiushi, July 2, 2021, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2021-07/02/c_1127617254.htm (accessed September 4, 2021).

63. John Fitzgerald, *Cadre Country: How China Became the Chinese Communist Party* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2022), 148.

64. See discussion of Document no. 9 in Chapter 3.

65. Zhongguo gongchandang jian shi [A brief history of the Chinese Communist Party] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2021); "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu dang de bainian fendou zhongda chengjiu he lishi jingyan de jueyi:'

66. Tony Saich, *From Rebel to Ruler: One Hundred Years of the Chinese Communist Party* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2021), 177-206; Julia C. Strauss, "Paternalistic Terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the PRC, 1950-1953;' *Comparative Studies in Society and*

History 44, no. 1 (2002): 80-105.

67. Yang Jisheng wrote: "I estimate that the Great Famine brought about 36 million unnatural deaths (referring to starvation deaths), and a shortfall of 40 million births.

China's total population loss during the Great Famine then comes to 76 million.' See Jisheng Yang, *Tombstone: The Untold Story of Maas Great Famine* (London: Allen Lane, 2012), 430. Frank Dikotter estimated that between 1.5 and 2 million people were killed during the Cultural Revolution. See Frank Dikotter, *The Cultural Revolution: A Peoples History*, xviii.

68. *Zhongguo gongchandangjian shi*, 214-15.

69. "Guanyu jianguo yilai dang de ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi" [Resolution on certain questions in the history of the Party since the founding of the PRC], *Renmin ribao*, July 1, 1981, 1.

70. *Zhongguo gongchandangjian shi*, 204.

71. *Ibid.*, 206.

72. Xi, *Lun Zhongguo gongchandang lishi*, 27, 59.

73. *Ibid.*, 139-57; *Zhongguo gongchandangjian shi*, 58.

74. *Zhongguo gongchandangjian shi*, 295.

75. *Ibid.*, 294. The fact that it was the Vietnamese who won against the French, albeit with substantial Chinese support, rather than a Chinese victory over the United States was ignored.

76. *Ibid.*, 98-101.

77. *Ibid.*, 93-94.

78. *Ibid.*, 201, 208-209.

79. Zerong Xu, *Sulian aoyuan Ju gong dang'an* [Archive of the Soviet Union's Assistance to the Chinese Communist Party] (Hong Kong: Xiafeier chuban youxian gongsi, 2022).

80. Vincent K. L. Chang, "Recalling Victory, Recounting Greatness: Second World War Remembrance in Xi Jinping's China," *China Quarterly* 248, no. 1 (2021): 1152-73.

81. "Xi Jinping chuxi di qishiliu jie lianheguo dahui yiban xing bianlun bing fabiao zhongyao jianghua" [Xi Jinping attends the general debate of the 76th session of the UN general assembly and delivers an important speech], *Renmin ribao*, September 22, 2021, 1.

82. *Zhongguo gongchandangjian shi*, 149.

83. Both Tibet and Xinjiang were conquered by the Manchu (Qing) authorities and were governed separately from China proper, which was also a conquered territory of the Manchu

Empire. The Chinese Republic inherited them from the Manchus after the Revolution of 1911. Parts of Xinjiang also came under Tang rule, but the Tang royal family was half-Turkic and half-Han, thus the Tang dynasty was not strictly speaking a Han-governed dynasty.

84. Steve Tsang, 'From Japanese Colony to Sacred Chinese Territory: Taiwan's Geostrategic Significance to China,' *Twentieth Century China* 45, no. 3 (2020): 351-68.

85. *Zhongguo gongchandang jian shi*, 112. *The reality that the Nanjing Massacre in December 1937 happened four full years before the United States even joined the Pacific War as a result of the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor (December 1941), shows how much respect the history textbook pays to facts.*

86. *Ibid.*, 117-20.

87. *Ibid.*, 148.

88. *Ibid.*, 153-54.

89. *Ibid.*, 199.

90. *Ibid.*, 269.

91. *Ibid.*, 323.

92. *Ibid.*, 323.

93. *Ibid.*, 498.

94. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng*, 22-23.

95. Xi, "Jianchi lishi weiwu zhuyi, buduan kaipi dangdai Zhongguo makesi zhuyi fazhan xin jingjie:"

96. *Ibid.*

97. "Jiaoyu bu deng ba bumen guanyu jiakuai goujian gaoxiao sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo tixi de yijian" [Recommendations of eight departments including the Ministry of Education on accelerating the construction of the ideology and thought work system in higher education institutions], *Gov.en*, April 22, 2020, http://www.gov.cn/zhen gce/zhengceku/2020-05/15/content_5511831.htm (accessed September 3, 2021).

98. "Xi Jinping xin shidai Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi sixiang jin kecheng jiaocai zhinan" [A guide for including Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era in the teaching materials for courses], *Gov.en*, July 21, 2021, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2021-08/25/content_5633152.htm (accessed September 9, 2021).

99. *Ibid.*

100. *Ibid.*

101. "Fujian dangyuan zhuyi! Cong jintian qi 'xuexi qiangguo zheyang zuo caineng manfen!" [Fujian party members pay attention! Only doing this can achieve full marks in Xuexi qiangguo from today], Xiaoxiang ehenbao, October 20, 2020, <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1681092439605761480&wfr=spider&for=pc> (accessed August 18, 2021).
102. "Xuexi qiangguo shangxian fangyi jiankang ma" [Health code for pandemic prevention now available in Xuexi qiangguo], Bilibili, February 2, 2021, <https://www.bilibili.com/read/cv9600163/> (accessed February 4, 2021).
103. "Xin shidai aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shishi gangyao:'
104. Jinping Xi, "Zai Beijing daxue shi sheng zuotan hui shang de jianghua" [Speech at symposium with Beijing University's teachers and students], Renmin ribao, May 3, 2018, 2.
105. Ibid.
106. Primrose Riordan, "China Limits Children to 3 Hours of Online Gaming a Week," Financial Times, August 31, 2021, <https://www.ft.com/content/adel5372-a3f6-4b60-807a-06a4fde9l9dd> (accessed September 1, 2021).
107. "Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang yule mingxing wangshang xinxi guifan xiangguan gongzuo de tongzhi" [Notice on further strengthening the work related to regulating the information of celebrities on the internet], Gov.cn, November 23, 2021, http://www.cac.gov.cn/2021-11/22/c_1639177815325970.htm (accessed May 5, 2022).
108. "Xi Jinping de xinwen yulun guan" [Xi Jinping's views on news and public opinion], Renmin wang, February 25, 2016, <http://jhsjk.people.cn/article/28147896> (accessed January 5, 2021).
109. "Guanyu 'shichang zhun ru furnian qingdan (2021 nianban)' youguan qingkuang de shuoming" [Explanations on the "market access negative list (2021 edition)"], Gov. en, November 10, 2021, <https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/yjzxDownload/sczrfmqd2021.pdf> (accessed January 13, 2022).
110. Jinping Xi, "Zhashi tuidong gongtong fuyu:'
111. Waiyee Yip, "China Steps in to Regulate Brutal '996' Work Culture," BBC, September 2, 2021, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-58381538> (accessed September 4, 2021).

فصل هفتم

1. *The original Chinese description (renlei mingyun gongtongti) is regularly mistranslated as "a community of shared future for humanity:' The Chinese Government uses this mistranslation in the same way it renders in non-Chinese languages the state chairmanship of the PRC as the state "president" when such an office does not exist in China, as it enables non-Chinese to mislead themselves. The original Chinese term does not include the word or concept of a "community:' The distinction is important. Xi conceives of the common destiny for the "humankind" as a unitary whole that can be hierarchical or top-down. A "community;' in contrast, implies agency for members of the community, and whoever leads the humankind must work with its constituent members, accepting if not respecting their agency.*
2. *For a discussion of the concepts of global order and global norms, see Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 2-15.*
3. *"Xi Jinping chuxi di qishiliu jie lianheguo dahui yiban xing bianlun bing fabiao zhongyao jianghua:'*
4. *Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021); Goldstein, "China's Grand Strategy under Xi Jinping"; John Mearsheimer, "The Inevitable Rivalry: America, China, and the Tragedy of Great-Power Politics;' Foreign Affairs, November/December 2021, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-19/inevitable-rivalry-coldwar> (accessed April 6, 2022).*
5. *"Shisan yi dalu tongbao he liang qian sanbai wan Taiwan tongbao shi xuemai xianglian de mingyun gongtongti" [The 1.3 billion mainland compatriots and 23 million Taiwan compatriots are a community of common destiny linked by blood], Renmin ribao, January 18, 2008, 2.*
6. *Jinping Xi, "Xieshou jianshe Zhongguo-dongmeng mingyun gongtongti" [Join hands to build an entity of common destiny between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations], Renmin ribao, October 4, 2013, 2.*
7. *Jinping Xi, "Zai ya fei lingdao ren huiyi shang de jianghua" [Speech at the Asian African Summit], Xinhua, April 22, 2015, <http://jhsjk.people.cn/article/26888455> (accessed April 3, 2022).*
8. *Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan, 53 7-49.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Jinping Xi, "Zai Zhongguo gongchandang yu shijie zhengdang gaoceng duihua hui shang de zhuzhi jianghua" [Keynote speech at the high-level dialogue between CCP and world political parties], Renmin ribao, December 2, 2017, 2.*

11. Jinping Xi, "Shunying shidai qianjin chaoliu, cujin shijie heping fazhan" [Go along with the trend of the times, and promote world peace and development], *Renmin ribao*, March 24, 2013, 2.
12. See, for example, Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 440.
13. Ibid.
14. Zhaosong Qu (il~tl), "Liang ge 'zuida gongyue shu' tongpin gongzhen, gongjian meihao shijie" [The two greatest common denominators reinforce each other to build a better world], *71.cn*, January 31, 2018, <http://www.71.cn/2018/0131/984709.shtml> (accessed April 5, 2022).
15. See Andrew J. Nathan and Boshu Zhang, "'A Shared Future for Mankind': Rhetoric and Reality in Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping," *Journal of Contemporary China* 31, no. 133 (2022): 57-71.
16. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 120.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Some have pointed out that the term "tribute" is Fairbank's invention because it cannot be found in the Chinese language. See Yongjin Zhang and Barry Buzan, "The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 5 (2012): 3-36.
20. Ibid.; June Teufel Dreyer, "The 'Tianxia Trope': Will China Change the International System?" *Journal of Contemporary China* 24, no. 96 (2015): 1015-31; John King Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968); Ming Liu, "Xi Jinping's Vision of a Community with a Shared Future for Humankind: A Revised International Order?" *National Bureau of Asian Research special report*, no. 85, June 2, 2020, 13-23, <https://www.nbr.org/publication/xi-jinpings-vision-of-a-community-with-a-shared-future-forhumankind-a-revised-international-order/> (accessed February 16, 2022).
21. Mingming Wang, "All under Heaven (tianxia): Cosmological Perspectives and Political Ontologies in Pre-Modern China," *HUA: Journal of Ethnographic Theory* 2, no. 1 (2012): 337-83, at 352.
22. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 120.
23. For the view of historians, see Dreyer, "The 'Tianxia Trope';"; Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order*; and Zhang and Buzan, "The Tributary System."
24. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 120.

25. Ibid.
26. *The regime was the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek, which sought refuge in Taiwan after being driven out of the Chinese Mainland in 1949.*
27. Xi's speech at the Central Military Commission Reform Work Conference on November 24, 2015, available at: <https://www.xuexi.cn/lgpage/detail/index.html?id=14487048638067766190> (accessed June 11, 2022).
28. Philip C. Saunders, Arthur S. Ding, Andrew Scobell, Andrew N. D. Yang, and Joel Wuthnow (eds.), *Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms* (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2019); Xi's November 28, 2022, speech at the PLA central theater command and March 7, 2022, speech at a plenary meeting of the delegation of the PLA and People's Armed Police Force at the fifth session of the 13th National People's Congress, available at: https://www.xuexi.cn/lgpage/detail/index.html?id=2097929275510246423&item_id=2097929275510246423.
29. "Xi Jinping 2022 nian san yue qi ri zai chuxi shisan jie quanguo renda wu ci huiyi jiefangjun he wujing budui daibiao tuan quanti huiyi shi de jianghua" [Xi Jinping's speech at the plenary meeting of the delegation of the PLA and the People's Armed Force at the fifth session of the 13th National People's Congress on March 7, 2022], Xinhua, March 7, 2022, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-03/07/content_5677717.htm (accessed June 30, 2022).
30. "Zai qingzhu Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun jian jun 90 zhounian dahui shang de jianghua" [Speech at the celebration of the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army], Renmin ribao, August 2, 2017, 2.
31. Joel McFadden, Kim Fassler, and Justin Godby, "The New PLA Leadership: Xi Molds China's Military to His Vision," in Saunders et al., *Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA*, 57-82.
32. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan, 390-1.
33. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng, 238.
34. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan, 443.
35. Ibid., 202-203, and Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan, 22-3, 118-30, especially 119-21.
36. Jinping Xi, "Zai qingzhu Zhongguo gongchandang chengli 100 zhounian dahui shang de jianghua" [Speech at the celebration of the centenary of the founding of the CCP], Renmin ribao, July 2, 2021, 2.
37. Ibid.
38. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan, 14.

39. Richard Q. Turcsanyi, Klara Dubravcikova, Kristina Kironska, Tao Wang, James Iocovozzi, Peter Gries, Veronika Vasekova, and Andrew Chubb, "Chinese Views of the World at the Time of the Russia-Ukraine War: Evidence from a March 2022 Public Opinion Survey," Palacky University Olomouc and Central European Institute of Asian Studies, May 12, 2022, <https://ceias.eu/chinese-views-of-the-world-atthe-time-of-the-russia-ukraine-war/> (accessed June 11, 2022). See also Suisheng Zhao, "From Affirmative to Assertive Patriots: Nationalism in Xi Jinping's China," *Washington Quarterly* 44, no. 4 (2021): 141-61.
40. Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, *China's Search for Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
41. State Council Information Office, "Zhongguo de heping fazhan baipishu" [White paper on China's peaceful development], September 6, 2011, <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/nd/2011/document/999798/999798.htm> (accessed April 8, 2022).
42. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 226.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. "Xi Jinping zai zhongyang dangxiao (guojia xingzheng xueyuan) zhong qingnian ganbu peixun ban kai ban shi shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua" [Xi Jinping delivered an important speech at the opening ceremony of the training course for young-and-middle cadres at the Central Party School (National School of Administration)], *Xinhua*, September 1, 2021, <http://jhsjk.people.cn/article/32214888> (accessed April 9, 2022).
46. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 120.
47. "Xi Jinping zai zhongyang dangxiao (guojia xingzheng xueyuan) zhong qingnian ganbu peixun ban kai ban shi shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua."
48. For example, Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan*, 449, 537-49.
49. David Dollar, "Is China's Development Finance a Challenge to the International Order?" *Asian Economic Policy Review* 13 (2018): 283-98; John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, "Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective," *Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development* 3, no. 1 (2019): 139-75.
50. Elizabeth C. Economy, *The World According to China* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018); Bruno Mac, *Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order* (London: Hurst & Company, 2020).
51. "Xi Jinping zai zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhi ju di sanshi ci jiti xuexi shi qiangdiao jiaqiang

he gaijin guoji chuanbo gongzuo, zhanshi zhenshi liti quanmian de Zhonggud' [Xi Jinping emphasized at the 30th collective study session of the Politburo Standing Committee: strengthen and improve international communication work to display a true, three-dimensional, and comprehensive China], Xinhua, June 1, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2021-06/01/c_1127517

461.htm (accessed April 9, 2022).

52. "Xi Jinping zai di san ci 'yidai yilu' jianshe zuotan hui shang qiangdiao yi gao biao zhun ke chixu hui min sheng wei mubiao, jixu tuidong gong jian 'yidai yilu' gao zhiliang fazhan" [Xi Jinping emphasized taking high standard, sustainability, and livelihood improvement as the goals to continue to promote and to jointly push forward the high-quality development of the BRI], Renmin ribao, November 20, 2021, 1.

53. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng, 309.

54. See, for example, "Xi Jinping tong Deguo zongli Mo keer tong dianhua" [Xi Jinping talks with German chancellor Angela Merkel on the phone], Xinhua, April 7, 2021, <http://jhsjk.people.cn/article/32072157> (accessed April 9, 2022).

55. Patrick Kollner, "Australia and New Zealand Recalibrate Their China Policies: Convergence and Divergence," *Pacific Review* 34, no. 3 (2021): 405-36.

56. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng, 356.

57. Ibid., 307.

58. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan, 462.

59. Xi, Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng, 288.

60. State Council Information Office, "Zhongguo de yatai anquan hezuo zhengce" [China's policies on Asia-Pacific security cooperation], January 11, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2017-01/11/content_5158864.htm<http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/nd/2017/document/999798/999798.htm> (accessed April 8, 2022).

61. The nine EU member states that have not signed a memorandum of understanding on the Belt and Road Initiative with China are Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden.

62. The EU member states that are not members of the CEEC and have signed the memorandum of understanding are Austria, Cyprus, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, and Portugal.

63. "China Questions German Minister's 'One Europe' Comments," Associated Press, August 31, 2017, <https://apnews.com/article/89191e6f6lcc4f3cb9f3dabdal ea3bcf> (accessed April 9, 2022).

64. "China 'Shocked' by German FM's 'One Europe' Warning," CGTN, September 1, 2017,

https://news.cgtn.com/news/3359544e32557a6333566d54/share_p.html (accessed April 9, 2022).

65. *South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v People's Republic of China) (Award) (Permanent Court of Arbitration, July 12, 2016) [2013-19]*.

66. ASEAN, "Joint Communiqué of the 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting," July 24, 2016, [https:// asean.org/joint-communicue-of-the-49th-asean-foreign-ministersmeeting/](https://asean.org/joint-communicue-of-the-49th-asean-foreign-ministersmeeting/) (accessed April 9, 2022).

67. Xi, "Zhengque renshi he bawo zhong chang qi jingji shehui fazhan zhongda wenti."

68. "Xi Jinping xiang Yingguo 48 jia jituan julebu 'pobing zhe' 2022 xinchun qingzhu huodong zhi hedian" [Xi Jinping sends congratulatory messages to the 48 Group Club's 2022 new year celebration activities-the "icebreakers"], *Renmin ribao*, January 27, 2022, 1.

69. Jiping Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 9.

70. *Ibid.*, 22-23. See discussion in Chapter 1.

71. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng*, 288.

72. "Xi Jinping chuxi di qishiliu jie lianheguo dahui yiban xing bianlun bing fabiao zhongyao jianghua" [Xi Jinping attended the general debate of the 76th UN General Assembly and delivered an important speech], *Renmin ribao*, September 22, 2021, 1. See discussion in Chapter 6.

73. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng*, 60.

74. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan*, 449.

75. *Ibid.*, 42.

76. "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he Eluosi lianbang guanyu xin shidai guoji guanxi he quanqiu ke chixu fazhan de lianhe shengming" [Joint statement of the PRC and Russian Federation on the international relations entering a new era and the global sustainable development], *Renmin ribao*, February 5, 2022, 2. See also Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng*, 258-9. Xi rhetoric here matches neither his real belief in the tianxia system, which is inherently hierarchical, nor China's real foreign policy, which distinguishes small countries from great powers.

77. In making their argument Xi and the Party ignore the fact that as a veto-holding permanent member of the UN Security Council, China formally became one of the top five great powers in 1945, four years before the PRC itself was founded.

78. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan*, 448.

79. *Ibid.*

80. For example, Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng*, 305.

81. *Economy, The World According to China, 186-206.*
82. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan*, 448.
83. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng*, 254-5.
84. Jinping Xi, "Jianchi he wanshan renmin daibiao dahui zhidu, buduan fazhan quan guocheng renmin minzhu" [Persist in and improve the people's congress system and continuously develop whole-process people's democracy], *Renmin ribao*, October 15, 2021, 1.
85. Tsang and Cheung, "China's Global Strategy according to Xi Jinping Thought:."
86. "Xi Jinping zai zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhi ju di sanshi ci jiti xuexi shi qiangdiao jiaqiang he gajin guoji chuanbo gongzuo, zhanshi zhenshi liti quanmian de Zhongguo:."
87. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 8-9.
88. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan*, 514.
89. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 8-9.
90. Jinping Xi, "Xieshou jin zhuan hezuo yingdui gongtong tiaozhan" [Join hands for cooperation in BRICS to meet common challenges], *Renmin ribao*, September 10, 2021, 2.
91. Jinping Xi, "Zai Shanghai hezuo zuzhi chengyuan guo yuanshou lishi hui di ershiyi ci huiyi shang de jianghua" [Speech at the 21st meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization], *Renmin ribao*, September 18, 2021, 2.
92. Reuters, "China to Equip and Train Solomon Islands Police after Anti-China Unrest:." *Guardian*, December 24, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/24/china-to-equip-and-train-police-in-solomon-islands-after-unrest> (accessed April 9, 2022).
93. Jinping Xi, "Zai di er jie 'yidai yilu' guoji hezuo gaofeng luntan kaimu shi shang de zhuzhi yanjiang" [Keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation], *Renmin ribao*, April 27, 2019, 3.
94. This is in line with his domestic approach. Xi has successfully captured the political system in China and modified it to fit in with this thinking, transforming a consultative Leninist system that is based on a collective leadership into a Sino-centric consultative Leninist system based on himself as the strongman of China.
95. *The tianxia concept does not recognize or provide for bipolarity.*

نتیجه گیری

1. Xi, *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan*, 226. See Chapter 7.
2. See Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung*; Schram, *The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung*.

3. For the Liu Shaoqi case, see Dittmer, *Liu Shaoqi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, 79-92; for the Lin Biao case, see Qiu Jin, *The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989); and for the Hua Guofeng case, see Richard Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 37-65. Xi Thought's long-term vision goes only to 2050, just after the centenary of the founding of the PRC, when Xi will be 97. To date, Xi has not provided for his own mortality in Xi Thought.
4. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, *OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China*, August 31, 2022, <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assessment.pdf> (accessed September 1, 2022).
5. Zhao, "From Affirmative to Assertive Patriots:."
6. Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, and Christine Huang, "Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries;" Pew Research Center report, October 6, 2020, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-chinareach-historic-highs-in-many-countries/> (accessed June 25, 2022).

کتاب‌شناسی زبان و ادبیات چینی

Articles and Reports

- Alibaba Group. 2021. "Alibaba jituan touru 1,000 yi yuan renminbi zhuli gongtong fuyuu" [Alibaba group injects ¥100 billion to promote common prosperity]. September 3, <https://www.alibabagroup.com/cn/news/article?news=p210903>. Accessed February 4, 2022.
- China Institute of International Studies. 2020. "Xi Jinping waijiao sixiang yanjiu zhongxin chengli yishi chenggong juxing" [Inaugural ceremony of Xi Jinping Thought on diplomacy research center successfully launched]. China Institute of International Studies, July 21, http://www.ciiis.org.cn/2020-07/21/content_41227967.html. Accessed September 14, 2020.
- Dangjian yanjiu editorial office. 2017. "Zai dang de chuangxin lilun weida qizhi xia kuobu qianjin" [Stride forward under the great banner of the party's theoretical innovations]. *Dangjian yanjiu*, 7, 19-23.

- Wang, Yueli (. 3: ffi~). 2016. "Shuzi xia xiang: Nongcun jingzhun fupin zhong de jishu zhili" [Data going down to the countryside: Technical governance for targeted poverty alleviation in villages]. *Shehuixue yanjiu* 6, 119-42.
- Zheng, Bingwen (~*Jt). 2019. "Hou 2020 shiqi jianli wending tuopin chang xiao jizhi de sikad" [Thoughts on establishing a stable and effective mechanism for poverty alleviation in the long term in the post-2020 period]. *Hongguan jingji guanli* 9, 17-25.

Books

- CCP Central Party School Editorial Office. 2017. *Xi Jinping de qi nian zhiqing suiyue* [Xi Jinping's seven years as an educated youth]. Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe.
- Deng, Xiaoping. 1993. *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan di san juan* [Selected works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3]. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.
- Deng, Xiaoping. 1994. *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan di er juan* [Selected works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2]. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.
- Liu, Mingfu (xr! Y=Jffl), and Wang, Zhongyuan Wang (L'!', Ji£). 2017. *Xi Jinping sixiang* [Xi Jinping Thought]. London: New Classic Press.
- Xi, Jinping. 2014. *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng* [Xi Jinping: The governance of China]. Beijing: Waiwen chubanshe.
- Xi, Jinping. 2017. *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di er juan* [Xi Jinping: The governance of China, vol. 2]. Beijing: Waiwen chubanshe.
- Xi, Jinping. 2020. *Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng di san juan* [Xi Jinping: The governance of China, vol. 3]. Beijing: Waiwen chubanshe.
- Xi, Jinping. 2021. *Lun Zhongguo gongchandang lishi* [On the history of the Chinese Communist Party]. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe.
- Xu, Jiatun (iq: ~fit!). 1993. *Xu Jiatun Xianggang huiyilu (shang)* [Xu Jiatun's Hong Kong memoir, part I]. Taipei: Lianjing chubanshe.
- Zhongguo gongchandangjian shi [A brief history of the Chinese Communist Party]. 2021. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.

Book Chapters

- Xu, Lanjun. 2014. "Translation and Internationalism: • In Maas Little Red Book: A Global

History, edited by Alexander C. Cook, 76-95. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

News Sources

71.cn

12371.cn

Baidu

Bilibili

Bowen Press

CCTV

DW

Gov.en

Guancha

Huanqiu shibao

Ifeng.com

Jhsjk.people.cn

Jiefangjun baa

Jingji ribao

Marxists.org

Qiushi

Renmin ribao

Renmin ribao haiwang wang

Renminwang

Shanxi ribao

Shenzhen Securities Times

Sina

Sina.com.hk

Tengxun wang

The Mingjing Magazine

Thepaper.cn

Vision Times

Xiaoxiang chenbao

Xinhua

Xinjiang ribao

Xuexi shibao

Zhongguo qingnian baa

Zhongguo ribao

Zhongguo wang

Zhongguo xinwen wang

زبان و ادبیات انگلیسی

Articles and Reports

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 2016. "Joint Communiqué of the 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting: July 24, <https://asean.org/joint-communique-of-the-49th-asean-foreign-ministers-meeting/>. Accessed April 9, 2022.

Batke, Jessica. 2002. "A Vast Network of New Era Civilization Practice Centers' Is Beijing's Latest Bid to Reclaim Hearts and Minds: ChinaFile, January 31, <https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/features/vast-network-of-new-era-civilization-practice-centers-beijings-latest-bid>. Accessed February 14, 2022.

Broadhurst, Roderic, and Peng Wang. 2014. "After the Bo Xilai Trial: Does Corruption Threaten China's Future?" *Survival* 56, no. 3, 157-78.

Cai, Xia. 2021. "The Party That Failed: An Insider Breaks with Beijing: Foreign Affairs, January/February, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-12-04/chinese-communist-party-failed>. Accessed December 22, 2020.

Chang, Vincent K. L. 2021. "Recalling Victory, Recounting Greatness: Second World War Remembrance in Xi Jinping's China: China Quarterly 248, no. 1, 1152-73.

Chen, Stella. 2022. "Speaking Loud for Xi Jinping: China Media Project, May 18, <https://chinamediaproject.org/2022/05/18/speaking-loud-for-xi-jinping%E2%82%AC%91/>. Accessed May 27, 2022.

Cheung, Olivia. 2022. "Factional Model-Making in China: Party Elites' Open Political Contention in the Policy Process: China Quarterly 251, 705-25.

Chitwood, Matthew. 2020. "For China, Ending Poverty Is Just the Beginning: Foreign Affairs, November 19, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-11-19/china-ending-poverty-just-beginning>. Accessed May 30, 2021.

Couture, Victor, Faber, Benjamin, Gu, Yizhen, and Liu, Lizhi. 2021. "Connecting the Countryside via E-Commerce: Evidence from China: American Economic Review: Insights 3, no. 1, 35-50.

- Dawn-Hiscox, Tanwen. 2017. "China Grants Unigroup \$22bn to Boost Semiconductor Sector." *Data Center Dynamics*, March 30, <https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/china-grants-unigroup-22bn-to-boost-semiconductor-sector/>. Accessed May 3, 2022.
- Dollar, David. 2018. "Is China's Development Finance a Challenge to the International Order?" *Asian Economic Policy Review* 13, 283-98.
- Dreyer, June Teufel. 2015. "The 'Tianxia Trope': Will China Change the International System?" *Journal of Contemporary China* 24, no. 96, 1015-31.
- Fang, Lijie, and Huang, Chien-Chung. 2020. "Targeted Poverty Alleviation in China: Evidence from Jingdong E-Commerce Poverty Alleviation." *Poverty and Public Policy* 12, no. 4, 386-96.
- Golan, Jennifer, Sicular, Terry, and Umapathi, Nithin. 2017. "Unconditional Cash Transfers in China: Who Benefits from the Rural Minimum Living Standard Guarantee (dibao) Program?" *World Development* 93, 316-36.
- Goldstein, Avery. 2020. "China's Grand Strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance." *International Security* 45, no. 1, 164-201.
- Guo, Baogang. 2020. "A Partocracy with Chinese Characteristics: Governance System Reform under Xi Jinping." *Journal of Contemporary China* 29, no. 126, 809-23.
- Hawes, Colin, and Li, Grace. 2017. "Transparency and Opaqueness in the Chinese ICT Sector: A Critique of Chinese and International Corporate Governance Norms." *Asian Journal of Comparative Law* 12, no. 1, 41-80.
- Holbig, Heike. 2013. "Ideology after the End of Ideology: China and the Quest for Autocratic Legitimation." *Democratization* 20, no. 1, 61-81.
- Huang, Tianlei. 2021. "Rising SOE Defaults Alarm Investors but Could Benefit the Chinese Economy." *China Economic Watch Blog, Peterson Institute for International Economics*, January 29, <https://www.piie.com/blogs/china-economic-watch/risingsoe-defaults-alarm-investors-could-benefit-chinese-economy>. Accessed June 17, 2021.
- Human Rights Watch. 2019. "China's Algorithms of Repression: Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App." May 1, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass>. Accessed May 28, 2021.
- Human Rights Watch. 2021. "Dismantling Free Society: Hong Kong One Year after the National Security Law." June 25, <https://www.google.com/search?q=human+rights+>

- watch+hong+kong+national+security+law&rlz=ICLAWFC_enGB820GB820&oq=human+rights+watch+hong+kong+national+security+law&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i60.495l j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8. Accessed December 14, 2021.
- Hurley, John, Morris, Scott, and Portelance, Gailyn. 2019. "Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective: • *Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development* 3, no. 1, 139-75.
- Johnson, Christopher, Kennedy, Scott, and Qiu, Mingda. 2017. "Xi's Signature Governance Innovation: The Rise of Leading Small Groups: • *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, October 17, [csis.org/analysis/xis-signature-governance-innovation-rise-leading-small-groups](https://www.csis.org/analysis/xis-signature-governance-innovation-rise-leading-small-groups). Accessed December 22, 2020.
- Kania, Elsa B., and Laskai, Lorand. 2021. "Myths and Realities of China's Military-Civil Fusion Strategy: • *Center for a New American Security*, January 28, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/myths-and-realities-of-chinas-military-civil-fusion-strategy>. Accessed July 7, 2021.
- Kollner, Patrick. 2021. "Australia and New Zealand Recalibrate Their China Policies: Convergence and Divergence: • *Pacific Review* 34, no. 3, 405-36.
- Koss, Daniel. 2001. "Party Building as Institutional Bricolage: Asserting Authority at the Business Frontier: • *China Quarterly* 248, 222-43.
- Koty, Alexander Chipman. 2021. "More Regulatory Clarity after China Bans For-Profit Tutoring in Core Education: • *China Briefing*, September 27, <https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-bans-for-profit-tutoring-in-core-education-releases-guidelines-online-businesses/>. Accessed October 25, 2021.
- Lam, Willy. 2016. "Xi Jinping's Ideology and Statecraft: • *Chinese Law and Government* 48, no. 6, 409-17.
- Lampton, David M. 2015. "Xi Jinping and the National Security Commission: Policy Coordination and Political Power: • *Journal of Contemporary China* 24, no. 95, 759-77.
- Lardy, Nicholas R. 2019. "China's Private Firms Continue to Struggle: • *China Economic Watch Blog*, Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 24, <https://www.piie.com/blogs/china-economic-watch/chinas-private-firms-continue-struggle>. Accessed July 8, 2021.
- Lee, Hochul. 2010. "Political Institutionalization as Political Development in China: • *Journal of Contemporary China* 24, no. 65, 559-71.
- Li, Cheng. 2009. "Intra-Party Democracy in China: Should We Take It Seriously?" *China*

- Leadership Monitor* 3, November 23, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/intra-partydemocracy-in-china-should-we-take-it-seriously/>. Accessed September 20, 2019.
- Li, Cheng. 2012. "The End of the CCP's Resilient Authoritarianism? A Tripartite Assessment of Shifting Power in China: • *China Quarterly* 211, 595-623.
- Li, Ling. 2022. "The Muddled Case against Xi Jinping's Third Term: • *LSE China Dialogues* blog, March 31, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2022/03/31/the-muddled-case-against-xijinpings-third-term/>. Accessed May 19, 2022.
- Li, Nan. 2018. "Party Congress Reshuffle Strengthens Xi's Hold on Central Military Commission: • *China Brief*, February 26, <https://jamestown.org/program/party-congress-reshuffle-strengthens-xis-hold-central-military-commission/>. Accessed October 1, 2020.
- Liao, Xingmiu, Tsai, Wen-Hsuan, and Lin, Zheng-Wei. 2020. "Penetrating the Grassroots: First-Secretaries-in-Residence and Rural Politics in Contemporary China: • *Problems of Post-Communism* 67, no. 2, 169-79.
- Liu, Adam Y., Oi, Jean C., and Zhang, Yi. 2022. "China's Local Government Debt: The Grand Bargain: • *China Journal* 87, 40-71.
- Liu, Chuncheng. 2019. "Multiple Social Credit Systems in China: • *Economic Sociology* 21, no. 1, 22-32.
- Liu, Janet, and Ong, Larry. 2018. "The Rise and Fall of China's Domestic Security and Legal Affairs Apparatus: • *Sinoinsider*, July 4, 2018, <https://sinoinsider.com/2018/07/the-rise-and-fall-of-chinas-domestic-security-and-legal-affairs-apparatus/>. Accessed January 12, 2021.
- Liu, Ming. 2020. "Xi Jinping's Vision of a Community with a Shared Future for Humankind: A Revised International Order?" *National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) special report* 85, 13-23, <https://www.nbr.org/publication/xi-jinpings-vision-of-a-community-with-a-shared-future-for-humankind-a-revised-internationalorder/>. Accessed February 16, 2022.
- Lo, Kevin, and Wang, Mark. 2018. "How Voluntary Is Poverty Alleviation Resettlement in China?" *Habitat International* 73, 32-42.
- Luong, Ngor, Arnold, Zachary, and Murphy, Ben. 2021. "Understanding Chinese Government Guidance Funds: An Analysis of Chinese-Language Sources: • *Center for Security and Emerging Technology Issue Brief*, March, <https://cset.georgetown.edu/publ>

- ication/understanding-chinese-government-guidance-funds/. Accessed July 25, 2021.
- Marquardt, Andrew. 2022. "Shanghai Residents Scream Out from High-Rise Apartments as Lockdown Stretches into Second Week: ' Fortune, April 11, <https://fortune.com/2022/04/11/shanghai-lockdown-residents-screaming-apartments-covid/>. Accessed April 27, 2022.
- Mearsheirner, John. 2021. "The Inevitable Rivalry: America, China, and the Tragedy of Great-Power Politics: • Foreign Affairs, November/December, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-19/inevitable-rivalry-cold-war>. Accessed April 6, 2022.
- Miller, Alice. 2008. "The CCP Central Committee's Leading Small Groups: • China Leadership Monitor 26, September 2, <https://www.hoover.org/research/ccp-centralcommittees-leading-small-groups>. Accessed December 22, 2020.
- Miller, Alice. 2014. "More Already on the Central Committee's Leading Small Groups: • China Leadership Monitor 44, July 28, <https://www.hoover.org/research/more-alreadycentral-committees-leading-small-groups>. Accessed December 22, 2020.
- Nathan, Andrew J., and Zhang, Boshu. 2022. "'A Shared Future for Mankind': Rhetoric and Reality in Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping: • Journal of Contemporary China 31, no. 133, 57-71.
- Nice, Geoffrey, Vetch, Nick, Clark, Tim, Kaur, Raminder, Kumar, Parveen, Linch, David, Manji, Ambreena, Osler, Audrey, and Roe, Catherine. 2021. "Uyghur Tribunal Judgement: Summary Form: • Uyghur Tribunal, December 9, <https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Uyghur-Tribunal-Summary-Judgment-9th-Dec-21.pdf> Accessed December 14, 2021.
- Norton Rose Fulbright. 2017. "China Financial Services Regulation: Increased Supervision of Large-Sum and Suspicious Transactions: • January, <https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/278d4460/china-financial-services-regulation-increased-supervision-of-large-sum-and-suspicious-transactions>. Accessed May 4, 2022.
- O'Brien, Kevin J., and Han, Rongbin. 2009. "Path to Democracy? Assessing Village Elections in China: • Journal of Contemporary China 18, no. 60, 359-78.
- Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, "OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China: • August 31, 2022, <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/>

2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assessment. pdf Accessed Sept 1, 2022.

Pan, Fenghua, Zhang, Fangzhu, and Wu, Fulong. 2021. "State-Led Financialization in China: The Case of the Government-Guided Investment Fund." *China Quarterly* 247, 749-72.

Patapan, Haig, and Wang, Yi. 2018. "The Hidden Ruler: Wang Huning and the Making of Contemporary China." *Journal of Contemporary China* 27, no. 109, 47-60.

Pei, Minxin. 2015. "The Twilight of Communist Party Rule in China." *American Interest*, November 12, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/11/12/the-twilight-of-communist-party-rule-in-china/>. Accessed January 26, 2021.

Peters, Michael A. 2017. "The Chinese Dream: Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era." *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 49, no. 14, 1299-1304.

Pils, Eva. 2017. "From Independent Lawyer Groups to Civic Opposition: The Case of China's New Citizen Movement." *Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal* 19, no. 1, 110-52.

Qian, Gang. 2018. "China Discourse Report 2018." *China Media Project*, December 30, <https://chinamediaproject.org/2018/12/30/china-discourse-report-2018/>. Accessed September 23, 2020.

Qian, Gang. 2020. "Diplomatic Moves toward 'Xi Thought.'" *China Media Project*, July 27, <https://chinamediaproject.org/2020/07/27/diplomatic-moves-toward-xi-jinping-thought/>. Accessed September 23, 2020.

Ree, Erik van. 1993. "Stalin's Organic Theory of the Party." *Russian Review* 52, no. 1, 43-57.

Rogers, Sarah, Li, Jie, Lo, Kevin, Guo, Hua, and Li, Cong. 2020. "China's Rapidly Evolving Practice of Poverty Resettlement: Moving Millions to Eliminate Poverty." *Development Policy Review* 38, 541-54.

Ruser, Nathan, Leibold, James, Munro, Kelsey, and Hoja, Tilla. 2020. "Cultural Erasure." *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, September 24, <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cultural-erasure>. Accessed June 2, 2021.

Sapio, Flora. 2022. "The National Supervision Commission: A 'Subaltern History.'" *Modern China* 48, no. 4, 754-84.

S&P Global. 2021. "China's New Shadow Banking Rules Signal Fresh Push to Clamp Down Systemic Risk." June 16, <https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/china-s-new-shadow-banking-rules-signal-fresh-push-to-clamp-down>

- down-systemic-risk-65022047. Accessed May 4, 2022.
- Shambaugh, David. 2022. "Becoming a ganbu: China's Cadre Training School System: • *Journal of Contemporary China*, FirstView.
- Silver, Laura, Devlin, Kat, and Huang, Christine. 2020. "Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries: • Pew Research Center report, October 6, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reachhistoric-highs-in-many-countries/>. Accessed June 25, 2022.
- Strauss, Julia C. 2002. "Paternalistic Terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the PRC, 1950-1953:' *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44, no. 1, 80-105.
- Teng, Biao. 2019. "From 1989 to '1984': Tiananmen Massacre and China's High-Tech Totalitarianism:' *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations* 5, no. 2, 691-711.
- Thomas, Neil. 2022. "Ties that Bind: Xi's People on the Politburo:' *Macro Polo*, June 17, 2020, <https://macropolo.org/analysis/the-ties-that-bind-xi-people-politburo/>. Accessed May 31, 2022.
- Tsang, Steve. 2009. "Consultative Leninism: China's New Political Framework:' *Journal of Contemporary China* 18, no. 62, 865-80.
- Tsang, Steve. 2020. "From Japanese Colony to Sacred Chinese Territory: Taiwan's Geostategic Significance to China:' *Twentieth Century China* 45, no. 3, 351-68.
- Tsang, Steve. 2020. "Party-State Realism: A Framework for Understanding China's Approach to Foreign Policy:' *Journal of Contemporary China* 29, no. 122, 304-18.
- Tsang, Steve, and Cheung, Olivia. 2021. "Uninterrupted Rise: China's Global Strategy According to Xi Jinping Thought:' *Asan Forum* 9, no. 2, <http://www.theasanforum.org/uninterrupted-rise-chinas-global-strategy-according-to-xi-jinping-thought/> #20. Accessed March 3, 2021.
- Tsang, Steve, and Cheung, Olivia. 2022. "Has Xi Jinping Made China's Political System More Resilience and Enduring?" *Third World Quarterly* 43, no. 1, 225-43.
- Turcsanyi, Richard Q., Dubravcikova, Klara, Kironska, Kristina, Wang, Tao, locovozzi, James, Gries, Peter, Vasekova, Veronika, and, Chubb, Andrew. 2022. "Chinese Views of the World at the Time of the Russia-Ukraine War: Evidence from a March 2022 Public Opinion Survey:' *Palacky University Olomouc and Central European Institute of Asian Studies*, May 12, <https://ceias.eu/chinese-views-of-the-world-at-the-time-of-the-rus>

sia-ukraine-war/. Accessed June 11, 2022.

Vickers, Edward. 2021. "Smothering Diversity: Patriotism in China's School Curriculum under Xi Jin ping:' *Journal of Genocide Research* 24, no. 2, 158-70.

Wang, Hanjie, Zhao, Qiran, Bai, Yunli, Zhang, Linxiu, and Yu, Xiaohua. 2020. "Poverty and Subjective Poverty in Rural China:' *Social Indicators Research* 150, 219-42.

Wang, Mingming. 2012. "All Under Heaven (tianxia): Cosmological Perspectives and Political Ontologies in Pre-Modern China;' *HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory* 2, no. 1, 337-83.

Wang, Juan, and Mou, Yu. 2021. "The Paradigm Shift in the Disciplining of Village Cadres in China: From Mao to Xi:' *China Quarterly* 248, 181-99.

Wu, Guoguang. 2019. "The King's Men and Others: Emerging Political Ties under Xi Jinping: • *China Leadership Monitor*, June 1, <https://www.prcleader.org/wusummer>. Accessed May 31, 2022.

Xin, Ling. 2016. "China Reveals Plan to Build New National Labs: • *Bulletin of the Chinese Academy of Sciences*, January, https://english.cas.cn/bcas/2016_1/201604/P020160408589102642600.pdf Accessed May 3, 2022.

Yan, Xiaojun, and Huang, Jie. 2017. "Navigating Unknown Waters: The Chinese Communist Party's New Presence in the Private Sector: • *China Review* 17, no. 2, 37-63.

Yang, Jie. 2011. "The Politics of the dangan: Specialization, Spatialization, and Neoliberal Governmentality in China: • *Anthropological Quarterly* 84, no. 2, 507-33.

Yeo, Yukyung. 2016. "Complementing the Local Discipline Inspection Commissions of the CCP: Empowerment of the Central Inspection Groups: • *Journal of Contemporary China* 25, no. 97, 59-74.

Zeng, Qingjie. 2020. "Managed Campaign and Bureaucratic Institutions in China: Evidence from the Targeted Poverty Alleviation Program: • *Journal of Contemporary China* 29, no. 123, 400-415.

Zenz, Adrian. 2019. "Thoroughly Reforming Them towards a 'Healthy Heart Attitude': China's Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang: • *Central Asian Survey* 38, no. 1, 102-28.

Zenz, Adrian. 2021. "Coercive Labor and Forced Displacement in Xinjiang's CrossRegional Labor Transfers: A Process-Oriented Evaluation: • *Jamestown Foundation*, March, <https://jamestown.org/product/coercive-labor-and-forced-displacement-inxinjiangs-cross-regional-labor-transfer-program/>. Accessed May 30, 2021.

- Zhang, Han, Chen, Huirong, and, Wang, Jishu. 2019. "Meritocracy in Village Elections: The 'Separation of Election and Employment' Scheme in Rural China: • *Journal of Contemporary China* 28, no. 119, 779-94.
- Zhao, Suisheng. 2021. "From Affirmative to Assertive Patriots: Nationalism in Xi Jinping's China: • *Washington Quarterly* 44, no. 4, 141-61.
- Zhao, Suisheng. 2022. "Top-Level Design and Enlarged Diplomacy: Foreign and Security Policy Making in Xi Jinping's China: • *Journal of Contemporary China* 32, no. 139, 73-86.
- Zhang, Yongjin, and Buzan, Barry. 2012. "The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice: • *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 5, 3-36.

Books

- Ang, Yuen Yuen. 2020. *Chinas Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Baum, Richard. 1994. *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bougon, François. 2018. *Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Brundsgaard, Kjeld Erik. 2017. *Chinese Authoritarianism as Fragmented Authoritarianism: Earthquakes, Energy and Environment*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Brown, Kerry. 2018. *Chinas Dream: The Culture of Chinese Communism and the Secret Sources of its Power*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Brown, Kerry. 2022. *Xi: A Study in Power*. London: Icon.
- Chan, Alfred L. 2022. *Xi Jinping: Political Career, Governance, and Leadership, 1953-2018*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cheung, Olivia. 2023. *Factional-Ideological Conflicts in Chinese Politics: To the Left or to the Right?* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Dickson, Bruce. 2003. *Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dikotter, Frank. 2016. *The Cultural Revolution: A People's History, 1962-1976*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Dittmer, Lowell. 1998. *Liu Shaoqi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Doshi, Rush. 2021. *The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Eagleton, Terry. 1991. *Ideology: An Introduction*. London: Verso.
- Economy, Elizabeth. 2019. *The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State* (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Economy, Elizabeth C. 2021. *The World According to China*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Fairbank, John King. 1968. *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Fewsmith, Joseph. 2013. *The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fewsmith, Joseph. 2021. *Rethinking Chinese Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fitzgerald, John. 2022. *Cadre Country: How China Became the Chinese Communist Party*. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
- Foot, Rosemary, and Walter, Andrew. 2011. *China, the United States, and Global Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Guo, Xuezh. 2019. *The Politics of the Core Leader in China: Culture, Institution, Legitimacy, and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hamilton, Clive, and Ohlberg, Mareike. 2021. *Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party Is Reshaping the World*. London: Oneworld Publications.
- Jin, Qiu. 1989. *The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Kerr, David. 2015. *China's Many Dreams: Comparative Perspectives on China's Search for National Rejuvenation*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lam, Willy. 2015. *Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, Reform, or Retrogression?* Oxford: Routledge.
- Lam, Willy. 2020. *The Fight for China's Future: Civil Society vs. the Chinese Communist Party*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Li, Cheng. 2016. *Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Li, Nan. 2021. *Civil-Military Relations in Post-Deng China*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lin, Chun. 2006. *The Transformation of Chinese Socialism*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Mac; aes, Bruno. 2020. *Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order*. London: Hurst & Company.

- McGregor, Richard. 2019. *Xi Jinping: The Backlash*. Melbourne: Penguin Books.
- Minzner, Carl. 2018. *End of an Era: How China's Authoritarian Revival Is Undermining Its Rise*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nathan, Andrew J., and Scobell, Andrew. 2012. *China's Search for Security*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Ross, Robert S., and Bekkevold, Jo Inge (eds.). 2016. *China in the Era of Xi Jinping: Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Saich, Tony. 2021. *From Rebel to Ruler: One Hundred Years of the Chinese Communist Party*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Saunders, Philip C., Ding, Arthur S., Scobell, Andrew, Yang, Andrew N. D., and Wuthnow, Joel (eds.). 2019. *Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.
- Schram, Stuart. 1963. *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*. New York: Praeger.
- Schram, Stuart. 1989. *The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shambaugh, David. 2008. *China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Shambaugh, David. 2016. *China's Future*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Wright, Teresa. 2018. *Popular Protest in China*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Tsang, Steve. 2007. *Governing Hong Kong: Administrative Officers from the Nineteenth Century to the Handover to China, 1862-1997*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Tsang, Steve, and Men, Honghua (eds.). 2016. *China in the Xi Jinping Era*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Xi, Jinping. 2014. *The Governance of China*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
- Xi, Jinping. 2017. *The Governance of China II*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
- Xi, Jinping. 2020. *The Governance of China III*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
- Xu, Zerong. 2022. *Sulian aoyuan Ju gong dangan [Archive of the Soviet Union's Assistance to the Chinese Communist Party]*. Hong Kong: Xiafeier chub an youxian gongsi.
- Yang, Jisheng. 2012. *Tombstone: The Untold Story of Mao's Great Famine*. London: Allen Lane.
- Zhao, Suisheng. 2004. *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Zhou, Shaojie, and Hu, Angang. 2021. *China: Surpassing the "Middle Income Trap."*

Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.

Book Chapters

McFadden, Joel, Fassler, Kim, and Godby, Justin. 2019. "The New PLA Leadership: Xi Molds China's Military to His Vision: • In *Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms*, edited by Philip C. Saunders, Arthur S. Ding, Andrew Scobell, Andrew N. D. Yang, and Joel Wuthnow. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 557-82.

Miller, Alice. 2008. "Institutionalization and the Changing Dynamics of Chinese Leadership Politics: • In *China's Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy*, edited by Cheng Li. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 61-79.

Schubert, Gunter, and Heberer, Thomas. 2021. "State-Business Relations under Xi Jinping: Steering the Private Sector and Private Entrepreneurs: • In *Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping: The Future Political Trajectory*, edited by Arthur S. Ding and Jagannath P. Panda. Oxford: Routledge, 105-30.

Wibowo, Ignatius, and Fook, Lye Liang. 2006. "China's Central Party School: A Unique Institution Adapting to Changes: • In *The Chinese Communist Party in Reform*, edited by Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Zheng Yongnian. London: Routledge, 139-56.

News Sources

Asia Financial

Asia Times

Associated Press

BBC

Bloomberg News

Caijing

Caixin

CGTN

China Daily

Chinafile

CNBC

CNSNews

DW

Financial Times

Global Times

Gov.hk

Guardian

Hong Kong Free Press

NikkeiAsia

New York Times

Radio France International

Radio Free Asia

Reuters

South China Morning Post

The Times

Wall Street Journal

Xinhua

Xuexi.cn

BIBLIOGRAPHY 269



نمایه

۱۲۰، ۱۲۴، ۱۳۰، ۱۳۲، ۱۳۳، ۱۴۸، ۱۵۶،	اتباع چینی، ۷۴، ۲۰۳
۱۵۷، ۱۶۰، ۱۶۶، ۱۶۸، ۱۷۳، ۱۷۵، ۱۸۶،	اتکا به خود، ۴۰، ۶۴، ۱۵۷، ۱۷۴
۱۸۷، ۱۹۱، ۱۹۹، ۲۱۸، ۲۲۳، ۲۲۵، ۲۲۶،	اجبار اقتصادی، ۲۴۲
۲۲۷، ۲۲۸، ۲۲۹، ۲۳۱، ۲۳۹، ۲۴۴، ۲۵۰،	آزادسازی، ۹۰، ۱۱۵، ۱۲۸، ۱۵۸
۲۵۱، ۲۵۳، ۲۵۸، ۲۶۳	آسیا، ۲۲۰، ۲۳۶، ۲۳۹
امنیت اقتصادی، ۱۵۶، ۱۵۷، ۱۶۶، ۱۷۳،	آسیا و اقیانوسیه، ۲۳۶
۱۸۶، ۱۸۷	آسیای مرکزی، ۲۱۸، ۲۲۵، ۲۳۶
امنیت داخلی، ۱۰۷	اصلاحات اقتصادی، ۱۸، ۱۱۶
امنیت دولتی، ۱۰۴، ۱۰۷، ۱۲۴، ۱۳۲، ۲۶۳،	اصلاحات سیاسی، ۲۱، ۱۱۶، ۲۰۸
امنیت سایبری، ۱۰۳، ۱۰۵	افکار عمومی، ۲۸، ۴۰، ۶۰، ۶۴، ۱۳۴،
امنیت سیاسی، ۸۰، ۱۳۲، ۲۲۶	۱۹۵، ۲۱۳، ۲۳۰، ۲۵۱، ۲۵۲، ۲۶۰
امنیت مالی، ۱۶۸	اقتدارگرایی، ۲۱، ۴۰، ۲۴۱، ۲۴۳، ۲۶۱
اندیشه مائوتسه تونگ، ۲۷	اقتصادی، ۱۸، ۲۱، ۲۲، ۲۴، ۲۷، ۲۸، ۳۴،
انضباط سیاسی، ۹۴، ۱۵۶	۵۱، ۵۵، ۵۶، ۵۸، ۶۰، ۶۱، ۶۳، ۶۴، ۶۸،
انقلاب‌های رنگی، ۲۴۲	۷۴، ۹۳، ۱۰۰، ۱۰۳، ۱۰۴، ۱۱۱، ۱۱۵،
اهرم‌های اقتصادی، ۲۳۸، ۲۳۹	۱۱۸، ۱۲۴، ۱۲۵، ۱۲۸، ۱۳۰، ۱۳۱، ۱۵۵،
ایدئولوژی، ۱۳، ۱۸، ۱۹، ۲۷، ۲۹، ۳۱، ۳۳،	۱۵۶، ۱۵۷، ۱۵۸، ۱۵۹، ۱۶۰، ۱۶۳، ۱۶۷،
۳۶، ۳۷، ۳۸، ۴۰، ۴۸، ۵۶، ۶۴، ۶۸، ۶۹،	۱۶۹، ۱۷۳، ۱۷۴، ۱۷۶، ۱۷۷، ۱۷۹، ۱۸۱،
۹۱، ۱۰۶، ۱۱۸، ۱۲۰، ۱۲۲، ۱۲۳، ۱۹۵،	۱۸۲، ۱۸۴، ۱۸۶، ۱۸۷، ۱۸۸، ۲۰۸، ۲۱۱،
۲۰۰، ۲۰۱، ۲۱۰، ۲۴۸، ۲۴۹، ۲۵۰، ۲۵۳،	۲۱۹، ۲۲۱، ۲۲۵، ۲۳۱، ۲۳۴، ۲۳۶، ۲۳۷،
۲۵۴، ۲۵۵، ۲۵۶، ۲۵۷، ۲۶۰، ۲۶۴، ۲۶۵،	۲۳۹، ۲۴۰، ۲۴۲، ۲۴۳، ۲۴۵، ۲۵۸، ۲۵۹،
ایدئولوژی اولیه، ۱۹، ۲۷، ۹۱	۲۶۳، ۲۶۶
ایدئولوژی دولت، ۲۰، ۳۳، ۳۸، ۴۰، ۲۴۹،	اقلیت‌های قومی، ۲۸، ۱۳۳، ۱۳۶، ۱۳۷،
۲۶۴	۱۳۸، ۱۴۷، ۱۵۳، ۱۹۸، ۲۱۴
ایدئولوژی دولتی، ۲۰، ۳۳، ۳۸، ۴۰، ۲۴۹،	امنیت، ۲۸، ۲۹، ۳۴، ۴۱، ۵۹، ۶۲، ۶۳، ۷۱،
۲۶۴	۷۴، ۸۰، ۹۳، ۹۹، ۱۰۱، ۱۰۳، ۱۰۵، ۱۰۷،

- اینترنت، ۶۱، ۱۱۵، ۱۱۷، ۱۳۸، ۱۶۱، ۱۶۲، ۲۱۳، ۲۴۱
- بازار، ۲۰، ۲۲، ۲۸، ۹۹، ۱۰۰، ۱۱۵، ۱۲۸، ۱۵۵، ۱۵۶، ۱۵۷، ۱۵۸، ۱۶۶، ۱۶۷، ۱۶۹، ۱۷۰، ۱۷۴، ۱۷۶، ۱۸۰، ۱۸۲، ۱۸۳، ۲۰۲، ۲۵۱، ۲۵۸
- بحران مالی جهانی، ۱۲۹، ۱۷۴
- بخش خصوصی، ۶۱، ۱۱۱، ۱۱۳، ۱۵۸، ۱۶۷، ۱۶۸، ۱۷۲، ۱۸۵، ۲۵۹
- برابری طلبی، ۱۴۷، ۲۲۶
- برنامه پنج‌ساله چهاردهم، ۱۷۷
- برنامه پنج‌ساله سیزدهم، ۱۵۰
- بوروکراسی، ۲۳، ۸۷، ۹۵
- پروتکل‌های سیاسی، ۸۱
- پوچ‌گرایی تاریخی، ۲۰۴
- تاریخ چین باستان، ۳۶
- تجارت، ۷۷، ۱۲۵، ۱۴۵، ۱۵۷، ۱۶۹، ۱۷۱، ۲۲۱، ۲۳۴، ۲۳۵، ۲۳۷، ۲۳۸، ۲۳۹، ۲۴۰، ۲۴۱، ۲۵۹
- تجربه فنگ کیائو، ۱۳۵
- تحقق، ۱۹، ۲۰، ۳۳، ۴۱، ۵۰، ۵۱، ۷۰، ۸۴، ۱۱۸، ۱۲۷، ۱۲۹، ۱۳۷، ۱۵۲، ۱۵۳، ۱۷۶، ۱۸۳، ۱۹۲، ۱۹۴، ۱۹۶، ۲۰۰، ۲۱۸، ۲۲۹، ۲۳۰، ۲۴۲، ۲۴۴، ۲۴۷، ۲۵۰، ۲۵۳، ۲۵۴، ۲۵۵، ۲۶۰، ۲۶۵
- تدریس خصوصی، ۲۰۲
- تلقین ایدئولوژیک، ۲۷، ۶۹، ۸۲، ۸۴، ۲۱۱
- تمدن چین، ۳۷، ۶۴، ۱۲۰، ۱۲۳
- تمرکز قدرت، ۲۰، ۲۳، ۴۰، ۸۸، ۹۶، ۱۰۶، ۱۱۰، ۱۳۶
- توسعه، ۲۲، ۲۸، ۳۲، ۳۳، ۳۴، ۳۷، ۴۵، ۴۶، ۴۸، ۴۹، ۵۱، ۵۲، ۶۰، ۶۳، ۶۴، ۱۰۰، ۱۰۴، ۱۰۵، ۱۱۳، ۱۱۶، ۱۱۷، ۱۱۸، ۱۲۰، ۱۲۶، ۱۲۸، ۱۲۹، ۱۳۱، ۱۳۲، ۱۴۱، ۱۵۰، ۱۵۵، ۱۵۶، ۱۵۷، ۱۵۹، ۱۶۱، ۱۶۴، ۱۶۵، ۱۶۹، ۱۷۱، ۱۷۴، ۱۷۵، ۱۷۹، ۱۸۰، ۱۸۱، ۱۸۶، ۱۸۷، ۱۹۲، ۱۹۳، ۲۰۵، ۲۱۴، ۲۲۴، ۲۳۱، ۲۳۴، ۲۴۲، ۲۳۹، ۲۴۳، ۲۴۸، ۲۴۹، ۲۵۹
- تولید ناخالص داخلی، ۱۰، ۱۲۸، ۱۲۹، ۱۴۸، ۱۵۶، ۱۶۳
- تیان آن من، ۱۳۰
- تیناشیا، ۲۹، ۲۱۷، ۲۱۸، ۲۱۹، ۲۲۲، ۲۲۳، ۲۲۴، ۲۲۵، ۲۲۶، ۲۲۹، ۲۳۷، ۲۴۳، ۲۴۵، ۲۵۵، ۲۶۲
- جامعه مدنی، ۱۱، ۲۴، ۱۱۴
- جانشینی رهبری، ۲۲، ۶۱، ۹۷، ۹۸
- جداسازی، ۲۸، ۱۷۶، ۲۳۹، ۲۵۹، ۲۶۳
- جناح‌گرایی، ۸۱
- جنگ سرد، ۱۱۷، ۲۲۳، ۲۴۰
- جنوب جهان، ۲۴۳، ۲۴۵
- جهانی‌شدن، ۶۸، ۲۶۳
- جهش بزرگ به جلو، ۲۰۴، ۲۶۶
- جوان‌سازی ملی، ۲۰، ۳۲، ۳۶، ۶۳، ۹۱، ۱۲۵، ۱۲۷، ۲۱۸

حزب، ۱۰، ۱۳، ۱۵، ۱۶، ۱۷، ۱۹، ۲۰، ۲۱، ۲۲، ۲۳، ۲۴، ۲۷، ۲۸، ۲۹، ۳۱، ۳۲، ۳۳، ۳۴، ۳۵، ۳۶، ۳۷، ۳۸، ۳۹، ۴۰، ۴۱، ۴۲، ۴۳، ۴۴، ۴۵، ۴۶، ۴۷، ۴۸، ۵۰، ۵۲، ۵۳، ۵۴، ۵۵، ۵۶، ۵۷، ۵۸، ۵۹، ۶۰، ۶۱، ۶۲، ۶۳، ۶۴، ۶۵، ۶۷، ۶۸، ۶۹، ۷۰، ۷۱، ۷۲، ۷۳، ۷۴، ۷۵، ۷۶، ۷۷، ۷۸، ۷۹، ۸۰، ۸۱، ۸۲، ۸۳، ۸۴، ۸۵، ۸۶، ۸۷، ۸۸، ۸۹، ۹۰، ۹۱، ۹۲، ۹۳، ۹۴، ۹۵، ۹۶، ۹۷، ۹۸، ۹۹، ۱۰۰، ۱۰۱، ۱۰۲، ۱۰۳، ۱۰۴، ۱۰۵، ۱۰۶، ۱۰۷، ۱۰۸، ۱۰۹، ۱۱۰، ۱۱۱، ۱۱۲، ۱۱۳، ۱۱۴، ۱۱۵، ۱۱۶، ۱۱۷، ۱۱۸، ۱۱۹، ۱۲۰، ۱۲۱، ۱۲۲، ۱۲۳، ۱۲۵، ۱۲۶، ۱۲۷، ۱۲۸، ۱۲۹، ۱۳۰، ۱۳۱، ۱۳۲، ۱۳۴، ۱۳۵، ۱۳۶، ۱۳۷، ۱۳۹، ۱۴۰، ۱۴۳، ۱۴۴، ۱۴۶، ۱۴۸، ۱۴۹، ۱۵۰، ۱۵۱، ۱۵۲، ۱۵۳، ۱۵۶، ۱۵۸، ۱۶۷، ۱۷۱، ۱۷۲، ۱۷۳، ۱۷۴، ۱۷۵، ۱۷۶، ۱۷۹، ۱۸۵، ۱۸۶، ۱۸۷، ۱۸۹، ۱۹۰، ۱۹۱، ۱۹۲، ۱۹۳، ۱۹۴، ۱۹۵، ۱۹۶، ۱۹۷، ۱۹۸، ۱۹۹، ۲۰۰، ۲۰۲، ۲۰۳، ۲۰۴، ۲۰۵، ۲۰۶، ۲۰۷، ۲۰۸، ۲۰۹، ۲۱۰، ۲۱۱، ۲۱۳، ۲۱۴، ۲۱۵، ۲۱۶، ۲۱۸، ۲۱۹، ۲۲۲، ۲۲۴، ۲۲۶، ۲۲۷، ۲۲۸، ۲۲۹، ۲۳۰، ۲۳۱، ۲۳۲، ۲۳۳، ۲۴۲، ۲۴۳، ۲۴۷، ۲۴۹، ۲۵۱، ۲۵۲، ۲۵۳، ۲۵۴، ۲۵۵، ۲۵۶، ۲۵۷، ۲۵۸، ۲۵۹، ۲۶۰، ۲۶۱، ۲۶۲، ۲۶۳، ۲۶۴، ۲۶۵، ۲۶۶، حزب کمونیست، ۱۰، ۱۳، ۱۵، ۱۶، ۲۰، ۲۱، ۲۲، ۲۳، ۲۷، ۲۸، ۳۱، ۳۲، ۳۳، ۳۵

جیانگ زمین، ۱۷، ۱۹، ۲۲، ۳۱، ۳۴، ۴۲، ۴۶، ۶۱، ۶۸، ۷۱، ۷۹، ۸۵، ۹۷، ۱۰۳، ۱۱۱، ۱۱۲، ۱۲۸، ۱۳۱، ۱۳۶، ۱۸۶، ۲۲۷، جندقطبی، ۲۲۶، ۲۳۵، ۲۴۶، ۲۶۳، چهار اعتمادیه نفس، ۱۴۶، چهار آگاهی، ۴۷، ۵۴، ۱۱۳، ۱۴۶، ۱۹۷، چهار جامع، ۴۹، چین محور، ۲۰، ۲۸، ۲۲۲، ۲۲۶، چینی، ۱۱، ۱۳، ۱۵، ۱۷، ۲۰، ۲۴، ۲۷، ۲۹، ۳۳، ۳۴، ۳۶، ۳۷، ۳۸، ۴۱، ۴۲، ۴۴، ۴۸، ۴۹، ۵۰، ۵۳، ۵۴، ۵۷، ۵۹، ۶۴، ۷۶، ۷۸، ۸۳، ۸۴، ۸۶، ۹۱، ۹۴، ۹۶، ۱۰۰، ۱۰۱، ۱۰۲، ۱۰۶، ۱۰۹، ۱۱۳، ۱۱۴، ۱۱۶، ۱۱۸، ۱۱۹، ۱۲۰، ۱۲۱، ۱۲۲، ۱۲۳، ۱۲۶، ۱۳۶، ۱۴۶، ۱۴۷، ۱۵۰، ۱۵۳، ۱۶۰، ۱۶۲، ۱۶۷، ۱۶۹، ۱۷۰، ۱۷۳، ۱۷۷، ۱۸۹، ۱۹۰، ۱۹۲، ۱۹۳، ۱۹۴، ۱۹۵، ۱۹۶، ۱۹۷، ۱۹۸، ۲۰۰، ۲۰۱، ۲۰۵، ۲۰۶، ۲۰۷، ۲۰۸، ۲۱۰، ۲۱۱، ۲۱۴، ۲۱۵، ۲۱۸، ۲۱۹، ۲۲۲، ۲۲۵، ۲۲۹، ۲۳۲، ۲۳۳، ۲۳۴، ۲۴۲، ۲۴۴، ۲۴۷، ۲۴۹، ۲۵۰، ۲۵۲، ۲۵۳، ۲۵۴، ۲۵۹، ۲۶۰، ۲۶۱، ۳۲۵، ۳۶۵، چینی سازی، ۳۶، ۳۷، ۹۶، ۱۲۱، ۱۲۳، ۱۳۷، ۱۴۷، ۱۹۸، ۲۰۶، ۲۴۹، حاکمیت، ۲۲، ۴۱، ۵۰، ۶۹، ۷۶، ۸۸، ۹۱، ۹۹، ۱۰۵، ۱۱۲، ۱۱۴، ۱۹۹، ۲۰۶، ۲۲۰، ۲۲۹، ۲۳۱، ۲۴۰، ۲۴۱، ۲۴۴

۱۶۵، ۱۷۶، ۱۷۷، ۱۷۹، ۱۸۲، ۱۸۳، ۱۸۴،
۱۸۵، ۱۸۶، ۱۸۷، ۱۹۳، ۲۱۳، ۲۲۱، ۲۲۵،
۲۵۷، ۲۶۰

رفاه مشترک، ۴۹، ۵۱، ۱۳۶، ۱۶۵، ۱۷۶،
۱۷۷، ۱۷۹، ۱۸۲، ۱۸۳، ۱۸۴، ۲۲۱، ۲۵۷،
۲۶۰

رهبر، ۱۳، ۱۴، ۱۵، ۱۹، ۲۰، ۲۲، ۲۳، ۲۷،
۲۹، ۳۲، ۴۱، ۴۴، ۵۵، ۶۲، ۶۳، ۶۹، ۷۱،
۷۷، ۸۰، ۹۰، ۹۱، ۹۲، ۹۴، ۹۸، ۹۹، ۱۰۲،
۱۲۲، ۱۲۷، ۱۲۸، ۱۴۷، ۱۵۳، ۱۵۹، ۱۸۸،
۲۰۷، ۲۱۰، ۲۱۴، ۲۲۲، ۲۲۶، ۲۲۷، ۲۳۸،
۲۴۰، ۲۴۴، ۲۴۶، ۲۴۷، ۲۴۸، ۲۴۹، ۲۵۰،
۲۵۱، ۲۵۳، ۲۶۱

رهبری جمعی، ۶۱، ۶۲، ۷۱، ۸۵، ۹۱، ۹۳،
۹۶، ۹۷، ۹۸، ۹۹، ۱۰۹، ۱۲۲، ۱۳۶، ۲۴۸،
۲۵۰، ۲۵۲، ۲۵۶، ۲۶۵، ۲۶۶

رهبری حزب، ۱۷، ۲۰، ۲۸، ۳۷، ۳۹، ۴۰،
۵۰، ۵۴، ۶۰، ۶۳، ۶۴، ۷۶، ۸۳، ۸۷، ۹۰،
۹۴، ۹۶، ۱۰۰، ۱۰۲، ۱۰۳، ۱۰۶، ۱۰۸،
۱۰۹، ۱۱۲، ۱۱۴، ۱۱۶، ۱۱۸، ۱۲۱، ۱۲۳،
۱۳۲، ۱۴۶، ۱۴۷، ۱۴۹، ۱۵۳، ۱۸۳، ۱۹۰،
۱۹۱، ۱۹۴، ۲۰۰، ۲۰۶، ۲۰۸، ۲۱۳، ۲۱۵،
۲۱۶، ۲۲۷، ۲۲۹، ۲۳۱، ۲۵۹

رهبری مرکزی، ۹۳، ۱۰۴، ۱۰۵،
رؤیای چین، ۱۸، ۲۰، ۲۸، ۲۹، ۳۳، ۳۸،
۴۱، ۵۰، ۵۶، ۵۹، ۶۲، ۶۳، ۶۴، ۸۴، ۹۲،
۹۳، ۹۹، ۱۲۳، ۱۲۵، ۱۲۷، ۱۳۲، ۱۵۳،
۱۷۶، ۱۷۷، ۱۸۶، ۱۹۰، ۱۹۲، ۱۹۵، ۲۰۷

۳۷، ۳۹، ۴۰، ۴۱، ۴۲، ۴۳، ۴۴، ۴۵، ۴۶،
۴۷، ۴۸، ۵۲، ۵۳، ۵۷، ۶۰، ۶۱، ۶۴، ۶۷،
۶۹، ۷۱، ۷۲، ۷۴، ۷۵، ۷۸، ۸۱، ۸۲، ۸۴،
۸۶، ۸۷، ۸۹، ۹۳، ۹۶، ۹۷، ۱۰۱، ۱۰۵،
۱۰۸، ۱۰۹، ۱۱۰، ۱۱۶، ۱۱۷، ۱۱۸، ۱۱۹،
۱۲۰، ۱۲۱، ۱۲۳، ۱۲۵، ۱۲۶، ۱۲۸، ۱۴۶،
۱۴۸، ۱۵۲، ۱۹۰، ۱۹۱، ۱۹۸، ۲۰۳، ۲۰۷،
۲۱۴، ۲۱۹، ۲۲۲، ۲۲۷، ۲۴۲، ۲۴۳، ۲۵۱،
۲۵۲، ۲۵۳، ۲۵۴، ۲۶۶

حزب مشروعیت، ۷۱
حزب سازی، ۵۰، ۶۷، ۷۰، ۷۱، ۸۵، ۹۰،
۱۳۱، ۱۴۶، ۲۰۲، ۲۵۶

حقوق بشر، ۲۲، ۱۱۴، ۱۴۷، ۱۹۹، ۲۲۱،
۲۳۱، ۲۴۰، ۲۴۱، ۲۴۲، ۲۵۷
دانشگاهی، ۱۱، ۱۳، ۲۴، ۱۹۴، ۱۹۵

دموکراسی درون حزبی، ۲۳، ۶۱، ۸۱، ۹۸
دنگ شیائوپینگ، ۱۷، ۱۸، ۲۰، ۲۳، ۳۱،
۴۱، ۶۱، ۶۸، ۸۰، ۸۵، ۹۵، ۹۷، ۱۲۲، ۱۲۵،
۱۲۷، ۱۳۰، ۱۳۱، ۱۵۲، ۱۵۶، ۲۱۵، ۲۲۷،
۲۴۵، ۲۴۷

دوقطبی، ۲۳۵، ۲۴۶
دیسپورای چینی، ۱۸۹، ۱۹۳، ۲۱۴، ۲۱۵
رژیم های لنینستی، ۲۲

رشد اقتصادی، ۳۶، ۶۰، ۶۳، ۱۲۸، ۱۳۱،
۱۵۶، ۱۵۷، ۱۶۶، ۱۷۴، ۱۸۱، ۱۸۲، ۱۸۶،
۲۲۷، ۲۳۸، ۲۵۱، ۲۵۲
رفاه، ۳۴، ۴۹، ۵۱، ۱۰۱، ۱۰۸، ۱۲۷، ۱۲۵،
۱۲۸، ۱۲۹، ۱۳۰، ۱۳۶، ۱۴۶، ۱۵۰، ۱۵۷

- صندوق، ۱۶۲، ۱۶۳، ۱۶۴، ۲۳۹، ۲۴۰
- ضد انحصار، ۱۷۲، ۱۷۶
- ضد فقر، ۱۱، ۱۲۶، ۱۲۷، ۱۳۱، ۱۳۶، ۱۳۷، ۱۳۹، ۱۴۰، ۱۴۱، ۱۴۵، ۱۴۶، ۱۴۷، ۱۴۸، ۱۴۹، ۱۵۰، ۱۵۱، ۱۸۴، ۲۶۰
- عمل‌گرایی، ۱۸، ۳۱، ۳۵، ۱۵۷، ۲۳۸، ۲۵۶، ۲۵۷
- فرمالیسم، ۱۴۴، ۲۵۷
- فرهنگ، ۱۴، ۲۸، ۲۹، ۴۹، ۵۱، ۶۴، ۹۱، ۱۲۱، ۱۳۱، ۱۳۳، ۱۹۱، ۲۱۲، ۲۱۳، ۲۲۵، ۲۶۰، ۲۵۸
- فرهنگ چینی، ۱۴، ۲۲۵
- فرهنگ قهرمان، ۱۹۱
- قانون، ۱۷، ۲۰، ۲۲، ۳۳، ۳۵، ۳۶، ۴۵، ۴۷، ۴۸، ۵۰، ۷۶، ۸۰، ۸۳، ۸۸، ۹۲، ۹۶، ۱۰۱، ۱۰۲، ۱۰۵، ۱۰۷، ۱۱۲، ۱۱۴، ۱۳۱، ۱۳۲، ۱۳۳، ۱۷۶، ۱۸۹، ۱۹۸، ۱۹۹، ۲۰۰، ۲۳۱، ۲۴۳، ۲۴۷، ۲۵۶، ۲۶۳، ۲۶۴
- قانون اساسی حزب، ۱۷، ۲۰، ۳۳، ۳۵، ۴۷، ۴۹، ۵۰، ۸۳، ۹۶، ۱۰۲، ۱۳۱، ۲۴۷، ۲۵۶
- قانون‌گرایی، ۴۰، ۴۱، ۸۸
- قدرت اقتصادی، ۲۸، ۶۳، ۶۴، ۱۵۵، ۱۵۸، ۱۵۹، ۲۴۶، ۲۵۱، ۲۶۳، ۲۶۶
- قدرت بزرگ، ۲۱، ۲۴، ۵۰، ۵۲، ۱۵۹، ۲۲۷، ۲۳۲
- قدرت نرم، ۵۱، ۶۴، ۲۶۲
- قرارداد اجتماعی، ۲۸، ۶۳، ۱۲۶، ۱۲۷، ۱۲۹، ۱۳۰، ۱۳۲، ۱۳۴، ۱۳۶، ۱۳۷، ۱۴۱
- ۲۱۸، ۲۲۳، ۲۳۲، ۲۳۸، ۲۴۴، ۲۴۷، ۲۵۱
- ۲۵۳، ۲۵۵، ۲۶۰، ۲۶۴، ۲۶۵
- ریسک‌های مالی، ۱۶۳، ۱۶۷
- ژائو زیانگ، ۹۵
- ژائو لجی، ۴۲
- ژجیانگ، ۴۸، ۱۳۵، ۱۴۵، ۱۵۷، ۱۷۶
- ۱۷۷، ۱۷۹، ۱۸۰، ۱۸۲، ۱۸۳، ۱۸۴، ۱۸۵
- ژو یونگ کانگ، ۷۲، ۷۷، ۸۰، ۹۲
- ساخت چین ۲۰۲۵، ۱۰
- سازمان‌های بین‌المللی، ۲۱۹، ۲۲۰، ۲۴۰، ۲۴۱
- سازمان‌های غیر حزبی، ۹۴، ۹۵، ۱۱۱، ۱۱۲
- سرمایه خصوصی، ۱۶۳، ۱۶۸، ۱۸۵
- سرمایه‌داری، ۱۱۵، ۱۱۶، ۱۱۷، ۱۵۸، ۱۸۱، ۱۸۵، ۲۰۹، ۲۱۰، ۲۱۵
- سنتی، ۳۷، ۵۶، ۶۴، ۷۸، ۱۲۳، ۱۴۷، ۱۶۵، ۲۱۲، ۲۲۳، ۲۲۶، ۲۲۷، ۲۳۸، ۲۴۵
- سوسیالیسم چین محور، ۳۶، ۱۹۱
- سوسیالیسم کلاسیک، ۱۸۵، ۱۸۶
- شرق آسیا، ۱۰، ۲۹، ۶۸، ۲۱۸، ۲۱۹، ۲۲۳
- شرکت‌های خصوصی، ۱۱۱، ۱۱۲، ۱۴۵، ۱۴۶، ۱۵۶، ۱۵۸، ۱۶۷، ۱۶۸، ۱۶۹، ۱۷۲، ۱۸۵، ۱۸۷، ۲۱۳، ۲۵۹
- شرکت‌های دولتی، ۵۲، ۷۳، ۸۵، ۸۷، ۱۱۲، ۱۱۳، ۱۱۵، ۱۳۹، ۱۵۸، ۱۶۷، ۱۶۸، ۱۶۹، ۱۷۳، ۱۸۱، ۱۸۲، ۱۸۵، ۲۵۹
- شهروند چینی، ۲۹، ۱۳۴، ۱۸۹، ۲۱۴

- گروه‌های کوچک رهبری مرکزی، ۹۴، ۹۸، ۱۰۲، ۱۰۳، ۱۲۳
- لنینیست، ۳۸، ۹۰، ۱۵۶، ۲۵۲
- لنینیسم، ۱۳، ۱۸، ۱۹، ۲۷، ۲۸، ۲۹، ۳۵، ۳۶، ۳۷، ۳۸، ۴۰، ۴۱، ۴۹، ۵۹، ۶۰، ۶۱، ۶۲، ۶۳، ۶۴، ۹۶، ۱۱۸، ۱۱۹، ۱۲۰، ۱۲۱، ۱۲۳، ۱۵۶، ۲۱۵، ۲۴۹، ۲۵۰، ۲۵۱، ۲۵۲، ۲۵۳، ۲۶۵
- لنینیسم مشورتی، ۱۳، ۱۹، ۲۹، ۵۹، ۶۰، ۶۱، ۶۲، ۶۳، ۶۴، ۱۲۰، ۱۲۳، ۲۵۰، ۲۵۱، ۲۵۳، ۲۵۲
- لی کچیانگ، ۱۶، ۱۳۶
- لیبرال دموکراسی، ۱۱۹
- لینگ جی هوا، ۷۹
- ماکائو، ۱۳۳، ۱۹۹، ۲۱۴
- مائو تسه تونگ، ۳۳، ۳۴، ۳۶، ۵۹، ۶۹
- مداخله بشردوستانه، ۲۲۱، ۲۴۱، ۲۴۵
- مدرسه مرکزی حزب، ۳۵، ۴۳، ۴۷، ۴۸، ۱۰۸، ۲۳۲
- مشاوران، ۱۹۳، ۱۹۵
- مشروعیت، ۲۲، ۶۴، ۷۲، ۸۷، ۹۰، ۱۰۰، ۱۰۲، ۱۱۰، ۱۱۶، ۱۲۰، ۱۲۲، ۱۲۳، ۱۳۰، ۱۳۱، ۱۵۱، ۱۵۷، ۱۹۱، ۲۲۲، ۲۲۷، ۲۲۹، ۲۴۲، ۲۴۹، ۲۵۱، ۲۶۰
- مشروعیت رژیم، ۹۰، ۱۵۷
- مشروعیت عملکرد، ۱۳۱، ۱۵۱
- مصرف، ۱۲۶، ۱۷۴، ۱۷۷، ۱۸۲
- معلمان، ۵۲، ۸۷، ۱۹۳، ۲۰۳، ۲۱۰
- ۱۴۳، ۱۴۷، ۱۵۱، ۱۵۲، ۱۵۷، ۱۹۱، ۱۹۷، ۲۵۹
- قوانین و مقررات درون‌حزبی، ۸۳، ۸۹، ۱۱۰
- قوانین و هنجارهای بین‌المللی، ۲۲۲، ۲۴۰، ۲۴۱
- کشورهای درحال توسعه، ۱۱۵، ۲۲۳، ۲۳۴، ۲۳۵، ۲۳۹، ۲۴۰، ۲۴۳، ۲۵۵
- کمپین، ۱۱، ۲۹، ۴۲، ۴۶، ۶۸، ۷۲، ۷۳، ۸۶، ۹۲، ۱۲۶، ۱۲۷، ۱۳۶، ۱۳۷، ۱۳۸، ۱۳۹، ۱۴۰، ۱۴۱، ۱۴۲، ۱۴۴، ۱۴۵، ۱۴۶، ۱۴۷، ۱۴۸، ۱۴۹، ۱۵۰، ۱۵۲، ۱۸۹، ۱۹۰، ۲۰۸، ۲۴۹
- کمیته دائمی، ۱۵، ۲۱، ۴۲، ۶۳، ۷۲، ۷۶، ۷۷، ۷۸، ۸۰، ۸۱، ۸۳، ۸۶، ۹۸، ۱۰۲، ۱۹۴، ۱۹۹، ۲۵۶
- کمیته دائمی دفتر سیاسی، ۱۵، ۴۲
- کمیته مرکزی، ۱۶، ۴۲، ۴۳، ۴۷، ۵۴، ۵۷، ۵۸، ۶۲، ۷۹، ۸۱، ۸۵، ۹۸، ۱۰۲، ۱۰۶، ۱۰۷، ۲۰۸، ۱۳۷، ۱۲۰، ۱۰۷
- کمیته مرکزی هجدهم، ۴۷
- کمیسیون نظارت ملی، ۱۱۰، ۱۷۲
- کمیسیون نظامی مرکزی، ۴۱، ۲۲۸
- کنگره نوزدهم حزب، ۲۱، ۲۲، ۴۷، ۴۸، ۷۷، ۸۰، ۱۳۱، ۱۷۳، ۲۱۰، ۲۴۷
- کنگره هجدهم حزب، ۴۲، ۴۸، ۷۷، ۸۶
- کووید-۱۹، ۱۴۰، ۱۷۳، ۱۷۴، ۱۹۳
- گروه علی‌بابا، ۵۲، ۱۷۲

ملی گرایي، ۳۷، ۶۰، ۶۸، ۱۱۹، ۱۵۳، ۱۵۷، ۱۶۰، ۱۸۶، ۱۸۹، ۱۹۰، ۱۹۶، ۲۲۶	ملی، ۴، ۲۰، ۲۳، ۲۸، ۳۵، ۳۷، ۴۰، ۴۱، ۴۲، ۴۳، ۴۹، ۵۱، ۵۴، ۵۶، ۵۸، ۵۹، ۶۰، ۶۲، ۶۴، ۶۵، ۷۱، ۷۸، ۸۲، ۸۷، ۸۹، ۹۲، ۹۶، ۹۹، ۱۰۰، ۱۰۲، ۱۰۴، ۱۰۵، ۱۰۷، ۱۱۱، ۱۱۳، ۱۱۴، ۱۱۵، ۱۱۶، ۱۱۷، ۱۱۹، ۱۲۲، ۱۲۵، ۱۲۹، ۱۳۲، ۱۳۳، ۱۳۷، ۱۳۸، ۱۴۶، ۱۴۷، ۱۴۹، ۱۵۱، ۱۵۵، ۱۵۷، ۱۶۰، ۱۶۳، ۱۶۴، ۱۶۵، ۱۶۶، ۱۶۸، ۱۷۲، ۱۷۶، ۱۷۷، ۱۷۸، ۱۸۶، ۱۹۰، ۱۹۲، ۱۹۶، ۱۹۹، ۲۰۰، ۲۰۱، ۲۰۶، ۲۰۷، ۲۱۲، ۲۱۵، ۲۱۸، ۲۱۹، ۲۲۳، ۲۲۷، ۲۲۸، ۲۲۹، ۲۳۱، ۲۴۱، ۲۴۳، ۲۴۴، ۲۴۹، ۲۵۱، ۲۵۳، ۲۵۵، ۲۶۱، ۲۶۴، ۲۶۵
منافع ملی اصلی، ۲۳۱	
مؤسسات مالی، ۱۵۶، ۱۶۶، ۱۶۸، ۱۶۹	
نظارت، ۳۹، ۴۳، ۴۸، ۵۲، ۶۰، ۶۴، ۷۲، ۷۳، ۷۵، ۷۷، ۸۴، ۸۵، ۸۶، ۸۷، ۹۵، ۱۰۱، ۱۰۶، ۱۰۷، ۱۲۰، ۱۳۴، ۱۳۵، ۱۴۶، ۱۵۰، ۱۵۳، ۱۶۹، ۱۷۰، ۱۷۲، ۱۷۵، ۱۸۲، ۱۸۴، ۲۰۱، ۲۰۳، ۲۵۱، ۲۵۲، ۲۵۹، ۲۶۰	
نظریه دنگ شیائوپینگ، ۳۴، ۴۸	
نظم اقتصادی، ۱۵۶، ۱۵۷، ۱۶۶	
نظم بازار، ۱۶۶، ۱۷۱، ۱۸۲	
نظم بین‌المللی لیبرال، ۲۲۲، ۲۴۴، ۲۴۵	

The Political Thought of Xi Jinping

By

Steve Yui-Sang Tsang & Olivia Cheung

Translated By

Rahmat Hajimineh

Ahmad Ghasemi

Mohammad Reza Hatamvand

